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ABSTRACT 
 
SUNNISM VERSUS SHI’ISM? 
RISE OF THE SHI’I POLITICS AND OF THE OTTOMAN APPREHENSION  
IN LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY IRAQ 
Yaslıçimen, Faruk 
M.A., Department of History 
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Oktay Özel 
July 2008 
 
The resurgence of religious political activism had predominantly been one of 
the foremost themes of structural transformations among societies during the 
nineteenth century. The major characteristic regarding the history of religion in the 
Middle Eastern context was a bilateral process, that of the mobilization of society 
and of the consolidation of organized social movements followed by a subsequent 
process of politicization. As for the Iraqi region, the influence of Shi’ism increased 
over certain segments of society thus “the spread of Shi’ism” primarily meant the 
increased activity and organization of Shi’i communities, which increased their 
weight in political spectrum rather than the magnitude of “the spread” itself. 
There were internal and external reasons for the rise of Shi’i politics. On the 
one hand, the intensifying governmental cohesion over the very segments of society 
during the process of centralization deeply influenced the existing social structure 
through dislocating various populations and many large tribal confederations. On the 
 iv
other hand, the rise of Usulism at the expense of the Akhbari interpretation of the 
Shi’i jurisprudence generated an innovative tendency, stimulating the Shi’i scholars 
to understand and interpret the worldly affairs in a different manner. It gave an 
impetus and a peculiar function to the position of Shi’i clerical notables, particularly 
the mujtahids, consolidating their authority in social as well as political matters. 
The growing influence of Shi’ism in the Iraqi region gave rise to Ottoman 
apprehension. As a common theme in the Ottoman official documentation, a strong 
emphasis was made upon the seriousness and urgency of “the spread of Shi’ism.” 
Ottoman officials embraced a policy of educational counter-propaganda to deal with 
the Shi’i Question. The major strategy, which they utilized, was not the use of 
forceful measures but the promotion of Sunni education through opening medreses 
and sending Sunni ulema to the Iraqi region. However, indoctrinating Sunnism at the 
expense of Shi’ism had much to do with the political unity and the social integrity of 
the empire rather than the pure religious motivation. 
This study further examines selected aspects of the social relations between 
Shi’is and Sunnis of Iraq in the late nineteenth century. However, the strong 
emphasis is made upon the relations between the Iraqi Shi’is and the Sunni Ottoman 
government drawing some conclusions on the antagonistic relations between 
governmental authorities and certain segments of Shi’i masses. This study also 
discusses a two-dimensional view developed by the Ottoman officials regarding 
Shi’ism and the Shi’is of Iraq, perceiving the former as a theological deviation from 
the “true” path of Islam and recognizing the latter as being similar to those of other 
local figures who made up the Iraqi society. 
 
Key words: Abdülhamid II, Shi’ism, Sunnism, Iraq, Iran, Ottoman, Mujtahid. 
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ÖZET 
 
ŞĐĐLĐĞE KARŞI SÜNNĐLĐK MĐ? 
GEÇ 19. YÜZYIL IRAK’TA ŞĐĐ SĐYASETĐNĐN YÜKSELĐŞĐ  
VE ARTAN OSMANLI ENDĐŞESĐ 
Yaslıçimen, Faruk 
Yüksek Lisans, Tarih Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Assist. Prof. Oktay Özel 
Temmuz 2008 
 
19. yüzyılda meydana gelen toplumsal dönüşümlerin önde gelen temalarından 
biri, din merkezli modern siyasi söylem ve eylemlerin yükselişi olmuştur. Genel 
itibariyle toplumsal mobilizasyon ve örgütlü hareketlerin tekamülünü, siyasallaşma 
süreçleri izlemiştir. Irak örneğinde ise Şiiliğin toplumun çeşitli katmanları üzerinde 
giderek artan nüfuzu, bu yapısal dönüşüm sürecinin bir parçasını teşkil etmektedir. 
Gerek döneme ilişkin tarih yazımı gerekse siyasi tartışmalarda bahsi geçen “Şiiliğin 
yükselişi” söylemi Şiiliğin fiili yayılışından ziyade böyle bir yapısal dönüşüm 
sürecine tekabül etmektedir. Başka bir ifadeyle, saygın Şii Müçtehidler etrafında 
kenetlenen Iraklı Şiiler artık siyasal alanda kayda değer bir ağırlık kazanmışlardır. 
Irak’ta Şii siyasetinin yükleşinin ardında yatan, yukarıda bahsettiğimiz 
konjektürel sebeble birlikte, iki temel sebep daha vardır. Bunlardan birincisi, 
Osmanlı imparatorluğunun merkezileşme çabaları kapsamında yürütülen iskan 
faaliyetlerinin toplumsal yapıda meydana getirdiği dalgalanmaların bıraktığı derin 
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tersirlerdir. Diğeri ise, Şii hukukunda meydana gelen bir dönüşüm olan Usuliliğin 
Ahbariliğe karşı kazandığı zaferi takiben müçtehidlik kurumunun tebarüz etmesidir. 
Zira böylelikle Şiilerin siyasete olan yaklaşımları değişmiş ve dünyevi meselere 
zamanla daha fazla müdahil olmaya başlamışlardır. 
Şii Müçtehidlerin Irak toplumu ve bölgesel siyaset üzerinde giderek artan 
etkisi, Osmanlı idarecilerinin bölgedeki devlet otoritesinin bekası konusunda ciddi 
kaygılar taşımalarına sebebiyet vermiştir. Đdarecilerin saplantı derecesine varan 
kaygıları devletin resmi yazışmalarında açıkça görülebilmektedir. Buna müteakip, 
devlet yetkilileri gerekli tedbirlerin alınması konusunda fikir birliğine varmış ve 
gerek konjektürel gerekse dini hassasiyetlerin tesiriyle Şii ulemaya karşı fiili güç 
kullanımdan ziyade Sünni eğitim faaliyetlerinin yoğunlaştırılmasına karar 
vermişlerdir. Ne var ki, bölegede Sünniliğin güçlendirilmesi salt dini bir mesele 
olmaktan çok siyasi bir zaruret olarak telakki edilmiştir. 
Bu çalışmanın ilerleyen bölümlerinde geç 19. yüzyılda Irak’ta yaşayan Şii ve 
Sünniler arasında cereyan eden bazı toplumsal ilişki örnekleri de irdelenmektedir. 
Tarih yazımında iddia edildiğinin aksine, Irak’lı Şiiler ve Sünniler arasında toplumsal 
alanda bir takım sıkıntılar olmakla birlikte ciddi bir çatışma yoktur. Zira husumetvari 
meseleler çoğunlukla Osmanlı tebası olmayan Şiiler ve Osmanlı hükümet memurları 
arasında yaşanmaktadır. Bunlarla birlikte bu çalışmanın son bölümü, hayli karmaşık 
bir ilişkiler ağını da çözümlemeye teşebbüs eder ve özellikle Osmanlı idarecilerinin 
Şiiliğe ve Şiilere karşı geliştirdiği iki farklı bakışı inceler. Osmanlılar Şiiliğe karşı 
tahkir edici bir söylem geliştirmelerine ve her fırsatta bu mezhebi “itikâd-ı bâtıla” 
olarak zikretmelerine karşın Şiileri Irak toplumunu oluşturan diğer öğelerle eşdeğer 
telakki etmişler hatta Yezidi, Şii ve Bektaşileri idari kadrolarına da tayin etmişlerdir. 
Anahtar Sözcükler: 2. Abdülhamid, Sünnilik, Şiilik, Irak, Đran, Osmanlı, Müçtehid. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
During the five-years period of the U.S. occupation of Iraq, starting in March 
2003 and continue to the present, there have been reports of the communal strife 
between Shi’is and Sunnis of Iraq in the weekly journals, on televised news, and in 
the headlines of the daily newspapers. Thus, while reading Đran Ahkam Defterleri 
and trying to locate something worthy of analyzing with regard to the diplomatic 
relations between the Ottoman and Iranian governments, my curiosity was drawn to 
the social relations in the Iraqi region; the ever-intensifying social conflicts prompted 
me to research the past of the sectarian relations in nineteenth century Iraq. Indeed, 
as the primary sources of this historical study are the official documentation 
produced by either the Ottoman or the British administrators, the study turned out to 
be a research project focused mostly on the relations between the Shi’i masses and 
the Sunni Ottoman government and partly on the social relations between diverse 
communities of the Iraqi region. However, since contemporary historians seemed 
very much wed to the idea of Shi’i revival since the 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution, 
tracing back the historical roots of a current phenomenon and drawing teleological 
conclusions to find the roots of the current sectarian conflicts in the past seemed the 
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major bias in the field to overcome. Thus, the initial endeavor of this study was to 
understand and describe the events pertaining to the relations between Shi’is and 
Sunnis of Iraq. The next step was to catalog searches done at the Ottoman Prime 
Ministry Archives in Istanbul. Fortunately, the call numbers of the documents 
belonging mostly to the second half of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
were cataloged in the archive’s computer system with concise summaries. After 
researching some selected key words that might have related to the history of Iraq, 
many documents appeared whose numbers reached to the hundreds. Finally, I began 
to chronologically read, transliterate, and analyze these documents.  
During the process of archival research, one of the first issues regarding the 
Ottoman engagement in Iraq that significantly stood out was the uneven increase in 
the official documentation providing information about a rapid development termed 
“the spread of Shi’ism” dating from the last quarter of the nineteenth century. This 
unusual case inspired me to write the second chapter of this study, entitled 
“Ottomans and Iranians: Natural Enemies and Eternal Friends.” It predominantly 
developed into an endeavor of describing the traditional Ottoman bureaucratic 
mentality regarding the Iraqi region that came into being through the long history of 
religious and political conflicts between the Ottoman and Iranian governments. 
Particularly the chronological listing of the official documentation enabled me to 
have an insight into the traditional bureaucratic perspective of the Ottoman officials 
and then to recognize the sudden change of this stance by the Hamidian regime. 
Therefore, the second chapter came to present a plausible background for 
understanding the views of the Ottoman government on the Iraqi region, which had 
been the common frontier of both empires for centuries. 
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The Ottoman official documentation produced in the middle of the nineteenth 
century demonstrated that there were mainly three issues regarding the Ottoman 
engagement in Iraq: the repair of holy shrines, Friday Khutbes, and the Ottoman 
policy of reacquisition of lands. The repair of the holy pilgrimage sites and tombs in 
Iraq had been an important issue between the Ottoman and Iranian governments. The 
right to repair the Shi’i shrines was perceived by the rulers of both governments as a 
way of establishing or maintaining authority since serving the shrines had been the 
most effective means of gaining the legitimation and submission of the Shi’is of Iraq. 
Similarly, reading Khutbes in the name of the Sultans, as the traditional way of 
declaring sovereignty over a certain territory, became a source of imperial conflict 
between the Ottoman and Iranian governments. The last issue was the Ottoman 
efforts to retain peacefully the ownership of lands, which were gradually possessed 
by the Iranian Shi’i subjects. In general, this chapter provides an analysis of the 
traditional policies and power struggles between Iranian and Ottoman governments 
over the Iraqi region, which geographically and politically remained in the sphere of 
both empires. However, this study notes that the customary manner of struggle, that 
of reinstating the state authority over the Iraqi territory through prevention of 
possible governmental plans, attacks, or intrigues, changed remarkably since the 
early 1880s by the reign of Abdülhamid II. 
What was the reason behind this noticeable change? Was it the artificial 
creation of the Ottoman bureaucratic circles under the Hamidian regime, 
reformulating the perception of the Shi’i presence in a different way? Alternatively, 
was it an actual process, taking place in and changing the social fabric of the Iraqi 
society? The uneven increase in the Ottoman official documentation concerning the 
spread of Shi’ism gives an impression that the alteration of the political agenda was 
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not until the reign of Abdülhamid II whose policy of Pan-Islamism consequently 
brought about a new outlook to understand both the presence and the activities of 
Iraqi Shi’is. Since the paramount concern of the Hamidian regime, both to preserve 
the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire and to unite Muslims all around the 
world through espousing the universal ideology of Sunni Islam, was obvious, the 
first explanation seemed more sensible. The Pan-Islamist endeavor of the Hamidian 
regime in an environment of ever-growing western imperial colonialism gained an 
impetus to manage a global policy of Islamism. In this context, establishing secret or 
open relationships with the religious shaykhs located on an extended geography such 
as Turkistan, India, Africa, Japan, and China to propagate the Istanbul-centered Pan-
Islamism1 and monitoring the engagement of the Protestant missionaries in the 
Hawaiian Isles2 as well as watching the activities of Shi’i ulema in the Iraqi region 
had all received the similar attention from the Hamidian regime. However, the 
discourse of “the spread of Shi’ism” had further implications beyond that of being a 
mere bureaucratic invention. These considerations encouraged me to write the fourth 
chapter of this study on the “Shi’i Presence and the Spread of Shi’ism in Iraq in the 
late Nineteenth Century.”  
Yet, before introducing the fourth chapter, another issue, which distinctly 
emerged during the archival research and led me to write the third chapter of this 
study, should be first emphasized here. Archival research on the primary documents 
at the Ottoman Prime Ministry Archives and later at the British National Archives 
together raised a discrepancy and reinforced my nascent skepticism about “the spread 
                                                 
1
 See Đhsan Süreyya Sırma, II. Abdülhamid’in Đslam Birliği Siyaseti (Đstanbul: Beyan Yayınları, 2000). 
In this context, the indoctrination of Sunnism was a pragmatic policy aimed at achieving the 
straightforward submission of masses to the Ottoman Caliph. However, it is interesting to note why 
the Ottoman government did not prefer to endorse the anti-governmental predispositions in the Shi’i 
political tradition against the imperial forces but rather favored the spread of Sunnism. 
2
 See Selim Deringil, “An Ottoman View of Missionary Activity in Hawaii,” The Hawaiian Journal of 
History, Vol. 27 (1993). 
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of Shi’ism” in the historiography on the Shi’is of Iraq. The distinguished scholars of 
this field such as Yitzhak Naqash and Meir Litvak, whose works will be discussed 
throughout the relevant parts of the chapters, explained the spread of Shi’ism with 
the gradual transformations taking place in the social structures of the Iraqi society 
through a combination of various factors. The northward movements of large tribal 
confederations formerly inhabiting the middle and southern parts of the Arabian 
Peninsula, the forced migrations of the tribal populations, and the centralization 
policies of the Ottoman government, which arduously worked to provide the 
infrastructural facilities such as building the Hindiyya Canal and opening new lands 
for agricultural cultivation, all were significant transformational variables. These 
factors, along with others, were introduced by these historians as the most 
remarkable ones, which achieved the settlement of tribes and disentangled the 
nomadic tribal identity. The concurrent rise of Shi’ism accidentally fed this necessity 
by providing them a new identity; thus, Shi’ism spread very rapidly due to this 
sociological transformation. However, this scheme seemed very oversimplified since 
my research at both the archives clearly demonstrated that the customary and 
unending tribal conflicts constituted one of the most important problems of the Iraqi 
region throughout the nineteenth century. Therefore, the third chapter came to 
present a concise critique and reconsideration of the historiography on the history of 
Iraqi Shi’is, questioning the chain of reasoning of the above-mentioned 
argumentation and finally suggesting a revised conclusion. The critique is not a total 
rejection but rather a reformulation.  
Indeed, nineteenth century Iraq had witnessed serious social changes. One 
major impetus was the Tanzimat reforms, which aimed to restructure the Ottoman 
Empire administratively, economically, and socially. The most influential attempt for 
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the control over the provinces of Iraq was the application of the centralization 
policies, which were envisaged to achieve the settlement of tribes. Since the tribal 
life-style was customary, it was a reasonably arduous task for the Ottomans to 
realize. In the previous phases of the centralization attempts, the Ottoman authorities 
achieved first the integration of the unsettled elements into the political system in the 
form of direct conflict or cooperation, yet they never fully accomplished the 
settlement of tribes or disentangled their social structures. Although there was 
relative success in that some tribes gave up their customary way of living and 
adopted the sedentary life enjoying the privileges provided by the Ottoman Empire, 
the centralization issue remained a problematic even after the establishment of the 
Turkish Republic. Nevertheless, the centralization policies succeeded in the 
dislocation rather than the settlement of the tribes that eventually caused a certain 
sense of crisis among the tribal structures. Such a dislocation caused internal 
consolidation and homogenization of the tribal entities as well as provided the 
nominal adoption of Shi’ism by them. Thus, the constant struggle of the tribes 
residing Iraq embraced the anti-governmental motive in the Shi’i political tradition 
that discouraged the submission to any form of political authority in the absence of 
the Twelfth Imam. This furthered the dominant idea of disobedience in the Shi’i 
political tradition, thus penetrating into the political visions of the tribes and 
redressing the motivation of the tribal politics. However, this presumption is rather 
much more theoretical than being practical and remains exceptional. In general, both 
the nature and extent of this spread remained ambiguous; yet, there is still an effort to 
analyze the scale of the influence of this penetration in the concluding remarks of the 
fourth chapter. 
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The uneven change of the Ottoman bureaucratic mentality regarding the Shi’i 
presence in Iraq combined with the critical revision of the historiographical 
reconsiderations and encouraged me to write the fourth chapter of this study, which 
is about the centuries-old presence of Shi’is in and the spiritual importance of the 
Iraqi region. The chapter also aims to describe the social composition of the Iraqi 
society before discussing the nature and quality of “the spread of Shi’ism,” which is 
the focal point of this chapter. As a common theme in the Ottoman official 
documentation, a strong emphasis was made upon the seriousness and urgency of the 
spread of Shi’ism. At a certain point, the intensity and tone of the official 
documentation contradictorily both encourages the researcher about the certainty of 
the spread of Shi’ism as a historical event and discourages the researcher through 
revealing his doubts since the state’s intelligence over its subjects seems to be very 
inaccurate. Furthermore, there does not seem to be a clear reference concerning such 
a “spread,” except for a few touches in certain contemporary chronicles. There are 
other sources mentioning the spread of Shi’ism; however, the ambiguity 
overwhelms. Therefore, in the fourth chapter, I attempted to present an alternative 
approach to understand the spread of Shi’ism in the Iraqi region in the late nineteenth 
century.  
The fourth chapter, titled “Shi’i Presence and the Spread of Shi’ism in Iraq” 
is mainly an effort to contextualize the discourse of “the spread of Shi’ism” into a 
broader world-historical context of the late nineteenth century. It was both primarily 
the rise of Shi’i politics, not the spread of Shi’ism, that owed its emergence to the 
jurisprudential transformation in the Shi’i fiqh which resulted in the victory of 
Usulism and the transformations within the social structures which came into being 
through the interplay of the highly-complex and multi-faceted causes that all shared 
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the framework of modernity. Akhunds, mu’mins, and primarily the mujtahids, for 
instance, were rightly approached by the Ottoman officials as the effective agents of 
the rising Shi’i influence. The rise of Usulism at the expense of the Akhbari 
interpretation of the Shi’i jurisprudence generated an innovative tendency, 
stimulating the Shi’i scholars to understand and interpret the worldly affairs in a 
different manner. It gave an impetus and a peculiar function to the position of Shi’i 
clerical notables, consolidating their authority concerning the social as well as 
political matters. In this context, mujtahids began to be introduced as capable persons 
who could make jurisprudential judgments depending on their reason and 
consequently invoke authority over certain masses of people. Thus, the mujtahid 
consequently came to be a religious man as well as a political leader. 
The rise of Usulism and the subsequent rise of mujtahids shared a common 
historical context with the contemporary currents of Pan-Islamism, the Dreyfus 
Affair, the Zionist Movement, the Irish Question, the rise of Mahdi in Egypt, 
accelerated activities of Christian missionaries, and the rise of William Gladstone to 
prominence. It was a structural change in the public sphere during the nineteenth 
century whose major theme had predominantly been the religious revival. Therefore, 
the major characteristic regarding the history of religion in the Middle East was a 
bilateral process, that of the homogenization of society and the consolidation of 
organized social movements followed by a subsequent process of politicization. 
Therefore, it is the important suggestion of this thesis that although the influence of 
Shi’ism increased over the certain segments of the Iraqi society, the spread of 
Shi’ism primarily meant the increased activity and organization of the Shi’i 
communities, which increased their effectiveness and weight in the political 
spectrum rather than the magnitude of spread itself. 
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Under the title of “Education as an Ottoman Response to the Shi’i Question,” 
the fifth chapter discusses the Ottoman educational counter-propaganda against the 
spread of Shi’ism. Although this study argues that the spread of Shi’ism was nominal 
in character and mainly focused upon the consolidation of the Shi’i communities 
around the political-religious charisma of the mujtahids, Ottoman authorities 
perceived the spread of Shi’ism as a process of rapid conversion of great numbers of 
Sunni masses to Shi’ism. Since the urgent necessity of the Iraqi region was to quell 
the ongoing tribal warfare and to co-opt the considerable proportion of the Iraqi 
population that was Shi’is, Ottoman officials embraced a policy of educational 
counter-propaganda. The official documentation also reveals that the officials had 
also attached importance to the rule that correction of faith by sword was not allowed 
by the Islamic laws, thus they began an extensive counter-missionary activity 
through disseminating Sunnism. The generated policies aimed to break the influence 
of the Shi’i ulema in the Iraqi region. The major strategy, which they utilized, was 
the promotion of Sunni education through opening medreses and sending Sunni 
ulema to the region. However, the ulema were to be chosen from among those who 
were endowed with special qualities. “To correct the beliefs” had become the main 
motive of the Ottoman officials. Indeed, indoctrinating Sunnism at the expense of 
Shi’ism had much to do with the political unity and the social integrity of the empire 
rather than the recurrently expressed cliché of the official documentation as to 
‘correct the religion of its people.’ In fact, throughout the long history of the 
Ottoman Empire, there have always been heterodoxies, and the Ottoman authorities 
either fought against or tolerated them, but the case in the late nineteenth century was 
unprecedented since the government embraced the policy of educating its subjects in 
a massive way and ideologically combined them with the outlook of the state. 
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The sixth chapter discusses selected aspects of the social relations between 
Shi’is and Sunnis of Iraq in the late nineteenth century, mostly depending on the 
official administrative documentations of the Ottoman and British governments. It 
also presents the Muharram Commemorations as the times in which sectarian social 
tensions grew stronger. The chapter further examines the relations between the Iraqi 
Shi’is and the Sunni Ottoman government, as it was discussed in-depth in the 
subsection of “the Samarra Incident,” which was given as the typical example of the 
increasing antagonism between the followers of Sunnism and Shi’ism in Iraq. 
However, a thorough analysis of the event reveals something different. Although the 
historiography introduced the social relations as very much blended with bigotry, 
antagonism, and unrest, it appears that social relations between the followers of the 
two sects were stable for the period under examination. However, the upheavals were 
between the Shi’i social groups and the Sunni Ottoman government rather than 
between Shi’is and Sunnis of Iraq. This complements the idea that the traditional 
political conflicts between the tribes and the governments might have gained a new 
vision through the adoption of the Shi’i political tradition of disobedience. Hence, 
the anti-governmental motive of the Shi’i tradition, which was kept alive since the 
early formations of Shi’i community, might have been replaced with their customary 
resistance to the Ottoman governmental authority. 
The seventh chapter explores the Ottoman treatment of Shi’is and the 
discourse generated by the Ottoman officials regarding the Shi’is of Iraq. The mode 
of Ottoman engagement in the Shi’is of Iraq seems highly complex. During the 
course of the nineteenth century, Ottoman officials developed a two-dimensional 
outlook regarding both the Shi’ism and the Shi’is of Iraq. On the ideological 
dimension, Ottomans perceived Shi’ism as a theological deviation from the true path 
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of Islam, thus a heretic belief whose followers could not be trusted anymore. On the 
historical dimension, Ottomans viewed the Iraqi Shi’is as being similar to that of 
other local figures who made up the Iraqi population, however, connected to the 
political ambitions of the Persian governments. The Ottoman authorities used an 
abusive discourse exclusively in their official documentation against Shi’ism as a 
branch of theology. It was recurrently expressed in the official documentation that 
the Shi’i belief was false and heretical whereby Shi’is could be potentially disloyal; 
however, Ottoman officials appointed Shi’is or Yezidis to their administrative 
offices. Similarly, the Ottoman authorities adopted two seemingly contradictory 
policies, that of gaining the goodwill and consent of the powerful Shi’i mujtahids and 
of taking necessary measures to prevent the spread of Shi’ism, which was sponsored 
by these Shi’i mujtahids. Therefore, this chapter aims to understand the complexities 
of the Ottoman perception and treatment of Shi’ism and Shi’is. 
 
Sources and Methodology 
This study was born out of a desire for analyzing a historical problematic with 
the methods of modern scholarship. Following the history-writing tradition at Bilkent 
University, I attached principal importance to the primary sources mostly produced 
by the Ottoman and British officials. However, both the overwhelming inaccuracy 
and uncertainty of the Ottoman and the British official documentation and the 
inherent bias of the administrators necessitated a critical stand. The official 
documentation seemed indispensable from one perspective, however, misleading 
from another. Therefore, the researcher needs an analytical compass in order to 
realize his position and to measure the reasonable limits of historical interpretation. 
The conjectural historical context, in this regard, works to dispose of the 
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irregularities and complexities of the historical information, if not totally sacrifices 
the reality. 
The British National Archives in London contains many useful registers 
concerning the history of Iraq. These registers were compiled through bringing 
together the internal and external official correspondences, periodical reports, and 
translations of important news from newspapers published for the time being. The 
content of these registers were mostly driven by the sources, which informs about the 
current events and reflecting the attitudes of the British Councilors. A significant 
remark for a researcher who wants to use these sources would be to remain vigilantly 
aware with regard to the transliteration of private names whether of persons or 
places. The names were recorded with varying differences. For instance, there are 
various versions of the transliteration of Basra such as Busrah, Bussorah, Bassarah, 
Basrah, and Basra. The same is true for Baghdad and Mosul provinces since these 
registers were inconsistently recorded the names as Bagdad or Baghdad, and for 
Mosul as Mossul, Mousul, or Mosul. Other examples of this inconsistency can be 
seen in the recorded names of people from Turkish, Persian, or Arabian origin. For 
instance, in a document, Müşir Fevzi Paşa, as it was written in Turkish, was recorded 
as “Fawzi Pasha,” while in another document as “Faouzee Pasha.” This was a natural 
result of phonetic translations of foreign names, which was possibly very well 
understood for the time being, however, needs the special attention of researcher. 
Therefore, many alternatives are necessary to be tried in order to reach the related 
documents. 
According to Christoph Herzog, the historical records kept in the British 
National Archives concerning the Ottoman administration in Iraq in the nineteenth 
century are less reliable due to the “turcophobic bias” described in the words of 
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Colonel A. Kemball as “the proverbial improvidence and mismanagement of Turkish 
Officials.”3 The scope of those sources are limited with the information obtained 
through scarce observations in the region, from abundantly gossip, institutional 
correspondences, personal network communication, and official correspondences 
between the British Consulate and the Ottoman provincial administration. Since the 
Ottoman government assumed the British presence to be dangerous in many senses, 
the channel of information was not always open for the British administrators to 
obtain from them. Although one of the major sources of information largely confined 
to gossip, however, the personal contacts of the British officials with the unofficial 
local notables of the Iraqi region is noteworthy and gives invaluable information 
about the intentions and political capabilities of local groups. 
Ottoman official documentation, on the other hand, gives unreliable 
information about the local situations. As it will be discussed in the fourth chapter of 
this study, the official reports dispatched to the imperial center give contradictory 
and misleading comments about the subject matters. The reflection of a similar 
problem can also be seen in the Ottoman administration of Albania. Isa Blumi argued 
that obtaining reliable information was a serious problem for the Ottoman central 
administrators since “Ottoman officials lacked the kind of intelligence-gathering 
resources and networking that the Catholic Church and the Austrian consul have 
much more reliable sources of information.”4 However, it is noteworthy to mention 
that there is an obvious change in the Ottoman official documentation since the reign 
of Abdülhamid II. The documents concerning the Iraqi region that were produced 
during the Hamidian period are better organized and more systematic when 
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compared to the ones produced during reigns of Sultan Abdülmecid and Sultan 
Abdülaziz. In addition, there is an evident increase in the numbers of produced 
documents during the Hamidian regime as well. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
OTTOMANS AND IRANIANS: NATURAL ENEMIES AND 
ETERNAL FRIENDS5 
 
 
Religious and non-religious motives together played decisive roles in shaping 
the political and military struggles between the Ottoman and Iranian Empires. These 
struggles were carried out in the lands of Azerbaijan, Eastern Anatolia, and Iraq, 
which together constituted a frontier zone from north to south. In the context of this 
study, Iraq occupied an important place in these struggles, both as representing a 
vital component of this frontier and as housing various diverse ethnic and religious 
communities. However, Iraq, where a concentrated Shi’i presence constituted a 
sizable proportion of the society in which the highly esteemed Shi’i education was 
developed, represented the utmost significance of this frontier regarding the imperial 
relations between Ottomans and Iranians. From the sixteenth century onwards, 
hence, Iraq remained a battleground between the Ottoman and the Safavid, and later 
the Qajar, Empires. 
                                                 
5
 I borrowed this highly explanatory title with a slight difference from an article by Gökhan Çetinsaya 
“Essential Friends and Natural Enemies: The Historical Roots of Turkish-Iranian Relations” Middle 
East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 3 (September 2003). Indeed, the Ottoman 
authorities used the term “natural enemy” in their official correspondences. As representing the 
governmental hostility, they called Iran “the natural enemy of the Iraqi region.” (Hıtta-i Irakiyyenin 
düşman-ı tabiiyyesi Iran devleti olub) BOA, Y.PRK.MK 4/80, 27/L/1306 (26 June 1889). 
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Baghdad, for instance, one of the most important cities in the region, changed 
hands three times between the Ottomans and the Safavids in one and a half centuries. 
It was “conquered only under Sultan Süleyman Kanuni in the mid-1530s [then], was 
lost again to Safavid Shah ‘Abbas in 1623 and reconquered by Murat IV in 1638.”6 
However, despite the fact that their control of the central Iraq was short, comprising 
“a mere forty-two years during the 220-year life span of the dynasty, Safavids never 
gave up their rhetorical and theoretical claim to Iraq.”7 Although Murat IV carried 
out “impressive campaigns against Erivan (1635) and Baghdad (1638-39), these 
areas were simply recaptured from the Safavids, and Erivan was held for less than a 
year.”8 The Safavids, just as the Ottomans, always looked for opportunities to 
recapture Iraq, as was the case through the negotiations of the extradition of Sultan 
Beyazid and during the rebellion of Uzun Ahmed against the Ottomans. 
Although the religious importance of the region was at stake, Iraq was also 
important for its geo-strategic position. Shah Ismail’s endeavor, for instance, to save 
Iraq from Akkuyunlu domination was less about religious commitment or ideological 
concerns to keep the holy shrines under his control and more about his attempt to 
consolidate his power in the region by eliminating potential rivals. It was rather the 
later historiography formed during the reigns of Shah Abbas I and Shah Abbas II that 
“related the military action to religious fervor.”9 According to Niewöhner-Eberhard, 
“the real focus of confrontation between the two parties was eastern Anatolia and 
western Azerbaijan. Iraq was significant because it constituted a commercial transit 
route between Europe and India.” The main character of the Ottoman-Safavid 
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relations was the “occupation without annexation” regarding the Iraq-i Arab in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.10 
Economic, political, strategic, and religious concerns were equally important 
in the struggle over Iraq. Iranian rulers, despite the official Shi’i creed being 
important to them, envisioned Iraq and its Shrines as an immanent part of their 
geography. Indeed, the effort was to invent a tradition that presented religious zeal as 
a driving force both inside and outside the Iranian territories. “Safavid engagement in 
Iraq-ı ‘Arab was naturally colored by the dynasty’s strong affinity with the region as 
an important source of Shi’i history, but it was, on balance, informed by caution and 
pragmatism more than by ideological commitment.”11 
Despite the weighty importance of non-religious motives, religious factors 
also played key roles in driving the two empires into political and military conflicts, 
particularly over the Iraqi region. From the sixteenth century onwards, the Ottoman 
Iranian political struggle “was at times as bitter as any struggle between Ottomans 
and the Christians of the dar-ul-harb, and the bitterness is reflected in the religious 
legitimation of the actions of the respective rulers.”12 The eastward expansion of the 
Ottoman Empire with the victory of Sultan Selim I against the Shi’i Safavids in 
1514, known as Çaldıran Muharebesi, and the subsequent conquests of Syria and 
Egypt enabled the Ottoman Empire to benefit from the immense and complex 
network of the Asian frontier. Three major cities of the region, namely Damascus, 
Jerusalem, and Cairo, in addition to the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, came under 
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Ottoman domination.13 These conquests gave some peculiar characteristics to the 
Ottoman Empire, which would come to shape the course of its future relations. 
Amongst these, inheritance of the caliphate, especially the being protector of Sunni 
Islam, was the most significant feature that added a unique dimension to the imperial 
struggles between these two empires.  
The Safavid Empire, on the other hand, though dependent upon the Turkic 
tribal forces, “was not a tribal confederacy on the usual lines, but a religious 
fraternity which made use of tribal links but could set them aside at need in favour of 
a higher calling.” Likewise, as it was a well-established fact, “the dynasty did not 
merely favour the Shi’ah; it seriously set about enforcing conversion to the Shi’ah 
upon the whole population.”14 The predominance of Twelver Shi’ism bestowed a 
unifying identity upon the people living on the lands ruled by the Safavids, although 
the price was enforced conversions. Furthermore, this situation created “a chronic 
hostility” in the political relations between the Ottomans and the Safavids and 
influenced the political alliances that were established with the Portuguese in the 
south and the Russians in the north against the Ottoman Empire.15 
The hostilities between the rulers of the two empires, along with other 
political and military factors, carried a religious dimension that was manifested in the 
policies applied to the frontier regions. Hence, one of the first acts of the rulers as the 
protectors of one denomination or the other was related to religious matters. The 
discourse of the letters written by Selim I in Persian and sent to Shah Ismail in 1514 
shows that the justification of the Ottoman Sultan was based on religious terms. In 
his letter, Selim wrote that:  
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The Ulema and our teachers of the law have pronounced death upon thee 
[Shah Ismail], perjurer, and blasphemer as thou art, and have laid upon every 
Mussulman the sacred duty of sacred arms for the defense of religion, and for 
the destruction of heresy and impiety in thy person and the persons of those 
who follow thee.16 
 
Hence, the forced conversions of the Iranian people to Shi’ism had created social 
hatred towards Shah Ismail. Thus, Toynbee noted that following the victory of 
Çaldıran, “Selim was able to enter Tabriz not merely as a conqueror but as a 
liberator; for his first act was to reconvert to the service of the Sunnah the mosques 
which had been arbitrarily converted to the service of the Shi’ah.”17 
In times of war as well as in times of peace, it was more difficult, particularly 
for the Persian pilgrims, to enter into the Ottoman lands for pilgrimage purposes. 
During the reign of Süleyman the Magnificent, for instance, Iranian pilgrims were 
not allowed access, despite the fact that an official firman issued by the same sultan 
guaranteed the access of every Muslim to Hijaz for pilgrimage.18 For the Ottomans, 
the visits of the Iranians, especially the high-ranking Iranian officials, were enough 
to raise suspicions about the political perils to come. They feared their possible 
contacts with the local powerful notables, whether religious or non-religious, who 
may collude with the Iranian Shah against the Ottoman Sultan. Hence, Shi’i pilgrims 
were urged to follow a longer and a more dangerous road to Mecca.19 These 
precautions were primarily taken against the Persian pilgrims, not against the 
Ottoman Shi’i subjects residing in Iraq or Bahrain. Permission for the Iranian Shi’i 
pilgrims to visit the holy shrines in Baghdad, Karbala, and Najaf was one of the 
articles of the Amasya Treaty signed between the Ottoman and the Safavid Empires. 
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It was a costly price paid by Shah Tahmasb to Süleyman the Magnificent and meant 
the recognition of Ottoman rule over Basra, Baghdad, Şehrizor, Van, Bitlis, Erzurum, 
Kars, and Atabegler.20 
As fostered by the customary and continuous visits of Iranian officials to 
Atabat, the ever-growing suspicions of Ottoman officials prolonged the fears of the 
Iranian threat over Iraq, which was geographically and politically in the sphere of 
Iran.21 Although, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, there were the factors 
that abated the hostility such as the expansion of European imperialism and the 
maintenance of Silk Road trade that the drew two empires closer,22 recurrent political 
and military conflicts sustained the suspicions of the two major powers in the region. 
In the eighteenth century, during the reign of Nadir Shah, who was known to be a 
great conqueror yet an enthusiastic but discontented ruler, struggles over the Iraqi 
region continued. “Even the second treaty of Erzurum that the Porte concluded with 
Iran in 1847 did not put an end to incidents on the border.”23 
In the course of diplomatic negotiations in around 1736 between the 
Ottomans and the Iranians during the reigns of Mahmut I and Nadir Shah, the 
recognition of the Caferi interpretation of Shi’ism as the fifth legitimate sect of Islam 
constituted one of the most important articles of the negotiations. The quest of Nadir 
Shah seemed sensible to the Ottomans since Prussia and Russia emerged as rival 
powers to the existing international system in the first half of the eighteenth century. 
Although Koca Râgıb Mehmed Pasha, the Reisülküttab at the time and later a 
powerful Sadrazam, insisted on the outward recognition of the Caferi sect, he yet 
proposed the application of Sunni Hanefi law in practice. However, the “official” 
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outlook of the Ottoman bureaucratic circles was very adamant, thus precluding the 
approval of Nadir Shah’s request.24 
 The historical chronicles kept the Safavid imagination and engagement with 
the Iraqi region alive from the sixteenth century onwards. Securing “the sacred 
geography”25 had been one of the central aspects of this engagement. In this regard, 
the narration of Khvandamir that was mostly written during the reign of Shah Ismail, 
yet completed in the beginning of the reign of Shah Tahmasb in 1524, deserves 
special attention. Khvandamir had devoted “two-and-a-half pages to Shah Ismail’s 
conquest of Baghdad, half of which is taken up by an account of pilgrimage the Shah 
performed to the ‘Atabat.”26 Furthermore, the visit of Shah Ismail to the holy shrine 
of Karbala was depicted very vividly: “The tomb draped with brocade and the walls 
and the pillars of the sanctuary with other precious cloth and the courtyard covered 
with the silk kilims” including the “twelve candle holders of pure gold devoted to the 
shrine and free meals distributed among visiting pilgrims and city’s residents.”27 
Similarly, Evliya Çelebi described the capture of Baghdad from the hands of 
Safavids during the reign of Sultan Süleyman the Magnificent. He particularly 
pointed out the Sunni shrine of Abdülkadir Geylânî, which was claimed to be 
deliberately defiled by the Shi’i governors of the city. Suraiya Farouqhi highlights 
the symbolic value of the tomb in political struggles between the Ottomans and the 
Safavids. The tomb had been appointed with various gifts donated by the Ottomans, 
while it was damaged by the Safevid administrators.28 Evliya further narrated that 
after the citadel of Baghdad was conquered by Süleyman and his soldiers, they first 
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adorned the towers of the citadel with Ottoman flags. Then they visited the tombs of 
Imam Azam ebu-Hanifa and Abdülkadir Geylânî, who symbolized Sunni Islam, 
which was defended by the Ottoman Empire. Immediately, the Sultan donated 
100,000 gold pieces to the lodging house (imaret) of Imam Azam. Afterwards, the 
Sultan continued by visiting the tombs of Kassâb Cömerd, Mûsâ Kâzım, Imam 
Hüseyin, and Imam Ali, son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad.29 
Sectarian outlooks played an influential role in shaping the imperial 
imaginations concerning the Iraqi region until the first decade of the twentieth 
century. Şemsettim Sami, for instance, the writer of the voluminous universal 
dictionary who lived two and a half centuries after Evliya Çelebi, emphasized the 
presence of the tombs of Imam Musa Kazim, Imam Azam ebu-Hanife, Imam Hanbel, 
Cüneyd, Şiblî, Ma’ruf Kerhî, and Abdülkadir Geylânî in the article “Baghdad,” as 
these tombs were the common symbols of the collective Sunni memory.30 
The implications of the geographical proximity and shared ethnic and 
religious complexities were also visible in the modern politics of the region. In 
September 1980, the Iraqi government explained the official reason behind its attack 
against Iran as being that of retaliating against “terrorist acts and sabotage by 
infiltrators who came in from Iran, by Iranian residents in Iraq, and by other people 
or Iranian origin, who set about committing a large number of murders and injuries 
from explosions.”31 Thus, the geographical proximity as well as the sectarian 
composition of the two countries have long been reasons for suspicion between the 
Iraqi and Iranian governments, if not tools for political maneuvers, from the early 
phases of confrontations until modern times. Although such imaginings continued, 
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the political struggles were reformulated in different contexts. In the following part, 
the general characteristics of the Ottoman policy regarding Iraq before the massive 
change in the political vision in the last quarter of the nineteenth century will be 
discussed. 
 
2.1 Reflections of the Traditional Sources of Conflict in the Midst of the 
Nineteenth Century 
Research at the Ottoman Prime Ministry Archives in Istanbul regarding the 
Ottoman involvement in Iraqi Shi’is in the midst of the nineteenth century revealed 
that there were three major issues: repairing the holy shrines, reading khutbes in the 
name of the sultans, and closely watching the changes in private land ownership. 
These issues were among the traditional sources of ensuring the authority of the 
Ottoman Sultan over Iraqi territory. Thus, these issues were upheld by the past as 
well as contemporary rulers of the region. Serving the holy shrines was important for 
both the personal accounts of the believers and for the states as being the sources of 
legitimacy whereas the Friday khutbes had been the times in which political 
authorities manifested themselves to their subjects from the early Umayyads to 
Republican Turkey, thus becoming the grounds for the quest for power. 
These features were visible in the Iranian-Ottoman struggle over Iraq from 
the early centuries of confrontation until the last quarter of the nineteenth century. 
The Ottoman authorities had formulated a traditional policy of fighting against the 
Iranian Empires. Since the Iranian governments had made “constant and continuous 
attempts” (teşebbüsât-ı mütemâdiyye)32 to penetrate into the political, social, and 
religious affairs of the Iraqi region, this traditional policy came to thwart any attempt 
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of Iranian governments and preclude their possible threats to the Ottoman 
sovereignty in Iraq. ‘Ascertaining the authority’ had been the principle concern of the 
Ottoman governments.  
In this regard, the centuries-old presence of Shi’is and Shi’ism in Iraq was 
perceived by the Ottoman authorities in relation to Iranian political ambitions. Nixon, 
British Consular in Iraq, wrote in 1877 that: 
Rightly or wrongly the Turkish authorities ascribe all these difficulties at 
Karbala and Najaf and on the Euphrates to the intrigues of the Persian 
Government, and naturally so, as the great mass of the population at Karbala 
are Persians of the Shiah sect who have a fierce desire to emancipate 
themselves from Sunni threat and regain the Shrines for the Shah of Persia.33  
 
On the eve of an Iranian military attack, which was highly expected by the Ottomans 
for the time being, Nixon’s statement briefly outlines the traditional fears of the 
Ottoman governors. Since the presence of Persian Shi’is in Karbala constituted a 
great mass of the total population, the suspicions of the Ottoman officials were not 
exclusively groundless. Did the Persian Shi’is really have a desire for regaining the 
shrines for the Shah of Persia? 
There is an answer to this question, which shows that a political discourtesy, 
supposed to be shown for the Iranian state officials, could have upset the Persian 
Shi’is immensely. According to the document, a reception was held at the Persian 
Consulate in Baghdad in honor of the birthday of the Iranian Shah. The Vali of 
Baghdad instead of paying a customary visit to the Persian Consulate sent his 
Christian interpreter, who went there in “plain clothes.” Hence, the Persian Council 
did not recognize Davud Efendi, the interpreter, as a substitute for Vali. This incident 
“has given a great offence not only to the Persian community at Baghdad which is 
very large but to the Shi’is in general, who regarded it as an intentional discourtesy 
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and as a work of the present Vali’s fanatical hatred of their sect.”34 According to the 
document, this was an incident which upset not only the Shi’i Persian residents in 
Baghdad but also the Shi’i Ottoman subjects. 
The competition between the two empires through defending one major 
denomination of Islam against the other established a bureaucratic repertoire. It may 
be argued that as long as the technological and diplomatic tools of the confrontations 
between the two empires had not changed, this repertoire shaped the political agenda 
of the Ottoman Empire regarding the Iraqi region throughout the nineteenth century. 
However, the reign of Abdülhamid II epitomized a deviation from this traditional 
policy since he developed a modern systematic strategy to integrate the people living 
within the official borders of the Empire around the single ideology of Sunni Islam. 
Representing a shift from traditional to modern governance, two main changes had 
occurred. First, the Ottoman bureaucrats had very lately realized the potential power 
of the Iraqi Shi’is, who were powerful enough to generate their own political visions. 
Second, acting in accordance with the conjectural necessities of world politics, the 
Ottoman officials formulated a policy of Pan-Islamism in the leadership of 
Abdülhamid II to unite the people of the Empire. Thus, the presence of Shi’is and 
Shi’ism in Iraq came to be understood in a different manner at the point where these 
two changes in the Ottoman bureaucratic mentality merged. This chapter aims to 
analyze this shift in bureaucratic mentality with stress on the traditional ways of 
preserving authority in Iraq as practiced by the Ottomans. 
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2.2 Repair of the Holy Shrines 
Following the 1970s and later the 1980s, Saddam Hussein had begun 
simultaneously to practice a bilateral policy of torture and deference. On the one 
hand, he terrorized the high-ranking members of the Shi’i oppositional movements, 
such as the Da‘wah Party and religiously popular figures such as the arrest of 
Muhammad Bâqir as-Sadr. On the other, he showed “greater deference to the Shi’i 
ulema [spending millions of Iraqi dinars] on shrines, mosques, husayniyyahs, 
pilgrims, and other affairs of religion, dispensing funds impartially to both Shi’i and 
Sunni establishments.” 35 Furthermore, he paid visits to Holy Shrines; declared the 
birthday of Ali, son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad, a national holiday; claimed 
his family descended from the Prophet Muhammad; and he ardently mentioned the 
names of Shi’i Imams in his address to the Iraqi people36. Although there were 
differences in the normative aspects of historical circumstances, Saddam Hussein 
practiced similar formal methods that both the Ottoman and the Persian rulers used to 
maintain their authority over the Iraqi region in the previous centuries. 
For the Hamidian regime in particular, Selim Deringil noted: 
Demonstrating his monogram (tuğra) on all public works completed in his 
time, inaugurating the clock towers in small Anatolian towns, rebuilding the 
tomb of Ertuğrul, sending imperial gifts to Kaaba during the Ramadan before 
the thousands of people, pitching tents on Mina, and providing the holy 
mantle of Kaaba on which the Sultan’s name was written [were the ways of] 
visual confirmation of the Sultan’s sovereignty.37 
 
In this context, the repair of the holy shrines had been an important matter between 
the Ottoman and Iranian Empires. It was perceived by both sides as a way of 
ascertaining authority over a certain geography and people. For this reason, the 
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Iranian consulate was trying to find opportunities on various occasions to obtain 
permission from the Ottoman authorities to repair such places in Baghdad and Basra. 
However, the Ottomans were very strict about the matter. They refused the proposals 
of Iranians and they themselves tended to repair them. It was a symbolic struggle to 
exercise sovereignty to become the protector of the lands where the holy relics and 
tombs were situated. 
The reason behind the Ottoman governors’ strict restriction of Iranian 
representatives to repair these places or construct new buildings in the holy shrines 
was the governors’ distrust of the activities of the Iranians in the Iraqi region. The 
long history of imperial conflicts had reinforced their skepticisms. The Ottomans did 
not allow the representatives of the mother of Shah Ismail II to construct a lodging 
house (imaret) meant only to serve to the Persian pilgrims during her visit to the holy 
shrines of Karbala and Najaf (1576-77). Similarly, when Perihan Sultan, sister of the 
Shah, wanted to donate carpets to some mosques in Iraq, the Ottomans kindly 
refused her benevolence. However, if the gifts had already reached these places, the 
Ottoman officials did not send them back.38 
Three centuries later, it was still possible to see examples of the same distrust. 
The management of the Shi’i Shrines was in the hands of the Ottomans who 
appointed each of them certain custodians. The specific name of the custodian was 
kiliddar, meaning key keeper, who was responsible for collecting the payments from 
the attendants. Except for the staff at Samarra who was Sunni, the other kiliddars 
were Shi’is. The Department of Religious Endowments, Evkaf, was responsible for 
the financial support of these shrines.39 However, the Shah’s visit to the Shrine of 
Imam Hussein in Kerbela in the middle of the nineteenth century showed that 
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Kiliddars could have acted on certain occasions as they wished. Some time after the 
Shah’s visit, the Ottoman Consulate in Tehran reported in 1851 that the Kiliddar of 
the tomb had given the Shah ‘the butt of a sword and some other precious relics’ kept 
there. Since the Ottoman officials did not allow such arbitrariness by any means, they 
took the matter seriously, thus an investigation was conducted.40 However, it is 
interesting to see that the kiliddar had acted freely as if he had been authorized to gift 
the relics. Furthermore, although the event took place in Karbala, Ottoman officials 
learned of the events not only after a long period had elapsed but also from the 
Ottoman Consulate in Tehran. One may easily presume that Shah’s visit must have 
been performed in a sermonial way. Therefore, two serious questions arise: why did 
the local officials not accompany the Shah and his retinue or, at least, why did they 
not monitor his visit? Forty years after this event, Ottoman officials surprisingly 
experienced a similar event in 1892. On the inscription panel above the door of the 
tomb of Imam Musa al-Kadhim in Baghdad, the name of the Nasir ad-Dîn Shah had 
been written instead of the name of the Ottoman Sultan.41 It is unknown for how long 
the name of the Shah was there, but it is certain that these and other parallel cases 
were sustaining the Ottoman fears about the increasing influence of Iranians over the 
Iraqi region. 
When al-Hajj Mezahâri, a well-known and respected Iranian merchant living 
in Karbala, wanted to construct a caravanserai for the benefit of the poor, the 
Ottoman authorities minutely questioned the purpose of the construction, while the 
discourse of the document revealed the strong doubts and suspicious mentality of the 
local Ottoman administrators of Baghdad.42 Similarly, construction of a school and a 
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house in Najaf that was sponsored by the Iranian Prince Sayf ud-Dawlah was 
recessed by an official decree. The Iranian Consulate in Baghdad asked for the 
continuation of the construction. However, the Ottoman government frustrated the 
efforts of the Iranian Consulate. Moreover, the Ottoman central administration 
advised the local governors to apply the same policy when they were confronted with 
similar cases in the future.43 
The Ottoman authorities received some preliminary information from the 
Ottoman Consulate in Tehran about the possible attempts of Iranians to repair the 
holy shrines near Baghdad. The consulate was informed by the central government 
that the duty of repairing the shrines belonged to no authority other than the Ottoman 
Empire. As it was described in the official documentation as “a definite legal rule,”44 
therefore Iranians would have no right to repair the shrines by any means. Their 
requests, if they were somehow made, should have immediately been rejected, and 
the Ottoman central authority should have been notified about those places that 
needed repair. 
Iranian Shahs were constantly asking for permission from the Ottoman 
authorities to undertake the duty of repairing the shrines in the Atabat, a collective 
name meaning a group of Shi’i shrines in Iraq.45 For instance, the minaret of the 
tomb of Imam Ali, son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad, was in danger of falling 
apart and needed repair. Although it would cost a large amount, approximately 
100,000 kuruş,46 Meclîs-i Ahkâm-ı Adliyye decided to repair the minaret apparently 
for three reasons: first, their respect for Imam Ali; second, the tomb was one of the 
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most visited places in the region; and third, because of the statement of the Iranian 
Shah for the repair. Indeed, the scribe of the document had first written that it was 
“the request of the Iranian Consulate” (Đran Devleti Sefâreti’nden muahharan vuku‘ 
bulan istirhâm üzerine), but then crossed out the expression and changed it into “the 
statement of the Iranian Consulate” (Đran Devleti Sefâreti’nden muahharan vuku‘ 
bulan ifâde üzerine), which carried more neutral connotations.47 
From the point of view of the shahs, the demand for the repairs had also been 
connected with internal politics of Iran. Shahs were aware of the power of the Iraqi 
Shi”i ulema since they attacked the Russian Consulate and organized certain masses 
to fight against the Russians during the reign of Fath Ali Shah.48 Therefore, as a 
matter of internal politics, the shahs strove to obtain the support of the ulema by way 
of these “good deeds.” On the one hand, the Ottomans were also looking for the 
consent of both the ulema and Shi’i people and were serving shrines to strengthen the 
legitimacy of their local and international power; on the other, these shrines were 
also important places according to their worldviews. The previously given examples 
of this traditional policy, just as the endeavor of Sultan Abdülmecid to donate gold 
and silver candlesticks to the shrines in Karbala and Najaf,49were extending from the 
beginning of the early conquest of the region until the fall of the empires. 
The establishment of mosques in which the official faith was indoctrinated 
was one of the essential methods of reinstating the state authority over the heterodox 
populations of the Empire. When the Ottomans attempted to convert the Yezidis, 
they spent “13,000 kuruş for the construction of a mosque and a school in a Yezidi 
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Village called Patrak where the majority had [eventually] converted to Islam.”50 
However, there were also Yezidis who rejected complying with the demands of the 
government. They were punished by the government until they embraced Sunni 
Islam. Furthermore, Deringil stated:  
Yezidi leaders further complicated matters by contacting the French council 
in Mosul and telling him that the community was prepared to embrace 
Christianity if France could protect them against Ömer Vehbi Pasha, [who 
was a general and] posted to the Vilayet of Mosul as ‘the commander of the 
reformatory force’ (fırka-i ıslahiye kumandanı).51 
 
The quest for serving the shrines had considerable political connotations as to 
gaining the consent of the people and declaring their obedience to the ruler. The 
governments wanted to benefit from the symbolic power of those shrines, which 
were very much respected by Shi’is of Iran, Iraq, and India. Thus, Ottoman 
governors refused on various occasions the demands of Iranian officials to construct 
buildings or repair the holy tombs. Ottoman officials were very determined not to 
authorize them even once, as it was the same reason behind the rejection of the 
request of Mukhsin Hasan Shah by Sadrazam Kamil Pasha. As it was stated in the 
Ottoman official documentation, allowing the Iranian Shahs to perform such 
activities might cause to the popular recognition of the Shahs as the spiritual guard of 
the region, which was the chief fear of the Ottomans. (Bu def’âlık dahî ruhsât-ı 
matlûbenin i’tâsı halinde şâh-ı müşârun ileyh hakkında iltifât-ı cihândır can cenâb-ı 
tâcdârînin yeni bir eser-i celîli ibrâz buyurulmuş olacağı vârid-i hâtır-ı kâsır 
olmasıyla.)52 
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2.3 Friday Khutbes 
Friday Khutbes are central both in the personal accounts of the believers and 
for the social psychology of public worship. Furthermore, the announcement of the 
sultan’s name in the Friday Khutbes has been the traditional source of legitimacy for 
the state and the sultan’s proclamation of authority, including the declaration of 
protectorate over certain sections of society. There are various cases of discussions 
between the Ottoman and Iranian governments over the control of bordering regions 
since those places remained a matter of unresolved dispute. After the triumph of the 
Usuli School over the Akhbaris, the idea that argued the Friday congregational 
prayers the usurpation of the occulted Twelfth Imam’s right, changed. However, the 
Usuli School legalized the Friday congregational prayers even in absence of the 
Twelfth Imam whose authority was represented by rightful Mujtahids. That is why 
the Friday congregational prayers became a problem between two empires after the 
triumph of Usuli School, which will be explained later in detail.53 
According to an Ottoman document, a public uproar occurred due to the 
announcement of the Shah’s name in a Friday Khutbe. The public uproar took place 
in a region which had recently come under Iranian control, yet whose inhabitants 
were Sunnis. The Shah ordered his name to be announced in Friday prayers in the 
mosques of this region as a political maneuver since the commission on measuring 
the Ottoman-Iranian boundary was approaching that place. Before Friday came, 
people were warned that whoever refused the order of the Shah would be punished. 
When the people gathered for the Friday prayer and heard the name of the Shah 
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instead of the Sultan’s name with which, the document claims, they had been 
accustomed to for decades, they then became gloomy and anxious, leaving the prayer 
before it actually began and dispersed.54 Undoubtedly, the document reflects the 
perception and the political position of the Ottomans; however, it is important to see 
that the Friday Khutbes had been one of the traditional grounds for struggle between 
Ottoman and Iranian rulers. 
 
2.4 The Ottoman Reacquisition Policy in Atabat 
Following the establishment of a firm authority in the Iraqi region in the 
midst of the sixteenth century, the Ottoman authorities preserved some vakfs while 
abolishing others. On the one hand, for instance, they abolished Musa al-Kadhim 
vakf asserting, “Nonce the Kızılbaş vakf is not legitimate.” (şimdiki halde Kızılbaş 
vakfı meşru‘ değildir). However, the Ottoman authorities compensated the 
expenditures, which were previously paid by the vakf, from the treasury of Baghdad. 
On the other hand, they preserved the vakf dedicated for the expenditures of the 
Shrine of Imam Zeyn al‘Abidin. The Ottomans also presumably reestablished some 
Sunni vakfs, which were abolished during the period of Safavids.55 
In the nineteenth century, the ban on foreign possession of lands primarily 
targeted the acquisitions of the disputed bordering regions between the Ottomans and 
the Iranians. However, the scope of the ban covered the Iraqi region as a whole since 
there were historical claims by Iranians over southern Iraq, particularly over Atabat, 
where the Shi’i shrines were the potential source of legitimacy for both the internal 
and external politics of the Persian Empire. Therefore, the Ottomans remarkably 
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observed the changes in private land ownership and new acquisition of lands and 
properties in Baghdad. Their primary target was first the people of Iranian origin and 
then the Ottoman authorities became interested in the acquisitions of the British 
subjects as well.  
It was ordered by the central government that the subjects of a foreign 
country who had property or land in Baghdad should sell their estates to the Ottoman 
Empire; then their legal positions should be reinstated as tenants or guests in the 
country. Later, the local authority was warned by the central government “not to act 
contrary to the order of the state” (nizâm-ı mülke muhâlif hareket itmemek)56. 
According to the Ottomans, the possession of lands by foreigners was incompatible 
with the rules (şerâit-i ahîdiyye). Iranians were Muslims but considered as 
foreigners. This order was deemed to include not only the Persian commoners living 
for decades in Baghdad but also the Persian princes who were buying new properties 
and constructing new buildings.57 The Ottoman central government applied a lenient 
but insistent policy to reacquire the estates of foreigners gradually in a peaceful and 
contractual manner. 
Indeed, the central authority did not regard the Iranian princes as equal with 
the other foreigners and advised to treat them in a more pleasant manner. In addition, 
there were many Persian subjects whose sons inherited their properties who had 
inhabited the Ottoman lands for more than fifty years. The government realized the 
intention and willingness of the Iranian subjects to change their citizenship to 
Ottoman, thus the government remained silent on the issue.58 In the following 
decades, the Ottoman authorities closely monitored the property ownership status. 
When the Foreign Ministry appointed translators to different parts of the region in 
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order to categorize the subjects and meet the needs of land registration, they paid 
special attention to the status of Iranian subjects residing in Karbala. In other words, 
they scrutinized the Iranian cases since they were considered important matters 
(mevâd-ı mu‘tenâ bihâdan).59 
Ottoman documents illustrate the unwillingness of the local officials to allow 
foreigners, whether Iranian or from other origins, to repair their houses without 
permission. It was thought by the Ottoman authorities that “the repair issue” might 
have resulted from implementing the ban on the land reacquisition of foreigners in 
Iraq. Although the primary concern of the government was the people of Iranian 
origin, it would have been a double standard to allow other foreigners, but not the 
Iranians, to repair their houses. Therefore, the Ottoman authorities reiterated the old 
ban over all the foreigners on taking the possession of lands and estates in Iraq; 
however, they were permitted to repair their houses having valid licenses. Ottomans 
principally emphasized the prevention of seizures of new lands by the people of 
Iranian origin, and then sought the recovery of the already possessed properties by 
Iranians legally by buying their property whenever they decided to sell.60 
Nearly a decade later, the Ottomans realized during the midst of the 
nineteenth century that people of Iranian origin had bought a considerable amount of 
private lands and estates in Iraq. In addition, the majority of the inhabitants living in 
that region were Shi’is, whether of Ottoman, Iranian, or Indian origins, who might 
have been influenced by the Iranian government’s traditional wish to declare a 
protectorate or to directly take the Shi’is as their subjects. Hence, the central 
Ottoman authorities decided to entrust the former president of Manastır Meclis-i 
Muvakkat Ahmet Rasim Efendi with registering lands and distinguishing subjects. 
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However, before that, because of the correspondence with the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, the local authority was advised to prevent the new purchases by the people of 
Iranian origin and to look for the ways of legally securing these lands, which were in 
the hands of Iranians for the time being. The legal way of securing these lands would 
be that when an Iranian who had estates in Iraq died, his property would be sold; and 
they should not allow the Iranians to buy the property in order to let the Sunni 
subjects of Ottoman origin make the purchase.61 This measure slightly affected the 
Shi’is Ottoman subjects but rather targeted the people of Iranian origin. 
Ottoman officials working in Iraq would be accused sometimes of treason due 
to their connection and affinity to Iran. Since the policy on the absolute territorial 
control of Iraq became generally accepted after the 1850s, subsequently it had 
become a new argument and a widely used discourse for their dismissals. Kırlı 
Efendi, the Kaimmakam of Karbala around 1860, is a significant example. He was 
accused for his closeness and sympathy towards Iran, selling the estates to the 
Iranians. However, after some brief scrutiny, the central government realized that 
this accusation was a baseless claim. Although the allegations against him proved 
groundless, the government did not refrain from warning Kırlı Efendi to be careful 
about the issue.62 
In an official report, it is seen that the rules of the 1867 law, which had also 
granted foreigners the right to hold real property, were clearly hesitated and possibly 
not applied in the following decades. Mr. Lyle, for instance, stated: 
[As a] manager and partner in the firm of Messrs Gray Mackenzie &Co 
applied to the Tapoo Office to register a mortgage in respect of some land in 
the Robat creek near Basra, on which he was advancing money. The Mudir of 
the Tapoo Department stated that orders had been received not to register any 
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mortgage in the name of a foreigner and not to transfer any land to 
foreigners.63 
 
J. Ramsay, the British Consular at Basra, could not solve the issue and transferred it 
to Constantinople. 
However, the Ottoman authorities were not always strict concerning the new 
“construction projects” by foreigners in the Iraqi region. They sometimes oscillated 
between the two opinions of allowing them to build new houses and consequently 
improve the conditions of the city or of not allowing them due to a fear of the 
growing Iranian influence. The Ottomans maintained that the importance of Shrines 
in Iraq for the Iranian and Indian Shi’is was similar to their respect shown for the 
Hijaz. Therefore, the rich people among the Indians and Iranians always wished to 
buy estates and lands to turn these properties into a vakf (charitable foundation) in 
order to improve the conditions of the wrecked quarters. Nevertheless, the rule 
concerning the ban both deprived them of performing such meritorious acts and 
caused the continuation of poverty in the region. Thus, the Vali of Baghdad proposed 
to the central government the following exceptional clause, to allow these foreign 
beneficiaries to construct buildings only under certain conditions. The state and 
condition of any buildings to be constructed, based upon the aforementioned 
purpose, needed to be reported to the Meclîs-i Kebîr of Baghdad. If approved, an 
official report certifying the conditions would be attached to the vakfiyye. Then the 
construction would have begun under the supervision of a government official.64 
Herewithal, both the beneficiaries would not be disappointed and the wrecked 
quarters would become more prosperous. 
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The Shi’i Question came to occupy an important place in the Ottoman 
bureaucratic mentality that sometimes it led to misinterpretations of actual events. 
For instance, in 1894, the Ottoman central government was informed that a 
considerable number of Sunni people living along the Iranian border were migrating 
to Iran. The Ottomans presumed that this undesirable situation was the result of 
Iranian policies that aimed to break the Ottoman influence over the region by 
spreading Shi’ism. Then, an investigation began by the decision of Meclis-i Mahsus-
u Vükela on 17 June 1894, to find out the reasons behind these movements and to 
decide what kind of precautions were necessary. Moreover, the local administrator of 
other boundary provinces such as Erzurum, Van, Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra were 
asked about the same issue. The result of the investigation showed that such 
movements across the two sides of the Ottoman-Iranian border were customary. 
There were two reasons for these movements: first, tribal conflicts; and second, the 
routine movements for summer pastures and winter shelters. Hence, although these 
people left their hometowns, they returned after a while. The case was also true for 
the migratory inhabitants of Amara who were already Shi’is. Moreover, they had no 
relation with the Iranian government unless the Iranian government wanted to keep 
them in its borders for economic reasons through offering exemption from taxes 
etc.65 This example clearly shows how the preconditioned Ottoman bureaucratic 
mentality misperceived an actual situation. 
It has been argued here that the inevitable geographical proximity provided 
for both the Ottoman and Persian Empires to be natural enemies and eternal friends. 
Iran, being the political defender of Shi’ism, was perceived by the Ottomans as one 
of the most central figures in the political debate over Iraq, posing imminent threats 
                                                 
65
 BOA, DH.MKT, 262/13, 14/M/1312 (17 June 1894) From the Ottoman Consulate at Tehran to the 
Sublime Porte. 
 39 
to the Ottoman domination and interests in the Iraqi region. Throughout the long 
history, the Ottomans established a bureaucratic mentality of enduring conflict with 
Iran as long as they perceived the Shi’is of Iraq being connected to the ambitions of 
the Iranian governments along with the British after the second half of the nineteenth 
century. Hence, until the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman 
authorities did not have another agenda for this area apart from reinstating the state 
authority over the Iraqi region by preventing possible Iranian plans, attacks, or 
intrigues. While the Ottomans were taking measures against the acquisition of lands 
by the people who were Iranian subjects, they were only thinking about preventing 
the Iranian political penetration into Iraq and did not seriously regard Shi’ism as an 
independent question until the 1870s. In other words, the Shi’i Question began to 
emerge as a serious problem on the Ottoman state agenda during the reign of 
Abdülhamid II who developed a modern systematic policy to integrate the people 
living within the official borders of the Empire around the single ideology of Sunni 
Islam. Thus, the official perception of Shi’ism noticeably changed and thereafter the 
Shi’i presence in Iraq acquired a different meaning. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
HISTORIOGRAPHICAL DISCUSSIONS ON ‘THE SPREAD OF 
SHI’ISM’ AND THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE IRAQI 
REGION IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE NINETEENTH 
CENTURY 
 
 
 An important publication by Yitzhak Naqash66 has given a new inclination 
to the historiography on the Shi’is of Iraq whereas Meir Litvak's book67 slightly 
broadened the scope of what Naqash argued. Their works were specifically about the 
history of the Shi’i people residing primarily in and around Baghdad and the Basra 
provinces of Ottoman Iraq through the nineteenth towards the twentieth centuries. 
The basic assessment in both books was that due to the Ottoman attempts at 
centralization, the nomadic tribal population of Iraq largely became settled through 
the nineteenth century. This meant a change in the traditional social fabric of Iraqi 
society that consequently disentangled the nomadic tribal identity. Hence, nomadic 
people inevitably needed a new identity, a new type of binding to replace the former 
identity marker and to restore the sense of belonging. The concurrent rise of Shi’ism 
accidentally served as the vehicle providing them with a new identity. Thus, Shi’ism 
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spread very rapidly due to this sociological transformation.68 In this chapter, 
elaborating upon examples that verify the above-mentioned assumption, the premise 
will first be discussed in detail; then its validity will be questioned. Therefore, the 
social structure of the Iraqi region in the late nineteenth century and its possible 
relation to the supposed spread of Shi’ism will be analyzed throughout the chapter. 
According to this compact assumption, there emerged a dynamism and 
synergy amongst the population of Iraq, including both the nomadic and the settled, 
through intersecting historical events. The Wahhabi pressure, setting in motion the 
migrations of large tribal confederations such as the Shammar Jarba and the ‘Anaze, 
towards Syria and Iraq between 1791 and 1805, changed the tribal map of Iraq.69 The 
Hindiyya Canal, beginning one-hour’s distance from the south of Musayyib on the 
Euphrates River running two hundred kilometers parallel to the river and again 
joining it near Semawa, was opened up at the beginning of the nineteenth century. 
Thus, “it gave a great push to socio-economic welfare of Najaf; it provided the water 
needed to sustain massive numbers of pilgrims and helped the city’s mujtahids to 
establish Najaf as the major Shi’i academic center from the 1840s.”70 In relation to 
these factors, another historical event took place, which was the prominence of 
Usûlism at the expense of Akhbari interpretation of Shi’i jurisprudence and the 
subsequent rise of the mujtahids, mu’mins, and akhunds as the visible agents of the 
spread of Shi’ism. In addition, water supply gave the Ottoman government an 
opportunity to settle the nomadic population in the region through compromising 
with or coercing them into agricultural production. Together these historical 
occurrences precipitated the forthcoming Ottoman reforms for centralization; 
settlement, thus, became the visible cause of the historical change. 
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The settlement policy, which was perceived as the backbone of this 
sociological transformation, brought about some structural problems such as the 
appropriate share of water for the irrigation and the just distribution of lands among 
the tribes and their tribesmen. The confusion due to the relative settlement and 
consequently partial disentanglement of the previous social structure led to the 
formation of intermediary groups of people called as sirkals and sayyids. They had 
various functions within this structure. Among them, the economic one was crucial. 
Naqash stated: 
The shaykhs, and those city dwellers who were holders of title deeds, needed 
sirkals to extract their share of revenue from the tribesmen to whom they had 
granted their pieces of land for cultivation. The sirkals were thus brokers 
whose main role was to keep the land under cultivation and to collect 
revenues for the landowner.71 
  
On the other hand, sayyids fulfilled many religious services. During the post of 
Namiq Pasha, some of the sayyids were given lands to cultivate. Thus, these lands 
attracted tribesmen from various locations and put them under the service of the 
sayyids. This facilitated the formation of alternative identities, thus altering the tribal 
forms of identification. “The Sayyids gave sanctions to weddings, circumcisions, 
funerals and other celebrations.”72 This, in turn, increased their power to propagate 
Shi’i Islam. 
Indeed, the settlement policy had been carried out since the very beginnings 
of the Ottoman Empire.73 However, the practice in the nineteenth century was 
becoming stricter due to the increasing territorial losses in the second half of the 
nineteenth century that set in motion the immigration of great numbers of refugees 
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from the Balkan and Caucasus regions. Following the devastating wars with Russia 
and Egypt, Ottoman authorities began a centralizing policy. To this end, one of their 
objectives was to take control of the rebelling Kurd leaders in the eastern Anatolia 
and northern Iraq. To a certain extent, the Ottoman campaigns yielded efficient 
results. Thus, “by the middle of the century, there were no emirates left in 
Kurdistan.”74 However, the direct rule of the Ottoman government could not be 
firmly established, with the exception of maintaining limited control in the cities. 
Alongside the resettlement of Christian populations in the Syrian region, there were 
Circassians, Türkmens, and Chechens amongst the immigrating colonies and certain 
portions of which were settled in the “Syrian periphery.”75 The main purposes of the 
Ottoman government in settling the immigrants and the nomads were to establish 
central governance, to have a firmer control over the population for the sake of 
increasing the treasury income, to provide a ready supply of men to the army, and to 
streamline the administration for facilitating better control of the territory. Thus, “the 
expansion of the settlement in the nineteenth century [became] a universal 
phenomenon characterized by the emigration of settlers, expansion of settlers, 
expansion of agriculture and trade, and the rise of powerful nation states.”76 
The bureaucratic mentality of the Hamidian regime, though it owed much to 
the personality of Abdülhamid II, had been gradually shaped through extensive 
Tanzimat reforms. The standardization of the Ottoman administration, the expansion 
of a modern school system, introduction of the new land code in 1858, and the 
Provincial Reform Law in 1864 all served to regulate the power of the local elites 
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and interest groups while strengthening the infrastructural power of the Ottoman 
state. Thus, the central government extended its authority beyond the urban centers 
towards the rural areas, as in the case of “the pastoralists and peasants of Transjordan 
were incorporated to Ottoman rule through the instruments of the Tanzimat state.”77 
Tanzimat reforms aimed to settle all the tribes around their winter shelters. 
Tribal members were given economic benefits such as being exempted from taxes.78 
It was argued by Halaçoğlu that, as a result of the century-old efforts, the settlement 
policy in Anatolia began to pan out around 1860s. In the following decades, new 
villages were established for those settled tribes.79 The Jaff tribe, for instance, whose 
members were Sunni, came to terms with the Ottoman government to settle at their 
winter shelters.80 The Ottoman authorities used some coercive methods as well in 
settlement efforts. In 1893, approximately 500 households belonging to the 
Hamawand tribe, for instance, were forcefully exiled to different parts of the empire 
such as Mardin, Hakkari, Sivas, Konya, Adana, and Mosul.81  
 The Ottoman administration deliberately favored the new intermediary 
groups, namely the shaykhs, in order to provide both the subservience of the 
“independent” tribes to the state and to put an end to the conflicts among them. To 
this end, the Ottoman officials awarded decorations and distributed robes of honor to 
the shaykhs whose respect was considerably high.82 Hanna Batatu stated:  
Shaykhly leadership, in other terms, was a military leadership clearly 
differentiated and increasingly hereditary, but in its first stages patriarchal in 
its essence and with few of the earmarks of a class position, and only began to 
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take the latter form as the once free-living tribe became more intimately 
bound to the land.83 
 
The shaykh, in the political framework of the late nineteenth century Iraq,  did not 
solely mean a religious person with his disciples, but rather a political person 
entering into power relations, committing crimes, taking revenge, and replacing the 
position of former mirs and emirs.84 In this context, the case of the Shaykh of the 
Mas’ûd Tribe presents a striking example in providing a clear understanding of the 
position of the shaykhs and their relations with their tribes in the late nineteenth 
century Iraq. The Shaykh was insulted by a young impudent boy belonging to a 
different tribe. The boy accused the shaykh of stealing his sheep. Afterwards, the 
shaykh immediately returned to his place feeling disgruntled. As such, he instigated 
his tribe to occupy the place where that boy was living. He succeeded in doing so. 
They occupied the road, plundered some boats on the canal, and carried away a 
number of the sheep of that boy in order to get the revenge of the shaykh. The 
officials could only intervene three or four days later. Somehow, they sent the 
instigator shaykh to prison, however, with fear that his tribe may rise against this 
imprisonment. Hence, they set him free three days later and escorted by five men 
while leaving Baghdad.85  
 The relation between the local intermediaries and the state was not a peaceful 
cohabitation at all. Hüseyin bin Ferid, a major, satirically complained about the 
political circumstances in the region, informing the central government about the 
power of the local agents. He reported that shaykhs were carrying Martini rifles and 
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its ammunition instead of misvak86 and tesbih; stealing from the poor by using guns; 
corrupting the revenues of the state; and, in general, rebelling against the 
government. He particularly highlighted two major problems from which the Iraqi 
region was suffering: first, the position of the tribal chieftains in the existing social 
structure as composed of tribes, which were able to obtain guns from the docked 
ships visiting the Basra Gulf; and second, Shi’i disciples of shaykhs who constantly 
fought with each other representing the struglles between different shaykhs. The 
latter one could engulf the tribes. In addition, there were corruptions in the tribal 
confederations that led the chieftains to build new alliances which tightened the 
government control. Possible contacts of these shaiyks with the agencies of the 
Iranian government were among the foremost fears of the Ottoman administrators.87 
Establishing security forces to implement the administrative reforms of the 
central government was a modern practice that was also adopted by the Ottoman 
governors to extend the regulations of the state to remote provinces to which 
“security and order” were promised. Thus, “during the Tanzimat period, the first act 
of an Ottoman governor, before introducing administrative reform, was to establish a 
gendarmerie regiment or company in that province. Other branches of government 
followed.”88 Although the Adana region is beyond the main focus of this study, the 
activities of Fırka-i Islahiyye set a good example of demonstrating the willingness of 
the Ottoman government to populate certain places that they wanted by purging new 
settlements. After the Crimean War (1853-1856), Fırka-i Islahiyye was established to 
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end the local authority of the tribes and bandits around the highlands of Adana.89 
Places from Payas to Kilis and from Beylan to Maraş were in a state of rebellion. 
Villages around Kilis were under the rule of a nomad named Deli Halil. During this 
process, the Ottoman administrators were entering into tribal power relations to 
obtain their subservience, benefiting from the opportunities given by internal 
political rivalries and cooperation between tribes. Thus, assessing that the place 
would be safer for the Ottoman troops, which were going to subsume their military 
movements, the commander of the Fırka-i Islahiyye demanded the establishment of a 
village around a derbend between Kürt Dağı and Gavur-Dağı and asked the chieftain 
of Hacılar Nahiyesi to bring about thirty houses in order to settle them down around 
the derbend.90 Similarly, for the security reasons they combined three nahiyes to 
create a new kaza. They established military barracks there and generated a town 
comprised of a hundred households. They named it Hassa Kazası because first the 
Hassa armies had stepped in. In the following days, three or four small nahiyes were 
combined and certain numbers of people belonging to the tribes were drawn towards 
this new kaza.91 
The coercion of the state was not the exclusive reason behind the settlement 
of the tribes. Some tribes decided to settle by themselves because of the physical 
conditions,92 some others settled due to economic reasons. The transformation from a 
nomadic to a settled life in the Çukurova region was gradual in manner. Nomadic 
tribes first became semi-nomadic then became sedentarized. The basic underlying 
reason for this shift was the economic factors, which slowly changed the social 
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structure, instead of the actions of the state.93 The Bedouin Khazal tribe, for instance, 
was ostensibly going to Karbala to buy their main necessities and some simple 
luxuries. The reason was that they were slowly drawn into the Bombay horse-market 
since they were “as keen horse-sellers as Yorkshiremen themselves.”94 Plowden, the 
British Council General at Baghdad,  believed that the desire of the Sublime Porte to 
settle the nomads such as the Anaze could be realized through “a long intermediate 
stage” just as “many of the clans of the Scottish highlands” passed through.95 
Naqash underscored the effects of the settlement dynamic upon the tribal 
affiliations by noting that, “this settlement fragmented the old tribal confederations, 
and altered the balance between the nomadic and sedentarized groups, and increased 
agricultural production and trade in southern Iraq.”96 In the light of all these 
developments and changes in the social structure, it was argued by the historiography 
that the Shi’is of Iraq began to obtain power. There emerged new figures such as 
Shi’i notables and elites. Mujtahids and particularly akhunds began to visit the 
recently settled nomads and function as judicial arbitrators amongst them. Hence, the 
settled tribesmen acquired a common identity through Shi’ism.  
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 However, this scheme, which was utilized to explain the nature of Shi’i 
expansion, should be questioned. Two important aspects of the argument seem to be 
very much oversimplified. First, the question concerning the success of the 
settlement policy is very dubious. Indeed, the documents both at the Ottoman Prime 
Ministry and at the British National Archives demonstrate that the Ottomans were 
still heavily engaging in the tribal question at the beginning of the twentieth century. 
In addition, British agencies were always seeking ways to gain the political support 
and loyalty of the tribal chieftains. Moreover, there are thousands of documents 
demonstrating that the overwhelming political problems in Iraq were related to the 
ongoing tribal warfare, which was not only between tribes and the state but also 
among the tribes themselves. Second, if the settlement policy did not have enormous 
influence in reshaping the social structure of the region, then how could this 
disentanglement have consequently led to the spread of Shi’ism, which was thought 
to have benefited from such a change and to have given a new identity to those still 
nomadic or at least semi- nomadic tribes? 
Contrary to the first assumption, which asserted that the settlement brought 
successful results throughout the nineteenth century, the social structure of the Iraqi 
region did not follow a path of steady change. Conversely, there was an ongoing 
antagonism between the state and the tribes because of the centralization. The fierce 
necessity of reforming the tribal structure had emerged for the state as a stipulation to 
provide agricultural production and consequently to increase the state revenues 
through taxation; to expand the state authority against foreign encroachments; and to 
provide man-power for the army. According to the socio-political circumstances of 
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late nineteenth century Iraq, the primary concern of the Ottoman government was to 
cope with the disorder caused by tribes regardless of their sectarian affiliations.97 
The tribal structures in the three Iraqi provinces were different from each 
other. The case in Mosul showed that the tribal confederations and shaykhhs 
benefited from the vacuum of power and kept their autonomous or semi-autonomous 
positions. The case in Baghdad was much more stable since the Tanzimat reforms 
achieved much more efficient results in establishing central governance. In Basra, 
there were two vast areas, Muntafiq and Amara, ruled by large tribal confederations 
such as the Muntafiq, Beni Lam, Beni Asad, and Albu Muhammad.98 
If it was not disrupted suddenly by government efforts, there was a symbiotic 
relationship between the nomads and the settlers based on the exchange of goods and 
products provided a socio-economic dynamism for nomads to maintain their 
presence.99 Nomads continued their customary seasonal movements. Around the 
1850s, the members of the ‘Anaze tribe were annually visiting the settled areas to sell 
their animal products. In return, they were buying foodstuff and clothes. When the 
government wanted to punish them, they stopped their trade with the settled 
population.100 Towards the end of the 1890s, the Arab tribes of Jabal Shammar were 
customarily visiting Najaf, Karbala, and other places “for the purpose of purchasing 
their annual supply of provisions.”101 It is clear that the tribes were still benefiting 
from this trade in the last decade of the nineteenth century. Therefore, the symbiotic 
lifestyle and cohabitation between the settled and the nomads enabled nomadism to 
reproduce and continue itself. 
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Having lived through the formative years of the modern Iraqi state, Longrigg 
wrote about the 1910s stating that “the Sadun [tribe] grew ever weaker, the Shammar 
as divided; their settlement was a failure. Shipping still suffered from the riverain 
tribes; the Hamawand still laughed at government in Bazyan.”102 It was the year in 
which Nazim Pasha was the governor of the three provinces of Iraq and the 
commander of the Sixth Army Corps. As the chief personality of the time in Iraq, the 
Pasha faced the serious difficulty of tribes withholding their taxes, and it was 
anticipated that the government would eventually have to coerce them to pay.103  
The Jaff tribe was described in 1911 by the British Vice-Council C.A. Greic 
as a “powerful, semi-nomadic, and frontier tribe.”104 Đsmail Hakkı Bey, Deputy for 
Baghdad, delivered a speech before the CUP (Committee of Union and Progress) in 
Baghdad in 1910. After stressing the importance of the education for the people of 
the province, he stated, “the nomadic tribes should be settled on the land and more 
attention should be given to agriculture.”105 Similarly, there is a British document, 
dating back to September 1910, which illustrates that “none [soldiers], I think could 
be safely drawn from the Kirkuk Division as the Baraizani Shaykh and the 
Hamawand, Shammar and the Dialiam [Deylem] tribes in the Mousul Wilayet, 
though settlement have been patched up with some of them, are still unsubdued.”106 
The mentioned tribes in this document were the most powerful and the most 
populous tribes in the region. The document provides the sense that the Ottoman 
centralization policy had not been that successful in a practical manner. 
Due to the inefficiency of the Ottoman Gendarmerie at Basra, robberies were 
frequent in the 1870s. Indeed, the British officials attributed the prevailing insecurity 
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of the town to the incompetence of the Ottoman Gendarmerie. In addition to the 
unrest caused by the tribal/nomadic population, it was worthy to note that, “the semi-
disaffected state of the settled Arabs which cause them to harbor and abet”107 was a 
factor contributing to the insecurity of the region. Moreover, the powerful tribes were 
able to control certain territories at the expense of the Ottoman provincial 
government in the early twentieth century. It was stated by the British Residency 
that: 
The Arabs of the Euphrates valley, it must be remembered, [were] numbered 
by tens of thousands and [were] well armed; their weakness [was] their 
incapacity to act together or to collect from beyond more than a certain 
radius. They know the country well, while the Turks would, I believe, have 
difficulty in finding their way about and in getting reliable information.108 
 
For instance, the Mas’ood tribe, an Arab tribe, had occupied both sides of the 
Husayniyah Canal between Karbala and Musayyib for sometime.109 It was thought 
that in a possible war between the Ottoman army and tribes, as observed by a British 
representative, it would be very difficult to guess who would be victorious, the 
Ottoman armed forces, or the well-organized tribal groups. 
The attempts of the Ottoman government in the beginning of the nineteenth 
century to establish a central authority over the Jabal Sinjar improved the public 
security and provided the security of the caravan routes; however, it achieved little 
success until “the 1837 military expedition of Hafiz Pasha, the governor of Diyar 
Bekr.”110 The representative of the British Consulate, M. Robertson argued:  
They [the Ottomans] state that in addition to the losses they have suffered 
from their property being plundered by the Arab tribes their trade is rushed by 
the general insecurity and absence of enforcement. They [Ottomans] consider 
that the security can only be restored by the appointment of a governor of 
Hijd who will be respected and feared as an individual, meaning Samir Pasha. 
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They don’t believe that more than are already at Khalef and Hasan would be 
of any use as the troops can only held certain points while the plundering 
Bedouins cause and go at pressure, and when pressured retreat to the desert 
where pursuit is impossible.111 
 
Similarly, it was a general problem as stated by Isa Blumi that:  
The Ottoman Empire was failed not only by its enemies but also by its own 
understaffed and frequently disloyal bureaucracy, its hold on Northern 
Albania and Yemen significantly drained its limited resources. The level of 
smuggling taking place beyond the control of Istanbul fuelled political and 
social forces that turned the regions into zones of war and then territorial 
conquests for the neighboring nation-states and their mafia-like allies.112 
 
As seen from the above-mentioned examples, the local power groups opposed 
the demands of the central government declared by the Gülhane Edict in 1839 and 
thus began to be more vigilant. Some of these local notables rebelled against the 
Ottoman government. Hence, the government faced the problem of implementing 
and executing this program.113 Thus, the Ottoman government generally employed a 
policy of reforming certain regions instead of coercing a collective settlement. 
During the Tanzimat period, the main purpose of the central government concerning 
tribal settlement was to ensure their subservience to the state. A rule put into effect in 
1842 aimed to end the move of tribes from one place to another for summer pastures 
or winter shelters. The regulation aimed to persuade the members of the tribes to 
remain where they were. They were given lands on the condition that they would 
engaged in agricultural activity. Officially, the post of şeyhlik was transformed into 
kaymakamlık or mutasarrıflık. Namely, the shaykhs of tribes were officially turned 
into kaymakams or mutasarrıfs. 114 
The nomadic tribal structure was the major social reality of the region and 
determined the mode of regional policy. The Ottomans, just as the Romans and the 
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Safavids, had used the tool of making alliances with the border-people who were 
mostly Kurds in the north and Bedouin Arabs in the south inhabiting both sides of 
the Zagros Mountain in keeping the security of the borders.115 Similarly, the 
mountainous character of the geographical landscapes imposed the necessity of 
establishing political alliances or relying on the tribal population over northern 
Albania along the Ottoman-Montenegrin border as well as the blurry transitional 
zones of the Ottoman-Iranian border where nomadic Bedouins lived.116 The 
implementation of the 1864 Provincial Reform Law in Libya and in the eastern 
frontiers of the Ottoman Empire sets a good example for this. The implementation of 
the law in Libya was much more successful when compared with the “Kurdish or 
Arabian frontiers.”117 
It was a governmental practice in the late nineteenth century that “a modern 
body politics that was bound together not only by the coercive powers of the central 
government but also by a network of social alliances and a shared sense of 
identity.”118 These political alliances were lenient in application and, thus, carried a 
benign nature. However, the ad-hoc alliances with other local tribes gave these tribes 
the opportunity to act freely in their localities, including plundering and looting of 
other tribes, which were generally their enemy. When the government called on 
certain tribes for their support, they enjoyed the opportunity to freely act and 
intervene into the affairs of the city or other tribes.119 Because of that, the 1868 Land 
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Law had changed few things in northern Iraq. The old property ownership paradigm 
did not dissolve the traditional patrimonial relations, but continued in another form. 
Despite the article of the Law ordering that, “the whole of the land of a village or 
town cannot be granted in its entirety to all of the inhabitants, nor to one or two of 
them. Separate pieces are to be given to each inhabitant …” in practice, the lands, 
which were previously ruled by the local elite, were registered in their names. 
According to Bruinessen, the implementation of the Law was relatively more 
successful in the highlands, whereas it gained little success in the lowlands. The vast 
holdings in southern Iraq, for instance, had been owned by the “chiefs of the Arab 
tribes.”120 As such, they were not going to relinquish their claims to the land just 
because of a law being proclaimed. 
Stamps were distributed to the chieftains of the tribes by the Valis of the 
provinces to obtain their subservience. The practice of bestowing the robe of honor 
(hil‘at) had been used as an important tool to demonstrate the obedience of the local 
notables to a higher authority since the early times of Islamic caliphates. Thus, 
rejecting or taking robes off meant mutiny against the higher authority. Many 
empires, including the Ottoman, as well as the Chinese and Roman, had adopted this 
tradition.121 The practice of enrobing with honorary dress (hil’at) and awarding 
decorations to appease the Bedouins had been applied by the Ottomans during the 
sixteenth and seventieth centuries to maintain the security of pilgrimage roads 
towards Mecca and Medina. Through this practice, the Ottoman authorities aimed to 
achieve both the security of the roads and the articulation of the Bedouin chiefs to 
“the Ottoman cursus honorum.”122 However, the extensive use of them during the 
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Hamidian regime attracted the attention of the British consular. Because of the 
plentitude of this hil’at, its value had decreased. The British representative noted: 
Two British Indian subjects here named Sujjad Ali Khan and Muhammad 
Hassan Khan of the Family of Nawab Agha Khan Meer, the Vezier of Ghazi-
ud-din Hyder King of Oudh, have lately been presented with medals and 
sanads by the Turkish government because they contributed money to the 
Hedjaz Railway. They do not seem to be very proud of them. Many such 
medals have been distributed here lately and decorations can easily be 
obtained in this way.123 
 
In Syria, in some districts such as Ajlun, the local Ottoman authorities carried 
out a policy of the systematic registration of lands that began a competition between 
the settlers and the nomads alike to acquire the possession of these lands. In return, 
this competition brought about the expansion of cultivated areas. Rogan stated: 
The application of the 1858 Land Law in Transjordan set in process the 
registration of land and encouraged a market in landed property. Between the 
threat of confiscation of lands for settlers and the lands which registered title-
holders stood to gain from their lands, pastoralists and cultivators came to 
accept the new Ottoman regime, much to the benefit of local agricultural 
production and tax revenues.124 
  
However, in the Iraqi region, “the principal source of conflicts in the Iraqi provinces, 
whether between notables or tribes, or between them and the government, was 
land.”125 The tribes in the region were becoming stronger by obtaining modern 
weapons through the international arms trade. Henceforth, there appeared serious 
problems related to tax collection matters. 
The share of lands and property illustrates that 80 percent of the cultivated 
lands were under the control of the Ottoman Empire. “According to Cuinet’s 
estimate, 30 percent of the cultivated land in the Baghdad province belonged to the 
Sultan, 30 percent to the state (miri), 20 percent to the private individuals (tapu), and 
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20 percent was registred as waqf.”126 Consequently, it may be inferred that at the end 
of the nineteenth century, tribalism constituted the dominant character of the Iraqi 
society. Therefore, it was a society with a majority of its population, at least 60 
percent, being composed of semi-autonomous or relatively sovereign tribal 
organizations. However, in contrast to this situation, the overwhelming control of 
property and lands was in the hands of the Ottoman government. Although after the 
Ottoman conquest of Iraq, the timar system was implemented in Baghdad and a 
tahrir register was prepared,127 de facto authority could not easily be established. 
Consequently, the reason behind the disputes between tribal organizations and the 
state arose from the struggle to share these lands. However, the Ottoman government 
was eager on distribute lands to the tribes in return for their subservience. Yet, the 
tribes did not seem willing to abandon their autonomous characters and de facto 
sovereignty to the hands of the state. Therefore, the dispute between these two agents 
appeared inevitable. 
If the settlement policy had not taken place as was claimed, then the tribal 
identity likely would have continued. Indeed, the continuation of tribal identity for a 
considerable amount of time is both a sociological necessity and was the practical 
reality. Bruinessen states, while explaining the power of aghas and shaykhhs and 
further the possibility of the disentanglement of the firmly established relations 
between notables and their serf-like tribesmen that “the existence of primordial 
loyalties and their apparent ubiquity do not preclude the functioning of other 
loyalties. Conversely, when new loyalties such as those of nation and class emerge, 
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the primordial ones do not suddenly cease to function.”128 In addition to this, Batatu 
notes that "down to the 1958 revolution and even afterwards tribes-people continued, 
on the whole, to be governed more by their ancient tribal customs than by the Islamic 
law as developed and interpreted by the Twelve Shi'i Imams." 129 Keeping in mind 
the presumption that the historical occurrences should anyhow follow reasonable 
chronological chains, the tribal customs should have continued their predominance 
over the tribesmen from the late nineteenth through the twentieth century.  
With regard to the discussions on the nature of the spread of Shi’ism, 
assuming that the settlement of the tribes was a prerequisite for the spread may create 
a perception contradictory to the historical reality that was very much determined by 
the ongoing tribal warfare. Indeed, the possibility of conflict seems inherent in a 
geography where the nomadic life-style was predominant due to the geographical 
sparseness, the need for migration, and the eventual possibility of confrontation 
between different nomadic groups. Therefore, it is plausible to claim that the 
Ottoman centralization policy in the late nineteenth century became stricter due to 
the increasing political tensions in the international arena, which acutely threatened 
the Ottoman territorial integrity and due to the unraveling coercive power of the 
government over its various subjects belonging to different ethnic and religious 
backgrounds. However, the success of the settlement policy was limited. The 
influence of the government diminished accordingly as the distance from the center 
of the empire increased. Thus, local groups enjoyed limited liberties, fiilling the 
vacuum of power unintentionally left by the dispersed and inefficient armed forces of 
the empire.  
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Although it is difficult to assume the resettlement of tribes as a prerequisite 
for the spread of Shi’ism, there is still a relation with the changes in the social 
structure of the Iraqi region. There were many other factors fluctuating the tribal 
moves and interrupting the efforts of the state. Around 1837, for instance, Wahhabi 
pressure had moved the “Tay and Anaze tribes which had a powerful penchant to 
cooperate with the state authority and settle down in the environs of Mardin and 
Baghdad”130 It is undeniable that the settlement policy had a strong influence over 
the Iraqi social fabric. Thus, the objective reality of the time was that the 
centralization policy did not fully settle the nomadic and the tribal population; yet it 
certainly dislocated many of them.131 Therefore, one can speculate that the coercive 
power of the governmental forces dislocated the tribes, causing consolidation of their 
internal structures. Moreover, the intensifying warfare between tribes of the region 
may have incited the intra-tribal homogeneity. It was the ground, on which the actual 
agents of historical change namely akhunds, mu’mins, and mujtahids, had played. 
Furthermore, “the anti-governmental motive” might have converged with the 
tribes’ drive for independence from any political authority; thus, Shi’ism might have 
permeated into the worlds of the tribal people by means of a common psychological 
background. Batatu says, “The anti-governmental motive of Shi’ism, its 
preoccupation with oppression, its grief-laden tales, and its miracle play representing 
Husayn’s passion, accorded with the instincts and sufferings of the tribes-people-
turned peasants and must have eased the tasks of the traveling of Shi’i Mu’mins.”132  
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To sum up, discussions on the nature of the spread of Shi’ism should not 
disregard the social structure of Iraq, which was very much determined by tribalism. 
Contrary to the above-mentioned presumption that of the settlement of nomadic 
populations then the subsequent disentanglement of their identity, which caused 
these people to adopt the Shi’i identity, it has been argued here that the socio-
political reality of the Iraqi social fabric was characterized by ongoing tribal warfare 
in the second half of the nineteenth century. Although the Ottoman government 
achieved the settlement of some tribes and some others settled by themselves due to 
economic reasons or structural factors, it did not mean that the customary and 
traditional identities completely disappeared. The old affiliations lasted for a 
considerable length of time. Thus, the question concerning the spread of Shi’ism 
should not be interpreted as the direct result of the changes in the social structure. 
Although the dislocation of the tribes and the increasing activities of the Shi’i 
Mujtahids in the region were undeniably important factors in escalating the Shi’i 
influence, this sociological phenomenon had some other dimensions that will be 
discussed from a historical perspective in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
SHI’I PRESENCE AND THE SPREAD OF SHI’ISM IN IRAQ 
 
 
Prior to the discussions about the spread of Shi’ism, it should be known that 
the presence of Shi’is in the Iraqi region was a centuries-old phenomenon. It was 
predominantly attributable to the tragic beginning of the Shi’i history with the 
martyrs of Hasan and Hüseyin, grandsons of the Prophet Muhammad, and to the 
presence of holy shrines of the respectable Shi’i Imams in the region. In the course of 
time, Iraq became a sacred geography for Shi’is and thus developed both into a major 
center of Shi’i education and into a blessed place for residence and burial. Devout 
Shi’is, before they passed away, desired their corpses to be buried near the shrines of 
highly esteemed Shi’i clerics hoping the mercy of God. Therefore, in this chapter, 
first, the spiritual importance of Iraq as being at the core of the Shi’i pilgrimage or on 
the road to the pilgrimage, second, the historical practice of the corpse traffic, and 
third, the demographic map of the Iraqi region will be introduced. The third issue 
will supposedly give an insight into the social composition of the Iraqi society before 
entering into the discussions on the nature and the extent of the spread of Shi’ism 
that will be the fourth, and the focal point of this chapter. As the fourth issue, the 
spread of Shi’ism will be discussed and be contextualized in the sixth part. The last 
part is going to present a brief discussion on the nature of the spread of Shi’ism. 
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4.1 Shi’i Pilgrimage 
There are many shrine cities in Iraq. Ali was wounded in Kûfe, but his tomb 
resided in Najaf. The tomb of Hussein is in Karbala. “Abbas  has a sepulcher of his 
own. The tomb of Hurr is situated seven miles to the north-east, and that of ’Aun 34 
miles to the north-west of Karbala.”133 Additionally, there are many other shrines 
belonging to the historically significant Karbala incident such as the “tomb of the 
Muslim-bin-’Akil who was Hussein’s emissary to Kufe, and [the tomb] of Hasan.”134 
Furthermore, not only Shi’is but also other Muslims have paid special attention to 
these Shi’i shrines. Resembling each other, the cult of saints have become 
overarching common symbols “among Sunnis, Alevi-Bektashis and even Sufi 
circles.”135 
Before discussing the Shi’i pilgrimage in particular, the pilgrimage to Mecca 
and Medina was described by a contemporary of the early twentieth century as such: 
Almost the only matter concerning all the Mohammedans of the Persian Gulf 
alike [was] that of the annual pilgrimages to the Holy cities of Makkah and 
Medinah. There [were] three principal routes across Arabia by which the 
pilgrims from the Persian Gulf reach Hijaz; the first runs from Hofuf in Hasa 
via Riyadh in Southern Najd; the second from Kuwait via Buraidah in Qasim; 
and the third, from Najaf in Turkish Iraq via Hail in Jabal Shammar. Of these 
the last, by which pilgrims from Persia generally travel, is the most important 
and the most regularly used one. 136 
 
 The other routes were preferred in cases of insecurity. 
Although the hajj to Mecca was acknowledged by Shi’is amongst the primary 
religious duties incumbent upon all Muslims, the persons who visited the tombs of 
Shi’i Imams were entitled as pilgrims (hajjis). Shi’i pilgrimage to the Shrines in Iraq 
came to be one of the main voluntary duties of the Shi’i believers. Both in times of 
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war and in times of peace between Safevids and the Ottomans, the visits, particularly 
for the shrines of Kerbala and Najaf, were thought to be substitutable for Mecca and 
Medina.137 Since Iraq was perceived a sacred geography, it continued its attraction 
through centuries. Marshall Hodgson noted that “the most precious apotropaic 
medicine was a tablet made of the clay of Karbala, held to be infinitely impregnated 
with the sacred blood of Husayn; if it was put under one’s pillow, one was, in effect, 
sleeping at Karbala itself and so under Husayn’s protection.”138 According to 
Ottomans, the importance of shrines in Iraq in the views of the Iranian and Indian 
Shi’is was similar to the respect shown toward Hijaz (Harameyn-i Şerifeyn).139 
As for the Shi’i pilgrimage in the late nineteenth century, approximately one-
hundred thousand pilgrims from Iran and India were annually visiting the Shrines.140 
The pilgrimages were directly influencing the prosperity of Karbala and Najaf. 
Because of that, there sometimes emerged harsh competition between the inhabitants 
of these two Shrines.141 Ottoman officials were demanding from each pilgrim, who 
was following the route to Mecca over Khaniqin, approximately 1 tuman, or 50 
kuruş.142 W. Tweedy, the British Consul in Baghdad, thought that the Turks were 
tolerant because they perceived the Shi’i pilgrims who were visiting the Holy 
Shrines, as a source of income.143 
Iraq was one of the great pilgrimage roads to Mecca and Medina. Since early 
times, the Islamic Caliphates, which ruled over the Iraqi region, paid special attention 
to the improvement of this road. Hence, they tried to find remedies to prevent the 
bedouin attacks on the pilgrim caravans as well as dotted the caravan routes with 
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facilities such as cisterns, milestones, forts, and fire beacons.144 Pilgrimage to the 
shrines of Iraq was a dangerous journey even in the beginning of the twentieth 
century. Constant disputes between tribes were harming and injuring the Shi’i 
pilgrims. These tribal quarrels were making the pilgrimage more difficult. For 
instance, even in the early twentieth century, when the control of the government 
relatively expanded compared to the past decades, there were frequent skirmishes 
occurring between Anaze tribe and their hostile ‘Amir of Jabal’ (Ibn Rashid). Shi’i 
pilgrims were troubled by these unrests on their road to Najaf.145 Although, at an 
occasion, a large number of pilgrims of Najaf remained untouched from the tribal 
conflict emaneted from the feud between Zugurd and Shumurds, 146 the feud 
continued in a growing manner. Thus, “in the course of disturbances some Persian 
subjects [were] said to have been killed, the large bazar [was] said to have been 
looted, and two British subjects [had] been robbed.”147 However, it appears from the 
official documentation that the Ottoman authorities were aware of the importance of 
protecting Persian pilgrims on their route to the Holy Shrines.148 
 
4.2 Corpse Traffic 
By the mass conversion of Iranians to Shi’ism in the sixteenth century, the 
corpse traffic to the holy Shrines of Iraq remarkably developed, particularly to Najaf 
in which the Shrine of Ali, son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad, was situated. The 
desire of Shi’i Muslims to be buried near the Holy Shrines arose by the belief that 
being subjected to the interceding of the capable Imams on their behalf would help 
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them to gain the mercy of God in the Day of Judgment. It was also a benevolence of 
Imams that would “reduce the interval (barzakh) between death and resurrection.”149 
Furthermore, Naqash mentions a tradition “attributed to the sixth Imam Ja‘far al-
Sadiq [which] relates that being next to Ali for a day is more favorable than seven 
hundred years of worship.”150 According to Çetinsaya, “every year an important 
number of people, fluctuating from 30,000 to 100,000, from Iran, and India, visited 
shrine cities of Iraq, or brought the remains of their relatives to bury at the 
Atabat.”151 
 There were some principle cemeteries in Iraq “outside the precincts of shrines 
themselves, which also burials take place, is in order of importance, the following: 
the Wadi as-Salam (Vale of Peace) at Najaf, the Wâdî al-Aimân (Vale of Security) at 
Karbala; the Maqabir al-Quraish, at Kadhimein; and Tarmah at Samarra.”152 The 
expense, “including fees payable to the Turkish Government, of transporting a Shi’ah 
corpse from Kermanshah to Karbala [varied] from 35 to 70 Tumans or, at present 
rates, from 12 to 24 shillings English.”153 
 Throughout the nineteenth century, although there were serious disputes 
among the respectable Shi’i Mujtahids about the transportation of the corpses, as to 
whether it was in conformity with the established practices in Islamic fiqh or not, the 
issue of the transportation of corpses had increased gradually. Depending on the 
British Administrative reports on the Iraq Health Service, Naqash gives the estimates 
of the corpse traffic in the late nineteenth century that “as many as 20.000 corpses 
were brought annually to Najaf alone both from within and outside Iraq”154 while 
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there were only 10.000 burial places. The gap between the number of burial places 
and the number of corpses had confused many of the witnesses of the time. However, 
it was understood later by the botanical surveys that thanks to the soil of Wadi al-
Salâm “the rock and soil around the grave would hold only a short period of time 
before collapsing; this in turn would cause the cavity containing the corpse to sink 
down and disappear.”155 
The transportation of corpses, whether from inside or outside, was subjected 
to certain taxes. They were either the corpses of foreign subjects of Iran and India or 
the Shi’i Ottoman subjects. At an occasion, the annual average income derived from 
the transportation of Shi’i corpses to the graves near holy shrines was estimated to 
7,700 Turkish Liras or 6,903 Pounds.156 However, in fact, the number of the 
collected taxes was changing annually. For instance, some 5,620 Persian and 4,000 
Ottoman subjects, in total 9,620 were buried in 1889 to these precincts, while some 
9,754 Persian and 4,600 Ottoman, in total 14,354 subjects were buried in 1890. The 
revenue of the Ottoman government in Iraq from all the sources officially estimated 
at 6,009 liras or 4,807 pounds in 1889 and at 11,554 Liras or 9,243 pounds in 1890. 
Although it was thought that these amounts were not very considerable at the time, 
Ottoman educational counter-propaganda, which will be explained in detail, was 
heavily dependent on these funerary taxes collected from Shi’is.157 
Fraudulence could sometimes occur during the transportation of corpses from 
Kermanshah to the abovementioned cemeteries near Holy Shrines. There were cases 
that muleteers, who had agreed to transport the corpse in exchange for twenty 
shillings, could leave the corpses down the Diyale River nonetheless in order to keep 
the money for themselves instead of giving it to the Ottoman officials. Similarly, for 
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instance, the people responsible for the transportation issue could lay two corpses 
down into one coffin to escape the official expenses.158 There were many other 
similar cases regarding the transportation, which was occasionally carried out 
through illegal ways. This impelled the local Ottoman governors to be in vigilance 
since the skirmishes that could brake out between the Arab smugglers and the 
Ottoman soldiers because of the smuggling of the corpses to Karbala and Najaf was a 
significant matter.159 
An official document dated to 1850 gives the impression that at that time the 
Ottoman central authority was not aware of the taxes collected from the 
transportation of corpses to the holy shrines of Najaf and Karbala. According to the 
report, the central authority obtained the information around 1850s through rumors 
that every year approximately five hundred corpses were brought to these shrines 
from Iran and other countries of Shi’i governments, and were taken from each certain 
amount of funerary taxes raging from 100 to 200 tumans.160 Hence, they supposed 
that the corpse traffic would then bring a considerable income to the central 
treasury.161 However, three years ago, the increase in the tariffs imposed upon the 
transportation of corpses from abroad to Karbala and Najaf was the matter of 
complaint that was notified by the British Consulate on behalf of the Iranian 
government as against to the local Ottoman authorities in Iraq. Amongst the demands 
enlisted, one was the increase in the taxes upon the corpses from 4 to 5 kıran, and the 
other was the introduction of a new funerary tax collected from the relatives of 
whoever buried in Kamaze near Karbala, which had not existed before and yet began 
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to be applied afterwards. Additionally, local authorities did not let the ritual ablution 
(gusül) of those who were the relatives of the Persian subjects residing in Iraq, unless 
they paid 1,5 kıran, or 75 kuruş.162 
On the one hand, there is was continuing demand since the mass conversion 
of Iranians to Shi’ism, and on the other, the corpse transportation was an early-
established practice. Therefore, the death bodies of Shi’is must have been brought to 
these holy shrines for many years and taxed by the local governors. However, the 
ambiguity of the central government about the taxes imposed upon the corpse 
transportation might mean unawareness of the central authority, which was 
restructuring its administrative and economic apparatuses with reference to the 
principle of central governance, and thus rediscovering its potential sources for the 
central treasury that were traditionally used by the local appointees. Furthermore, the 
previous document brings to mind the idea that the lack of knowledge of the central 
government would signal the evasion of the local administrators to report on their 
activities in order to maximize their incomes. However, this idea will remain 
ambiguous until it is examined whether the administrative reflexes of the local 
governors to the demands of the central government constitute a form of local 
consciousness. 
 
4.3 Population Map of Iraq 
The ethno-religious communal structures in the Ottoman Empire went 
through serious transformations in the late nineteenth century. Ottomans were 
classifying their non-Muslim subjects in definite categories of Christians, Armenians, 
and Jews. It had been the traditional division of the society into certain religious 
categories by the administrative units of the empire. However, this administrative 
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practice began to change and administrators adopted new ethno-religious categories 
by the second half of the nineteenth century. Christians, for instance, were classified 
as Bulgarians, Maronites, and Süryanis.163 In addition, there occurred intricate 
situations. It was in 1882 that the Ottoman government classified different ethno-
religious groups separately. In 1906-1907 censuses, “in addition to Bulgarians, 
Protestants, Armenian Catholics, Catholics, and Rums, they grouped Marinates, 
Süryanis, Caledonians, Jacobites, even Samiris as ‘new nations’ (yeni milletler). But, 
Rum Orthodox, Armenian, Jewish millets were counted forehead.”164 Thus, even the 
very few minority groups began to be counted within their own cultural dominions 
representing a separate identity. Sharing the same milieu, there appeared numbers of 
official documents about the geographical distribution of Iraqi population according 
to denominations in the late nineteenth century. 
Ottoman Iraq was divided into three administrative provincial units: Mosul, 
Baghdad, and Basra. There were eight ethnic groups inhabiting in these provinces: 
Arabs, Turks, Kurds, Armenians, Süryanis, Jews, Nestorians, and Sabaeans. The 
former three constituted the greater majority of the Iraqi population. Kurds were 
generally inhabiting Mosul, while Turks, Kurds, and overwhelmingly Arabs together 
in Baghdad whereas only Arabs in Basra. There were approximately twenty religious 
sects in the Iraqi region including their sub-divisions as Sunni Hanefi, Sunni Şafi, 
Sunni Maliki, Sunni Hanbeli, Cağferi Usuli, Cağferi Şeyhi, Cağferi Akhbari, 
Aliyyullahi, Yezidi, Babi, Catholic Chaldean, Catholic Süryani, Süryani-i Kadim, 
Nestorian, Armenian Catholic, Armenian Nestorian, Armenian Protestant, Jacobite, 
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Protestant Jew, and the Sabaean. There were five major languages spoken as Arabic, 
Turkish, Kurdish, Armenian, and Persian.165 
Baghdad and Basra provinces formed the greater majority of the total Iraqi 
population. According to Çetinsaya, the population estimates for provinces of 
Baghdad and Basra given by Vital Cuinet, whose book was published in 1894, still 
serves as the best account that numbered the provincial populations of Baghdad to 
790.000 and Basra to 940.000.166 The numbers given by Şemsettin Sami for the 
population of Baghdad is close to the number of Cuinet. According to the estimates 
of Sami, a part of Baghdad’s population was composed of crowded Bedouin Arabs 
like ‘Anaze and Shammar that were residing around Euphrates during summers and 
moving towards Najd in winters. The population of the subdivision of Baghdad 
province (Bağdad livâsı) was close to 300.000 including the Shammar tribe, whereas 
the total population of Baghdad province was approximately 800.000.167 It meant 
that nearly two third of the population was living outside the city center. 
In conformity with this information and with regard to the spatial distribution 
of the population, Çetinsaya surmises that, “the nomadic tribes inhabited the desert in 
the west and southwest and covered the 60 percent of the total area.”168 He further 
claimed that the percentage of the urban population had not changed between 1867 
and 1905.169 An official report, dated to 1880, help to better clarify the views on the 
general demographic structure of the Baghdad province. It shows that one quarter of 
the population was settled and “civilized” (engaged in agriculture), one quarter was 
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settled but bedouin (not engaged in agriculture), one quarter mostly peasants was 
living in tents engaging in agriculture, and the remaining quarter was living in tents 
and itinerant.170 
One of the earliest tahrir registers belonging to 1544 and kept by the Ottoman 
officials for the cadastral survey of the Iraqi region gives important information 
about the influence of Shi’ism in Kirkuk and Dakuk regions. Although the northern 
districts of the Iraqi region, unlike the provinces of Baghdad and Basra, were thought 
to be far from the predominance of Shi’i rituals and influence in general, there is a 
striking feature in this tahrir that the names recorded here are different from the 
names recorded in Anatolian or Arabian provinces. It shows the heavy influence of 
Safavids and particularly the Shi’i sect. Hüseyin, Hasan, Ali, Đmamkulu, Şah, 
Şahvirdi, Baba and Pir were among the most frequently given names along Mehmed 
which was the most common name given in Anatolian provinces.171 
Regarding the sectarian map and the spatial distribution of Shi’is inhabiting in 
the Ottoman Empire, it can be said that the majority of Shi’is belonged to either 
Imamiye or Zeydiye fractions of Shi’ism. The Imamiye was predominant in the Iraqi 
region while Zeydiye in Yemen. The inhabitants of Buhran District, in Yemen, were 
Batinis, whose characters were somewhat warlike, yet their numbers were few. There 
was another group belonging to Shi’ism, residing around Seyda and Lebanese 
Mountain, their numbers were also smaller though.172 A confidential report, dated to 
1910, indicates that the total population of the Iraqi provinces was reaching to 
1.500.000 souls. “The alluvial plains at the head of the Gulf [were] predominantly 
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Shi’ah.”173 In places such as Hasa and Bahrain, there were strong Shi’i minorities 
composed of 56.000 and of 40.000 souls respectively. “The Persian Gulf [was] 
predominantly Shi’ah, chiefly on account of the countries at its head, while the Gulf 
of Oman [was] almost altogether Sunni and Ibadi.”174 
The Iraqi region, or rather the part of it with which were principally 
concerned by the British, contained “about 546.000 Shi’ahs as against about 175.000 
Sunnis, but the Sunni element [had] political influence out of proportion to its 
numerical strength, chiefly in consequence of its connection with the 
government.”175 The majority of the inhabitants residing in Mosul were Sunnis in 
addition to few Aliyyullahis, Babis, and Cağferi Şeyhis. The majority of the subjects 
in Basra were Cağferi Usulis, while considerable number of the remaining part was 
Sunni. However, in that remaining part there were also Wahhabis, Cağferis and 
various Christian sects that did not have an important political weight.176 The tribes 
inhabiting around the boundary regions from Revandiz to Hanikin were Sunnis 
whereas the tribes residing on the borderlands from Hanikin to Mahmûde were 
Shi’is.177 However, there is no population estimates for those boundary-peoples. 
Compared to the number of Muslims, the numbers of Jews, Christians, and 
Armenians were very few. According to a British confidential report, the number of 
Jews in the Persian Gulf was estimated to less than 62,000. Of these, 61,000 souls 
were living in Iraq. One possibility for the great concentration in Iraq might be the 
holy Shrines of Jews, namely the tombs of Ezekiel at Kifl and Ezra at ‘Azair in Iraq. 
The number of Oriental Christians in the Persian Gulf was numbered to 11,000 
                                                 
173
 FO 195/2338, Document No: 97/4, 1910.  
174
 Ibid. 
175
 Ibid. 
176
 BOA Y.A.HUS 260/130, 28/L/1309 (25 May 1892) Ahmet Cevad Pasha, Grand Vizier Sublime 
Porte.  
177
 BOA Y.MTV 282/58, 18/Ş/1323 (15 December 1905) From the Commandership of the Sixth 
Army. 
 73 
altogether mostly residing in Baghdad, some in Basra in addition to few in 
Nasiriyah.178 
According to an estimate dated to 1880, seventy-five percent of the total Iraqi 
population was composed of Shi’is, while remaining one quarter of Sunnis. There 
were also very few Christians and Jews.179 According to the numbers given by 
Şemseddin Sami, though rough in character, the greater majority were Muslims, 
being half of the population as Sunnis and half as Shi’is.180 However, the recent 
researches of Çetinsaya, along with the Vital Cuinet, about the subject give 
seemingly more reliable numbers. The number of Sunnis in the province of Baghdad, 
for instance, were estimated to 309,000, whereas Shi’is to 480,000. As for the 
province of Basra, the number of Sunnis were estimated to 276,500, whereas Shi’is 
to 663,150.181 These numbers are also consistent with some official reports. 
According to a British report, dated to 1916, the division of the population of 
Mesopotamia between the two major denominations was that Sunnis constituted 
1.037.000 whereas Shi’is 1.173.000.182 Depending on these numbers, Çetinsaya 
infers that “in 1920s, [the number of] Shi’is was estimated to 56 percent of the whole 
population of Iraq (including Mosul).”183 According to British Census of 1920, the 
percentage of Shi’is was 56 of total population, while Sunnis, including Kurds and 
non-Kurds, were 36 percent. The remaining 8 percent was representing the non-
Muslims. The other censuses, such as the British Census in 1931 and the Iraqi census 
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in 1947 give close numbers and do not change the percentages seriously, as the 
change of percentages ranges from three to five at most.184 
Detailed information about the Iraqi population is crucial for understanding 
the magnitude and the direction of any change in the social structure. However, the 
most reliable population estimates for Iraq goes back, at best, to the late nineteenth, 
and early twentieth centuries such as those of Vital Cuinet, Şemsettin Sami, and 
official reports of British and Ottoman administrators. When the subject matter is to 
analyze the social change between the early and the late nineteenth centuries, then 
these estimates will not be sufficient to understand the nature and the magnitude of 
change. An average estimate of the numbers driven from different sources mentioned 
above helps only to understand the situation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. Therefore, Shi’is were predominantly inhabiting the provinces of Baghdad 
and Basra. They had also a considerable influence on the districts of Mosul province 
and they constituted the greater majority of the total population, possible percentages 
ranging from 55 to 60. All the sources mentioned above agreed that the number of 
non-Muslim in the Persian Gulf was very small in amount and most of them were 
residing in Iraq. Therefore, Sunnis constituted 35 to 40 percents of the total 
population, predominantly occupying the administrative and other governmental 
positions. 
 
4.4 Spread of Shi'ism: Myth or Reality? 
Questions about the nineteenth century social reality of Iraq, which was 
largely marked by the profound tribalism, do not necessarily contradict with the 
assertion of ‘the spread of Shi’ism’. When the heavy concentration of the Ottoman 
official documentation as well as some contemporary chronicles is considered, this 
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assertion becomes a serious historical question. A common theme in the Ottoman 
official documentation about the spread of Shi’ism is the stress on the seriousness 
and urgency of the situation and the subsequent necessity of taking immediate 
precautions. Interestingly enough, despite the heavy abundance of Ottoman sources 
on this issue, there are rare references to ‘the spread of Shi’ism’ in the British official 
documentation. 
The earliest reports that reached the Ottoman authorities about the spread 
seem to be dated to 1860s. The villages of Baghdad that were close to the Iranian 
border thought to have been under the threat of Shi’i propagation. Ottomans assumed 
that the agents engaged in propagation, namely mujtahids, mu’mins and akhunds, 
were coming from Iran. Reception of Shi’ism by the Ottoman subjects was 
considered precarious for the dependence and loyalty of these subjects to the state. 
Hence, the application of necessary measures to prevent this spread seemed crucial. 
The “Shi’i Question” was thus recognized as amongst the most important affairs of 
the state.185 
The possible political and religious consequences of the spread were known 
to the Ottoman authorities for many years. They were also familiar with the influence 
of the mujtahids over Iranian politics. Especially, the role of the mujtahids in 
abolishing the Tobacco Regie had a symbolic significance in the minds of the 
Ottoman officials, demonstrating the power of mujtahids.186 Likewise, the growth of 
Shi’i influence in the Iraqi region introduced to the Porte since 1860s through the 
reports of Mehmet Namık Pasha in 1862, and later Mithat Pasha in 1869. However, 
the reports concerning the Shi’i presence and the spread of Shi’ism subsided for 
about fifteen years until the 9th year of the succession of Abdülhamid II. Then, 
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according to Çetinsaya, the publication and circulation of Hüseyniyye Risalesi by the 
Ottoman authorities set in motion a counter propaganda against the spread of 
Shi’ism.187 
Shi’ism was predominant in both Karbala and Najaf, somewhat tragically for 
the Ottomans. According to a report dated to 1891, the Valis and the Mutasarrifs 
were kissing the hands of Akhunds as a show of respect. Soldiers and the 
commanders were no exception. The situation was true for Imam Musa town, which 
was one hour distant from Baghdad, and for Samarra, which was thirty hours distant 
from Baghdad. The overwhelming majority of the localities in the Iraqi region from 
Basra to Najd were Shi’is. In addition, in every town, there were at least fifteen 
houses resided by Shi’i mollas or ulema.188 
The tone of the Ottoman official documentation about the spread of Shi’ism 
was characterized by despair and hopelessness. Particularly, their fears reached to 
climax in the last decades of the nineteenth century. The Vali of Baghdad reported: 
“If the task of spreading Sunni education is omitted, then it will be impossible to find 
people who believe in the true tenets of faith even amongst the children of the 
government officials.” 189 Similarly, Vahhab had informed Kamil Pasha that Shi’ism 
was spreading amongst the nomads and tribes-people in large portions, while nearly 
half of Baghdad’s population had converted to Shi’ism. However, its expansion in 
the cities, where the settled people inhabited, was slower and conversion was taking 
place at a lower rate.190 It was a double process in the countryside that either the Shi’i 
missionaries were visiting the nomadic tribes or the nomadic tribes were accidentally 
encountering with them. The members of the tribes were visiting the Atabat for once 
                                                 
187
 Çetinsaya, Ottoman Administration of Iraq 1890-1908, 101-02. 
188
 BOA Y.PRK.ASK 72/80, 18/Ca/1309 (18 December 1891). 
189
 BOA Y.MTV 45/24, 10/M/1308 (25 August 1890). 
190
 BOA Y.PRK.BŞK, 57/16, 20/Ra/1316 (7 August 1898). 
 77 
or twice a year. When they came to those shrines, they communicated only with the 
Shi’i Ulema. Accordingly, they just met with the Shi’i interpretation of Islam.191 
Regardless of its phase, the communication between the Shi’i ulema and the nomadic 
non-Shi’i people was considered by the Ottoman officials as a grave danger. 
The numerical estimates of the Ottoman officials demonstrate the high level 
of anxiousness of the bureaucracy. They recognized that the sectarian map of Iraq 
was changing rapidly in the second half of the nineteenth century. The majority of 
the Ottoman subjects in Iraq, as supposed by the officials, had already accepted the 
Shi’i creed.192 According to a report in 1893, Shi’is constituted more than one third 
of the province of Baghdad.193 Another report, dispatched only six years later and 
written by Major Ali bin Hüseyin al-Fath claimed that eighty-five percent of the 
inhabitants of Samarra, Karbala, and Najaf was Shi’is. Feeding the fears of the 
central government, he added that, while only five percent of the total population was 
Shi’i including the city and its vicinity twenty-five years ago, thereafter this ratio 
increased and reached to sixty percent in the city and to eighty percent in the 
vicinity.194 Ottoman officials thought that more than thirty percent of the Iraqi 
population had converted to Shi’ism in such a short time. The Ottoman officials 
thought that the Iranian ulema was so active in their missionary activity that they 
were going into the tribes and walking around them “like the electric currents” 
(seyyâle-i elektrîkiyye misillü).195 In 1892, the current Vali of Baghdad reported that 
Shi’ism was spreading like the grasshoppers all around the Iraqi region.196 
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Ottoman officials had been traditionally attaching double reasons for the 
spread of Shi’ism. These were generally the insufficiency of Sunni education that 
consequently left people to ignorance, and the activities of Iranian mujtahids, 
mu’mins, and akhunds who furtively came to Iraq to “broadcast the good manners 
amongst those people.”197 The reasons assigned varied with slight differences, 
keeping the traditional way of presentation. Accordingly, Muhammed Arif Bey, 
Ottoman envoy to Tehran around 1893, informed the central government that there 
were two reasons for the spread of Shi’ism in Iraq. First, the activities of Iranians and 
particularly the Akhunds who visited villages, subdistricts (nahiye) and the tribes in 
order to spread the Shi’i creed; and second, the activities of Iranian Consulate which 
showed every inclination to interfere with the Iraqi affairs.198  
According to a report dispatched in 1889, 95 percent of the inhabitants of 
Najd, Basra, Muntafik, Samarra, Hille, Najaf, and Kerbala was Shi’i, while only the 
remaining 5 percent was Sunni. The expansion of Shi’ism was so influential that it 
even led to the conversion of one third of the population of Baghdad to Shi’ism. 
Ferik Ismet Bey assigned two reasons for this expansion: first, the considerable 
amount of money from Persia and India distributed by the British consulate backing 
the Shi’i ulema, and second, the activities of Shi’i Mu’mins and Akhunds who were 
educated in the Shi’i madrasas in Iraq. According to the surveys of Ferik Ismet 
Shi’ism had penetrated only to the Izza and Shammar tribes. The content of the 
memorandum presented by Ferik Ismet Pasha was confirmed with cross-reference to 
the other memorandums previously presented by Ali Bey, the current Vali of 
Tranzonid, Nafiz Bey, the chief of Defterhane in Baghdad, and Hasan Efendi, the 
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Mahkeme-i Teftîş-i Evkaf Müsteşarı. In conformity with their advices, the matter was 
endorsed to the Bab-ı Meşihat.199 
Iraq was particularly important for all of the Shi’is because of its spiritual 
importance, having the shrines of Shi’i Imams and having educational importance 
owing to the Kerbala and Najaf as the leading centers of Shi’i education in the 
nineteenth century. In addition, inhabitants of these towns were predominantly 
Shi’is. In the nineteenth century, the Sunni education, as introduced in the official 
documentation, was quite backward compared to the Shi’i education. Hence, the lack 
of Sunni educational institutions as well as the incapability of Sunni scholars in Iraq 
was presented by the Ottoman officials as two major reasons behind the spread of 
Shi’ism. These reasons believed to have created a vacuum, which was filled by the 
activities of Akhunds who went into the tribes and converted them to Shi’ism.200 
Vahhab Bey, Financial Commissary of the province of Baghdad, warned the Sublime 
Porte that Shi’i akhunds, coming from Iran, were converting the Bedouin Arabs and 
other nomadic communities to Shi’ism. He solicited the Porte to take urgent 
precautions. He also complained about both the Mufti and Vali of Baghdad to the 
Porte. The tone of his language was almost pleading.201 According to Major Ali bin 
Hüseyin al-Fath, the ignorance of Sunnis was causing to their dissolution and giving 
occasion to the spread of Shi’ism. The lack of piety and the shortage of Sunni ulema 
were the two causes behind the spread of Shi’ism.202 
Even a rough comparison between the presence of Shi’i and Sunni scholars 
give convincing remarks on the situation. Vali of Baghdad reported in 1890 that 
Shi’ism was spreading because of the neglect and tolerance of both the government 
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and the Sunni Ulema who were looking for jobs to earn their livelihoods. Hence, 
they stayed away from educating students unlike their Shi’i counterparts, who were 
more organized and satisfactorily financed,203 and whose numbers, according to the 
calculations of the Ottoman officials, were reaching to thousands in the Iraqi region 
in the late nineteenth century, residing with the purpose of teaching.204 Vali noted 
that those Shi’i scholars were astonishingly spending hundreds and thousands of 
tumans to open Medreses and attracting people around them. Because of such a 
“political mistake,” the number of Sunnis decreased very rapidly and the number of 
Shi’is increased asymmetrically. For the meantime, it was thought that the situation 
exemplified for Sunnis remained as “a white point on a black ox.”205  
The efficiency of the Shi’i education was one of the common reasons 
assigned by the Ottoman bureaucrats to the spread of Shi’ism. The Shi’i educational 
activities had been traditionally concentrated and powerful around the ‘atabat, 
attracting students from Persia, India, and other geographies of intense Shi’i 
residence. There were Persians and Shi’i Indians constantly visiting the Shrines for 
the purpose of pilgrimage and education, consequently stimulating the Shi’i social 
activity in Iraq. In addition, the powerful charismatic personality of Mirza Hasan 
Shirazî was increasing the synergy of Shi’i educational motivation since the last 
decade of the nineteenth century. According to the estimations of Refik Hüseyin, 
Vali of Baghdad, while there was not even a Sunni scholar, there were approximately 
500 Akhunds. Hence, Sunni people were despairingly sending their children to the 
Shi’i schools.206 
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On the one hand, the Ottoman official documentation encourages the 
researcher that the rapid spread of Shi’ism was an unquestionable fact as detected 
and contested by various central as well as local officials. It was thought to be 
spreading through the agencies of the Shi’i mujtahids, mu’mins, and akhunds who 
came to Iraq, benefited from the backwardness of the Sunni education, and 
performed a missionary activity. On the other hand, the official documentation 
stimulates doubts of the researcher since the state’s intelligence over its subjects 
seems very inaccurate. The numbers were generally rough in character giving no 
detailed accounts about when the spread began. The nature and magnitude of the 
spread cannot be estimated since the percentages were given as quarter, one third, 
half or with other similar ambiguous descriptions. They rather present rough 
percentages, emotionally charged descriptions, and uncertain numbers on the 
magnitude of the conversions to Shi’ism. Thus, it becomes necessary to ask whether 
the discourse, “the spread of Shi’ism,” was a myth or a reality, or how the official 
outlook and actual historical circumstances played roles during the formation of this 
discourse. Despite the obscure exaggerations in the rough and inconsistent 
enumerations assessed by the Ottoman bureaucrats, and despite the recurrently used 
clichés of the official language that fosters skepticism and distrust about the validity 
of the official claims regarding ‘the spread of Shi’ism’, can it be simply said that 
there was a process of conversions to Shi’ism? 
Indeed, they are not only the Ottoman official documentation that mentions 
the spread of Shi’ism. Gertrude Bell, for instance, noted in 1920 that, “It would be a 
curios historical study, if the materials for it existed, to trace the diffusion of Shi’ah 
doctrines in Mesopotamia. They have certainly spread, owing to the missionary zeal 
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of Shi’ah divines, during the last hundred years”207 such as the Zubaid tribe that 
converted to Shi’ism at about 1830s. However, the tribes residing in the north stayed 
away from the influence of this Shi’i spread. In addition to this, Çetinsaya gives 
reference to an important report written by Currie and dispatched to Salisbury, 
indicating that around 1895 nearly 100,000 Sunnis converted to Shi’ism within few 
years.208 
The spread of Shi’ism was taking place over wide areas. In Iraq, North India, 
Oman, and other places Shi’i activism brought about successful results. Cole noted:  
In fading Delhi, Sufi leader Shah Abdülaziz, who had Shi’i in laws, 
complained that in most households one or two members had adopted Imami 
Shi’ism. Sayyid Dildar Ali’s Shi’i Sufi nemesis, Mawlavi Sami, said that 
during his time in India he had noticed great Sunni families gradually 
adopting Shi’i ways, first in their prayers, then in marriage ceremonies, 
burials, and the division of inheritance (some finding the Shi’i law in the last 
regard more convenient).209 
 
The most recently published study on the history of Iraq under the Hamidian 
regime, by Gökhan Çetinsaya, furthered the importance of ‘the spread of Shi’ism’ 
claiming that the spread was the major source behind the formation of Hamidian 
Pan-Islamic policy. Çetinsaya stated:  
Though nothing came of this, it suggests that the controversies over 
Abdülhamid’s Pan-Islamism need to be placed in the context of the Shi’i 
problem in Iraq, his attempts at Shi’i-Sunni unity, and relations with Iran, as 
well as the traditionally acknowledged contexts of Indian and Egypt.210 
 
In other words, while the Hamidian regime was trying to figure out and solve the 
possible threats that might be posed by the Iraqi Shi’is in the future, they eventually 
formulated a policy of uniting all the Muslims first in Iraq, as the most diverse 
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Muslim community in the Empire, and then in the whole Muslim world. Therefore, 
according to his calculations, the discourse, namely the spread of Shi’ism, was 
corresponding to the actual circumstances rather than being fictionally created by the 
Ottoman bureaucracy. 
It was somewhat the constant worry of the Hamidian regime for achieving 
stronger political autonomy through establishing religious solidarity that eventually 
transformed the bureaucratic mentality. Interestingly, only after the readjustment of 
the Ottoman governmental mentality, empire’s bureaucratic circles reinterpreted the 
Shi’i presence in Iraq in a different manner and thus gave birth to “the Shi’i 
Question.” Hence, some historians, such as Yitzhak Naqash and Gökhan Çetinsaya, 
introduced “the spread of Shi’ism” as a gradual structural transformation that began 
in the late eighteenth century and continued the late nineteenth and as something that 
the Ottoman officials realized belatedly. Obviously, the reflection of the 
circumstances to the Ottoman documentation was partly due to the shift in the 
governmental outlook on the Shi’i presence in Iraq. However, the whole discourse 
was not simply a fictional creation of the Ottoman bureaucrats. There was something 
changing with the Shi’ism and the Shi’is of Iraq. Therefore, I argue to place the 
discourse of “spread of Shi’ism” somewhere in between the mythical interpretation 
of the Ottoman officials under the influence of Hamidian Pan-Islamist propaganda, 
and partly to actual historical processes interpreted by the scholarly debates on the 
history of Shi’ism in Iraq. 
There remains a vital question about the content and the nature of ‘the spread 
of Shi’ism’ whether it was a nominal reception or had some intrinsic value. It is hard 
to give a clear answer to this question since the manifestations of beliefs hardly 
become the matter of historical documentation, however, will be attempted in the last 
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part of this chapter. Yet, without ignoring the possible consequences of the content of 
the spread, it would be more plausible to focus on a more comprehensive 
explanation. To this end, I would like to adopt the idea of “social closure” put 
forward by Frank Parkins, and utilized by Juan Cole as an illuminating explanation. 
According to Cole, “the professionalization among nineteenth century Shi’i clerics 
and the setting up of increasing communal boundaries between Shi’i Muslims and 
other religious communities”211 are important for understanding the escalating 
synergy of Shi’i communities. Thus, it is the new and important contribution of this 
thesis that although Shi’ism had relatively spread into the tribes living in the 
countryside of Baghdad and Basra, it was the increased activity and organization of 
the Shi’i communities, which increased their effectiveness and weight in the political 
spectrum rather than the magnitude of spread itself. In this regard, the spread of 
Shi’ism shared a general historical context in the world history that will be explained 
below. However, before that it would be better to discuss an important process that is 
the rise of Usuli interpretation of Shi’ism at the expense of the Akhbari 
interpretation, reshaping, accelerating, and giving a great impetus to the Shi’i 
political activism. 
 
4.5 The Triumph of Usulism: The Rise of Shi’i Politics 
The rise of Usulism at the expense of Akhbari interpretation of Shi’i 
jurisprudence gave an innovative perspective to Shi’is for understanding and 
interpreting the worldly affairs. Usulism attributed a peculiar function to a group of 
Shi’i clerical notables. In this context, mujtahids began to be introduced as capable 
people who could make jurisprudential judgments depending on their reason and 
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consequently use political and religious authority over certain masses of people. 
Thus, they came to be religious as well as political leaders. 
The Imami Shi’is were “largely political quietists before 1500, awaited the 
return of the [twelfth] Imam from Occultation, or supernatural disappearance.” 
During the period of Occultation, “state-related functions as collection and 
distribution of taxes, leading Friday congregational prayers, and heading up holy war 
(jihad) campaigns could not be carried out until his return.”212 In relation to this, it 
was stated: 
The early Shi’i canonical collections of oral reports from the prophet and the 
Imams contained no designation of authority from the Imams to the clergy, 
and that although the relaters (sing. Muhaddith) of the Imam’s oral reports 
were charged with acting as informal judges in disputes between Shi’is, the 
community could reverse their decisions if they found them to be based on 
oral reports not widely accepted as authentic.213 
 
However, the qualities and functions of the rightful Caliph gained further 
importance during the formative period of Shi’i theology.214 Representing the 
prophetic charismatic authority, Imam Ali came to assemble the unique 
representative authority of the exoteric and exoteric aspects of Islam.215 According to 
the Shi’i version of Islamic legal authority, the doctrine of Imamate did not allow the 
disappearance of the personal prophetic charisma of the Prophet Muhammad. The 
doctrine further enabled the continuation of the prophetic charisma through the 
successive Imams, and eventually gained a permanent endurance with the idea of the 
occultation of the twelfth Imam.216 The doctrine of the occultation and its permanent 
endurance until the return gave a legal spectrum to the Shi’i jurists to transform the 
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status of the Mujtahids. Thus, the two main premises of the Usuli Shi’ism as “the use 
of independent reason (ijtihad) and the trust to human intellect” transformed into the 
tools of discovering the will of Hidden Imam.217 “The triumph of the Usuli position 
divided the Shi’i community into two: muqallid and mujtahid.”218 Mujtahid, as merji-
i taqlid, was liable “to dispense guidance on political matters in a sense opposed to 
the will of the state.”219 Mujtahids began to fulfill various functions over the society 
vis-à-vis the state authority. They involved in education, judicial matters, marriage 
contracts, and economic activities in bazaars, all of which fit the realm of the states 
and thus authorized by it. 
Merji-i taqlid was another important concept that emerged with the rise of 
Usulis. Especially after the deaths of Shafti and Sayyid Mahdi Tabatabai, the 
invention of the concept was due to a practical necessity of fighting against the 
Shaykhism and Babism. The mujtahid who occupied this status was thought to be 
representing conscience of the society as the central delegate of the ulema’s supreme 
authority. Marji-i taqlid meant the prominence of a mujtahid over other mujtahids, 
being at the top of the religious hierarchy.220 
Hamit Algar introduced the struggle between Akhbari and Usuli schools of 
fiqh as the most important internal differentiation in the history of Shi’ism. The 
dispute between these two schools was about the methodology and principles of fiqh 
as well as the issues of taqlid and ijtihad. Taqlid meant “the submission to the 
directives of the learned in matters of religious law” whereas ijtihad meant “the 
exercise of rational judgment by the learned in the application of religious law.”221 
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The Akhbaris, emphasizing the absolute authority of the Imams, “rejected both 
principles, holding that the entire community, learned and non-learned alike, should 
submit exclusively to the guidance of Imams. The Usulis by contrast proclaimed the 
legitimacy of submission to the directives of the learned, and of the practice by them 
of ijtihad.”222 According to Keddie, Usuli interpretation of fiqh provided “a doctrine 
of continuous reinterpretation of the will of the Imam, though it may have started for 
quite other reasons, institutionalized a flexibility regarding legal and especially 
political questions.”223 
Since the beginning of the nineteenth century, both the power and the number 
of the mujtahids began to increase exponentially. “The Mujtahids [became] 
instrumental in forcing Fath Ali Shah to a second war with Russia, and obtained the 
dismissal of several provincial governors.”224 The opposition between Mujtahids and 
the Iranian state ensured and deepened during the reigns of Muhammad Shah (1834-
1848) and Nasir ad-Din Shah (1848-1896). The number of Mujtahids, as well, 
“massively increased in the second half of the nineteenth century. While there were 
less than a dozen mujtahids in the first four decades of the nineteenth century,” in the 
following four decades of the Nasir ad-Din Shah’s reign, there were “nearly one half 
of the 359 noteworthy ulema of the period or some 175 persons, either explicitly or 
by inference, classifiable as mujtahids.”225 
The crucially important aspect of the victory of Usulis over the Akhbaris, as 
argued by the treatise of Muhammad Baqir al-Bihbihani, was that “it [became 
legally] incumbent on laymen to emulate not only the Imams, as the Akhbaris 
contended, but also the mujtahids, whose learning and religious eminence qualified 
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them to act as general representatives of the Hidden Imam.” Thus, mujtahids had the 
legal right to collect and distribute the religious taxes (zakat) and to authorize 
jihad.226 They began to utilize various sources of income. “Donations and religiously 
sanctioned taxes (zakat, khums) paid by the merchants formed the second most 
important source of ulema income after the endowments attached to mosques and 
institutions of religious learning.”227 The Mujtahids, having the legitimate right of 
ijtihad and sufficient sources of economic income, acted as political agents. “In 1843, 
the sack of the holy Shi’ite city of Karbala by the Ottoman governor of the Arab Iraq 
and the inaction of the Qajar government provoked Shafti to announce that he would 
dispatch an army against Baghdad whatever the intentions of the Shah.”228 In other 
words, the mujtahids regarded themselves as capable political rulers as well. In the 
beginning of nineteenth century, leading mujtahids began to collect religious taxes in 
the name of the hidden Imam.229 
The capability of mujtahids in establishing a religious precedent was 
outwardly expressed by Bihbihani (1706-1746), a prominent Shi’i scholar known as 
the leading figure in promoting the Usuli dominance. The role of the mujtahids 
gained further impetus through the writings and activities of Muhammad Hasan b. 
Bâkır an-Najafi (1787-1850). Najafi enlarged the scope of the mujtahid’s authority 
including the rule over political affairs, collection of religious taxes, protection of the 
weak, and the derivation of the incomes in the name of the just rulers.230 The power 
of the mujtahids reached its zenith during the charismatic leadership of Mirza Hasan 
Shirazi (1815-1895). Although Shirazî did not leave any scholarly work behind, his 
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political activism, especially his rejection of the Tobacco Regie in 1891, gave him an 
evident fame. His students, such as Naini and Khorasani who were to support the 
constitutionalist movement in Iran, continued the tradition of mujtahids’ involvement 
in actual political affairs through justifying modern schooling and military services. 
Mirza Hüseyin Tehrani (d. 1908) and Abdullah Mazenderani (d. 1914) supported the 
idea of balancing Shah’s authority with an assembly.231 
To sum up, following the triumph of Usulism, the Shi’i hierocracy showed a 
strong tendency toward centralization of the Shi’i ulema. Through the nineteenth 
century, the teachings of the leading Shi’i scholars helped to create an efficiently 
functioning hierarchy. The predisposition toward perfection and consolidation of the 
Shi’i hierocracy bestowed an immeasurable competence to the Shi’i religious 
organizations and thus the authority of the Mujtahids over society increased 
considerably. Thereafter, the existing Shi’i communities elsewhere in the Middle 
East were driven by the mujtahids who were leading or representing in the Shi’i 
masses both worldly and heavenly affairs, both of which cannot be separated 
according to Islamic theology. This was chiefly a modern phenomenon that was 
sharing a broader historical context that will be explained in the following pages. 
Before furthering the argument, the tendency of introducing akhunds and 
mu’mins, as the Shi’i students directed by certain mujtahids and as the ones who 
deliberately went into the tribes and fulfilled the social practical needs of tribesmen, 
should be criticized and revised. Regarding the statues of these Shi’i agents, the 
Ottoman official sources as well as Yitzhak Naqash introduced them as the major 
factor behind the conversion of tribes. These Shi’i agents were assumed as dignified 
and independent persons acting in solemnity and on behalf of the good will of their 
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creed. However, the actual case shows that the Shi’i men of learning were not always 
powerful agents, independently acting, teaching, and enlightening the tribesmen 
through their visits. Indeed, they were in need of money and occasionally retained by 
the tribes to make them served in their matters such as arranging divorce and 
marriage contracts, writing for their correspondences and keeping their accounts.232 
What is important here, as argued by an Ottoman official document, is the 
connection between these Shi’i agents and their interlocutors. Although, they were 
retained by tribes and dependants in the beginning, they influenced the social 
structures to which they were accredited. 
 
4.6 Contextualizing the Spread of Shi’ism 
Pan-Islamism, Dreyfus Affair, the Zionist Movement, Irish Question, the rise 
of Mahdi in Egypt and accelerated activities of missionaries, as well as the rise of 
William Gladstone to prominence were sharing a general historical context. 
According to Akarlı, Islamism of Abdülhamid II emerged in a defensive mood in an 
age in which “religious fervor was becoming an increasingly conspicuous aspect of 
internal and international politics in the age of high imperialism with rapid 
industrialization and its concomitant social problems.”233 Contrary to the traditional 
perceptions of modernization and secularization, traditional religious powers tended 
to became far more dominant throughout the nineteenth century. An examination of 
the nineteenth century political-religious mass movements, including “those tied to 
Sufi orders like Shamyl’s resistance in the Caucasus, or the Sanusis of Cyrenaica to 
the Messianism of the Babis of Iran or of the Mahdists of Sudan to the Orthodoxy of 
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the Iranian Ulema,” all together demonstrates the accelerating force of the traditional 
religious powers.234 
According to Karpat, “the upswelling from below made the Muslim masses 
gradually conscious of their social situation and identity, which then were politicized 
and redefined.”235 The Islamic revivalist movements in the late nineteenth century, 
except the Wahhabis of Arabia, were influenced by neo-Sufi movements and 
Nakşibandia. In addition, “all were popular, egalitarian movements, driven from 
below, and sought to regenerate and revive Islamic society morally from the inside 
… claiming to return to the religious fountainhead.”236 
Edmund Burke, provoking our methodological consciousness states that the 
changing contexts pose new perspectives, which certain thoughts predominate over 
others, and highlight certain presumptions. Thus, the idea of Islamic revival is partly 
a product of such a paradigmatic transformation in the perceptions, though partly 
rests on real circumstances. To make a sober reexamination of and to analyze the 
appropriate factors behind the increasing activity of Islamicate societies, Burke 
tended to make a differentiation between ‘the Islamic movements’ and ‘the social 
movements in Islamic societies’. Burke offers a multi-layered explanation that favors 
the collective social movements that espoused some common symbols instead of 
Islamic political movements whose symbols and concepts are driven from the 
Islamic belief. The first layer is “the indigenous self-strengthening movements” that 
came into existence through the coercive power of the states, which demanded more 
centralized control over the population. The second layer, “the incorporation of the 
Middle East into the world economy” that deteriorated the existing communal 
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relations and raised sharp economic cleavages. The third layer is “the establishment 
of the [direct] European hegemony” that consolidated the fragmented internal 
opposition against the foreign evil.237 
Ira Lapidus stresses the importance of the common symbols that gave 
legitimacy and popular attraction to Islamic socio-political movements since the 
second half of the nineteenth century. To him, the Islamic symbols and the leaders 
who represented them were the intrinsic values of the Islamic social structures. These 
symbols, though could only succeed in certain geographies, were carrying the 
potential for setting up organizational movements.238  
During the second half of the nineteenth century the revolts in Algeria from 
1851 to 1914, though mainly proto-nationalist and defensive in character against the 
colonial exploitation, were completely or partially organized by ‘religious figures’ 
who emphasized the universality and fairness of these movements.239 Against the 
French invasion of Tunisia, ‘activist men of religion’ played a decisive role of 
propagating behind the scenes. “They not only commanded considerable resources 
and the loyalties of diverse groups of people but also had systems of communication 
and information at their disposal.” Furthermore, the Sufi elite in southern Tunisia and 
Algeria “exercised a near-monopoly over learning sanctity, and consequently, moral 
authority.” 240 The case of Abu Jummayza, who was “a religious figure in western 
Dar Fur who emerged into prominence in 1888, there years after the death of Mahdi 
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[of Egypt],” showed that the already existing local oppositions gained more 
centralized and universalistic Islamic character toward the end of the nineteenth 
century, particularly due to the Western colonialist expansion.241 
The main religious branches began to consolidate over small groups of 
religious factions. For example, followers of the Khodja sect were residing both in 
India and in the Persian Gulf, in countries such as Oman. Its history is dated to 15th 
century that began through conversions of Hindus living in Sind and Kach to the 
Ismaili Shi’ism. The term, Khodja, meant in the context of the nineteenth century 
‘honorable and worshipful convert.’ Their numbers together in India and in the 
Persian Gulf were few as estimated to 2.000 souls. According to the description of 
the Geographical Volume of the Persian Gazetteer, Khodja was “a sect of people 
whose ancestors were Hindus in origin, which was converted to and has throughout 
abided in the faith of the Shi’ah Imami Ismailis, and which has always been and still 
is bound by ties of spiritual allegiance to the hereditary Imams of the Ismailis.”242 
However, in the midst of the nineteenth century, schism prevailed in the history of 
the Khodja sect. The followers of this sect in Bombay, India, became Sunnis whereas 
the ones in Gwadar243 accepted Twelver Shi’ism. Similarly, ninety percent of the 
Khodjas in Oman converted to Twelver Shi’ism. In compliance with the conjectural 
trends of consolidation and homogenization, the followers of Khodja sect adopted 
either Sunni or Twelver Shi’i interpretations of Islam. 
As another example, at the end of the late eighteenth century, parallel to the 
rise of Usulism, there emerged a fraction from within the Ibadi sect, named as 
Mutawwa’ barrowing some features of Wahhabism such as being “pledged to 
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obedience.” “The revolution of 1868, which carried Sayyid ‘Azzan bin Qays into 
power at Masqat, was essentially Mutawwa’ in its character.” Between the years 
1868-1871, there were fanatical proceedings of these sects in Oman. “The political 
ambition of individuals, the desire for change, and the hope of booty” were the main 
motives of seemingly religious disturbance that took place in Oman toward the end 
of the nineteenth century. Being responsible for these political turbulences, 
Mutawwa’ movement had been the central dissident theme of the Oman politics as 
forming the continuous opposition. The rise of Mutawwa’ as a strong oppositional 
figure in the Oman politics as well as the rise of the Ismailis to power under the 
leadership of Agha Khan in the midst of the nineteenth century was sharing a 
common paradigm with the resurgence of Shi’i political activism.244 
The internal cohesion played an important role as much as the external threat 
for homogenization of certain scattered social groups around ethno-religious 
identities. For instance, in the late nineteenth century, Ottoman authorities had taken 
harsh measures to convert Yezidis to Sunni Islam. In this context, “Umar Wahbi’s 
attack against Shaykhan in 1892 as commander of a reform force sent from Istanbul 
to Mosul to crush the tribal rebellions in the province provoked the conversion of the 
Yezidi Mir Mirza Beg and the desecration of the shrine of Shaykh ‘Adi which was 
turned into a Quranic school.”245 However, this endeavor gave birth to “millenarian 
anti-Muslim propaganda,” which created considerable degree of excitement and was 
carried out by two religious Yezidi persons from Shaykhan namely Mirza al-Kabari 
and Alias Khallu, and in return, frustrated the Ottoman campaign. Furthermore, this 
unexpected reaction mobilized the Yezidis of Jabal Sinjar whose numbers increased 
                                                 
244
 FO195/2338 Doc No: 97/4, (1910). In the early nineteenth century, the Ismailis, though did not 
endure, has enjoyed great political influence. In 1838, for instance, Muhammad Hussein Husseinî, 
Agha Khan, had revolted against the Persian government, seizing Kermanshah until defeated by the 
Persians. Thus, he was exiled to India in 1845. 
245
 Fuccaro, The Other Kurds, 34-35.  
 95 
considerably through the other Yezidis who joined them and formed an organized 
group gathering around Hamu Shiru, the leader of Yezidis at Jabal Sinjar.246  
The process that led to the homogenization of population and thus quickened 
the establishment of central administrations was not secularization but rather a form 
of modernization, which adopted an Islamic mood. Within the socio-political context 
of the frontier of Asia, such a period of modernization brought about a bilateral 
process that caused the rapprochement of state and society. It was the extension of 
political domination over the very segments of society as well as the increase of 
public involvement in political affairs. On the one hand, certain institutions such as 
the Maruzat-ı Rikabiyye Đdaresi, which operated under the Sarai machinery, 
functioned in collecting and replying the petitions presented by public and on the 
other, the continuing practice of public petitioning during the public processions of 
Sultans (Cuma Selamlığı), publicized the governmental apparatus. These two were 
the particular examples of the rapprochement between the Sultan and his subjects in 
the Ottoman context while the similar practice of petitioning played an important 
role in establishing direct communication between the Shah and the ordinary people 
in Iran.247 The politization of religious communities took place in the similar process 
that the Shi’is of South Asia gone through.248 
Despite various political and economic handicaps, there were considerable 
economic developments following 1890s that gave rise to the formation of 
‘organized labor movements.’ “Economic developments and new opportunities 
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accelerated the politization of the population.”249 Nadir Özbek explained the 
formation of public sphere in modern sense as the unintentional result of the 
Hamidian “paternalistic policy” that came out by the initiative of “ruling groups” that 
referred to “civic activities” for the purpose of “organizing popular consent, 
renewing and reproducing hegemony, and legitimizing themselves.”250 By the 
activities of Hamidian regime, there emerged and expanded a dynamic public sphere 
out of its search for legitimation. 
Juan Cole rightly pointed out some elements of religious communalism and 
separatism towards the late nineteenth century that was true not only for the modern 
South Asia but also for Iraq. Two aspects of the major phenomenon were that “first, 
the increasing organization of religious communities for political action and 
competition for resources- began towards the end of the nineteenth century, helped 
by the growing literacy and mass communications. Second, local community leaders 
mobilized their religious communities as a means of gaining power.”251 The author 
mentions a third element that of the direct influence of the British power, which was 
partly true for the Iraqi case since they could not establish a firm control over Iraq 
until the first quarter of the twentieth century. The first two aspects of the 
explanation are perfectly fitting the circumstances that were observed in the Iraqi 
society. The transformation from a dispersed social structure to a more central one 
engendered fluctuations in the traditional structure. Though a full-fledged 
centralization had not taken place even in the early decades of the twentieth century, 
the increasing governmental cohesion against the decentralizing elements intensified 
the homogeneity within communal groups. At some point, increased activity of 
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Shi’ism converged with the fluctuations in the social groups, whether urban or tribal, 
that eventually led to the nominal embrace of Shi’ism by the population, primarily by 
the tribes. After that, espousing their new identities, the discourse of their struggle 
against the official authority was redressed. In other words, mobilization of the 
communal groups took place in a religious mood, which was a mean for gaining 
power and opposing to the central authority. 
All these arguments denote the fact that there was a structural change during 
the nineteenth century in the public sphere whose major theme was predominantly 
the religious revival. The major characteristic regarding the history of religion in the 
Middle East was a bilateral process that of ‘the homogenization of society’ and ‘the 
consolidation of organized social movements’ followed by a process of politization. 
 
4.7 The Nature of the Spread of Shi’ism 
In the second chapter, the structure of the Iraqi population was discussed 
drawing the conclusion that despite the heavy persistence of the Ottoman 
government to achieve the settlement and subservience of tribes, the socio-political 
reality of the Iraqi region in the second half of the nineteenth century was 
characterized by the ongoing tribal warfare. In this chapter, it is discussed that the 
effectiveness of Shi’i populations increased through the rise of mujtahids as powerful 
religious and political leaders who achieved the subsequent, yet limited and nominal, 
conversions of certain segments of the Iraqi population from Sunnism to Shi’ism. 
Therefore, there were two major processes in the late nineteenth century Iraq as the 
recurrent unrests caused by the tribal warfare and the resurgence of the Shi'i politics. 
However, these two processes, though happening concurrently, never caused the 
constant tribal rivalry to turn into a large-scale sectarian conflict. 
 98 
An explanation to this seemingly paradoxical situation can be implicitly 
found in the writings of Hanna Batatu. Batatu’s claim, in general, is that the division 
of Iraqi society was not based on a sectarian frame but rather on social classes 
distinguished by their historical experiences of administration and economic 
situations. In explaining the ethnic-class correlations of the Iraqi society, Batatu 
argues that there was a “deep-seated social economic cleavage” between Shi’is and 
Sunnis. High ranks and files of the Iraqi Army were occupied by Sunnis, who 
commanded the conscripted Shi’i tribes-people. Similarly, “the most influential 
mallâks or landlords of the province of Basra were, with one exception, Sunni, while 
the cultivators of their palm gardens were overwhelmingly Shi’i.”252 According to 
Batatu, various other similar cases illustrate the socio-economical stratification and 
the structural reality of Iraq. 
Cole and Keddie argue another perspective that the content of the Shi’i 
protests cannot merely be confined to class disputes; in fact, they were carrying both 
ethnic-and-class based characteristics at the same time.253 In the twentieth century 
Iran, nationalism as an identity “has often proven stronger than obvious religious or 
sectarian allegiances, even in a state of weak national identity.”254 According to Cole 
and Keddie, “Shi’i activism [differs] in Iraq or in Lebanon than in Iran, and most 
Iraqi and Lebanese Shi’is wish to achieve a more equal status within their own 
societies rather than to give up their national identities completely for religious 
ones.”255 Whereas Peter Marion Sluglett and Farouk Sluglett state comparatively in a 
more moderate perspective that: 
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Several ties bind individuals to each other; family relationship, tribal 
affiliation, and co-residence continue to play an important part in people’s 
lives, and the lack of a democratic and regular administrative hierarchy makes 
the use of such channels indispensable. In this kind of society, sectarian 
membership, of whatever sect, plays a similar role, but because individuals 
may be operating on several levels at once, it is normally impossible to 
disentangle the specifically sectarian or family or tribal or co-residence 
ingredient of any particular intra-personal relationship. Hence we cannot say 
that the fact of being a Sunni or a Shi’i is of no importance, but it is generally 
only of importance in this sense.256 
 
Therefore, it can be inferred that the sectarian affiliations were not 
predominantly but, at most, equally important as much as other traditional factors 
such as the tribal affiliations and the co-residence that made up the Iraqi social fabric. 
Thus, despite the seemingly strong penchant, the ongoing tribal warfare did not turn 
into a large-scale sectarian conflict in Iraq. Indeed, Afghanistan experienced a similar 
case in the last decade of the nineteenth century through the Hazara War (1891-93). 
Following his reign, Abdurrahman as a Sunni Muslim ruler wanted to integrate the 
whole territory and pacify other potential powers including the “tribally organized 
Hazaras, the largest Shi’i community in Afghanistan, and one of the poorest groups, 
inhabiting a mountainous region that is characterized by long, cold winters and a 
paucity of arable land.”257 To this end, securing a fatwa from the leading Sunni 
ulema of Kabul, Abdurrahman declared the Shi’is infidel. His primary concern was 
to provide legitimacy for his military actions and justify the collection of the booty 
from the Hazaras. Abdurrahman further planned the incitement of the other Sunni 
tribes that could have made the benefit of booty and gladly join him. However, 
unexpected developments occurred beyond his plans. The previously isolated tribal 
warfare began to turn into a larger sectarian conflict. To defend their region and 
religion, Shi’i Hazara tribes united and set up a coalition under a Sayyid, Timur 
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Shah. Like Abdurrahman, they secured a fatwa from the leading mujtahids of 
Mashed against Sunnis. Soon after, the Qizilbashs, a major element of the Afghani 
Shi’is, were suspected by Abdurrahman who began to persecute them. Finally, 
Abdurrahman’s campaigns overwhelmed the resistance, reduced the power of 
Sayyids and tribal leaders, confiscated their lands, and relocated the inhabitants of 
the Hazaras.258 Both due to the extensive power of Abdurrahman and the incapability 
of the Shi’i tribal coalition, the sectarian conflict did not have a permanent impact. 
Otherwise, the excessive potential would have made the conflict more ostensible. 
It seems fair enough to argue that the distinctive characteristic of the 
geographical distribution of the Iraqi tribal population alongside the lenient policies 
of the Ottoman government towards the Iraqi Shi’i population avoided the 
materialization of such potential. The presumably accidental geographical 
distribution motivated them to adopt certain sects. The urban population of Baghdad, 
for instance, was living in different city quarters according to their faiths, sects, and 
classes. The Shi’i Shrine cities were predominantly housed by Arab or Persian Shi’is 
whereas the places, such as al-A‘dhamiyah where the shrine of Imam Azam situated, 
was populated by Sunnis.259 Furthermore, sometimes two branches of the same tribe 
could differ from one another as one being Sunni and the other Shi’i. The Shammar 
Jarba‘, a branch of the Shammar Arabs, lived around Mosul province and was Sunni, 
while the Shammar Toqah, another branch of the Shammar Arabs, lived around the 
south of Baghdad and was Shi’i. The same was also true for the Dulaim tribe one 
branch of whom resided around the middle Euphrates and was Shi’i whereas the 
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Dulaim tribe itself resided around the Euphrates and around the northern parts of 
Baghdad and was Sunni.260 
In addition to these factors, Marion Sluglett and Farouq Sluglett argue that the 
social stratification in Iraq was characterized by the ability of administration and the 
magnitude of economic wealth in the historical experience. Sunnis had been 
dominating the administrative offices for the long time. They were urban and 
wealthy and inhabited in Baghdad, the centre of political authority, while Shi’is were 
largely poor and lived in the rural areas. They remained untouched with the political 
circumstances unless they felt the necessity of protesting anything against their 
interests, beliefs or threatened their presence. Even after the 1920s, the tribal 
affiliations were much more important than being a devout of a particular sect. 
People were identifying themselves with regard to their families, which belong to 
certain tribes.261 Even more, Shi’is might have been more reluctant to the social 
change due to the fact that they were mostly a part of illiterate agrarian society and 
had nothing to say in the political decision making process.262 
To determine ‘who believes in what’ is a controversial issue, thus cannot be 
easily understood as long as revealing the manifestations of people’s faiths is quite 
hard. However, the ways of living can give an insight to understand the degree of 
religiosity among the Iraqi population thus help to clarify to comprehend the content 
of the spread of Shi’ism. As it was recurrently expressed throughout the study that 
the social and cultural values of the nomadic life were so powerful in the Iraqi 
society even in the midst of the twentieth century, some Shi’i Arabs identified 
themselves as bedouin, highlighting the values such as braveness, purity of race, 
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strength against difficulties, and superiority over the townsmen.263 Among the Arab 
nomadic people, across a huge geography including North Africa, Yemen, Oman, 
and Arabia, the religious rituals were occupying a less important place especially 
when compared to the settled people. For this reason, generally speaking, they had 
no particular ‘cult of death saints’ which is peculiar to settled life-style.264 Iraqi 
nomadic population did not constitute an exception to this situation. According to 
Batatu, “the life of urban Arabs was on the whole governed by Islamic and Ottoman 
laws, that of the tribal Arabs by Islamically tinged ancient tribal costumes.”265 
Therefore, the content of the spread remains ambiguous. In addition to this, one 
should be careful about the morphology of the social structure, which is important to 
understand the perception of piety and the nature of any sectarian affiliation. There 
has to be a separation between the ways and degrees of piety in nomadic and urban 
people. Nomadic people are driven more by their customs and traditions than the 
rules of the Sharia‘. Rules of the Sharia‘ are much more binding in the cities where 
many people are living together. Indeed, there are many official documents 
illustrating complaints of the Ottoman governors regarding the irreligious nature of 
nomadic life.266 Hence, the Ottomans were content with the idea of sending ulema 
into these nomadic populations. Undoubtedly, their opinions were in conformity with 
the reality of the time. Moreover, they were expecting that the increase in religiosity 
of people, in return, would increase their respect and obedience towards the Caliph 
and the state. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
EDUCATION AS AN OTTOMAN RESPONSE TO THE SHI’I 
QUESTION 
 
 
Although this study argues that the spread of Shi’ism was nominal in 
character and was mainly focused upon the mobilization of the Shi’i communities 
around the political-religious charisma of Mujtahids, Ottoman authorities perceived 
the spread of Shi’ism as a process of rapid conversion of great numbers of Sunni 
masses to Shi’ism. Thus, the Ottoman authorities assumed that the spread had some 
intrinsic value, which could pose considerable political threats in the near future. 
Because of that dynamic, it is necessary to introduce the education policy of the 
Ottoman officials as the central method of their systematic counter-propaganda 
against the spread of Shi’ism.267 From this perspective, it is clearly understood then 
why the Ottomans placed so much emphasis upon modern education. Any researcher 
studying the history of education in late nineteenth century Ottoman Iraq would 
likely have had his interest piqued by the state documents, which illustrate the 
profound belief of the Ottoman officials in the transformative power of education. 
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For the Ottomans, preventing the spread of Shi’ism was “an obvious precept” (emr-i 
bedîhî), which meant an evident and necessary object, having no need to be proven 
or manifested.268 Thus, education, particularly in the modern sense, had by the 
Ottoman Empire been endowed nearly a “magical” ability to change the society in 
the manner which the Ottoman authorities aimed to achieve. 
Indeed, as a universal phenomenon, state involvement in public education 
globally increased towards the end of the nineteenth century. This was true for 
France as well as the Russian, Japanese, and Ottoman empires. In Russia, for 
instance, promoting modern education was among the chief priorities of the empire 
along with building railroads. In France, political leaders, both conservatives and 
republicans, regarded modern education as a “panacea” to create a modern state and 
society. Living in the same historical context, “the Ottoman Empire shared with 
France, and with Russia, China, and countless other lands, an extraordinary optimism 
that looked beyond a myriad of pressing ideological and infrastructural problems. 
New style education appeared as a seemingly universal beacon of hope.”269 
Promoting modern education was very much to do with the quest of keeping the 
territorial integrity and administrative durability of the states. It was the milieu of the 
time that:  
Much of the flurry educational activity in Western European countries in this 
period is linked to (not unfounded) fears of being overtaken by their 
neighbors, not just in a military sense but in a technological and cultural one 
as well. Thus, the legacy of 1870 animated educational expansion in France, 
where it was thought that German victory was due in large part to superior 
Prussian education, while Germanophobia and Germanophilia alternately 
affected the shape of Russian educational developments.270 
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Ottoman authorities wanted to use the panacea of education to solve the Shi’i 
Question in Iraq. In general, “the state redoubled its efforts to fund and build schools 
wherever possible in keeping with the vision of the 1869 Education Regulation.”271 
In 1884, the Education Fund was created by the Hamidian Regime. As a stable 
income stream, the fund played a critical role in the establishment of primary schools 
in the provinces between 1882 and 1894. The source for this fund could be derived 
from an increase in “the amount of tithe (öşr). Previously, one per cent of the total 
harvest had gone to the Public Works Fund, but now 1.8 of tithe would be taken.” 272 
Rather than favoring the use of forceful measures, Ottoman authorities 
preferred to employ counter-propaganda, with the aim of promoting the expansion of 
Sunni education, to check the spread of Shi’ism. Ottoman authorities regarded 
ignorance as the main reason behind the growing acceptance of Shi’ism whereas the 
broad exposure to Sunni education was deemed as the cure to the political and 
religious threat of the Shi’i spread.273 Various Ottoman official documents centered 
upon the idea of disseminating Sunni education, regarding it as the best method of 
counter-propaganda. To this end, various methods were used such as constructing 
medreses where the appointed ulema taught Sunnism, sending itinerant Sunni 
preachers to the tribes as well as to the urban centers of the Iraqi region, inculcating 
Sunnism into the minds of Shi’i children, and strictly monitoring the activities of 
Shi’i Mujtahids and Iranian pilgrims visiting the Shi’i shrines. 
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The reason behind the implementation of education policy was the high level 
of optimism shown for the transformative power of education as well as the 
conjectural political necessities. According to Selim Deringil, as an alternative to the 
military option, the policy of education became a sort of “siege mentality” which 
pervaded the thinking of the Ottoman officials and kept their vigilance high in their 
quest to keep Shi’ism at bay.274 Deringil further argued that the Ottoman authorities 
required and adopted this policy because of the heavy presence of Shi’is that 
constituted a great share of the total Iraqi population.275 Along with these two 
important factors, the Ottoman official documentation also mentions another reason 
behind the state policy of education. It was believed that the education policy would 
have brought about more useful results instead of taking harsh measures since this 
method was thought to be more respectful of the rule that postulated “enforcement 
for the correction of faith is not allowed” (cebren tashîh-i i‘tikâd kâideten mümkün 
olmadığı cihetle).276 In addition to the last issue, the Ottoman officials explained 
their tendency to favor the education policy by expressing that “the malicious means 
do not behoove the Ottoman government.”277 
To better analyze the implementation of the Ottoman education policy, it is 
useful to explore some other dimensions that are interlinked with each other. As 
stated earlier, the optimism for the transformative power of education was deeply 
ingrained in the thinking of the Ottoman officials. This perspective coincided with 
two other factors: first, the principal characteristic of the Ottoman perception of Shi’i 
treat, and second the foremost and urgent necessities of the Iraqi region. Although 
the Ottoman authorities exclusively used the religious discourse while justifying their 
                                                 
274
 Deringil, The Well-Protected Domains, 100. 
275
 Ibid, 61. 
276
 BOA, Irade Dahiliyye 96880, 14/Z/1308 (20 June 1891). 
277
 BOA, Y.EE 10/69, 11/S/1312 (13 August 1894). 
 107 
counter-propaganda, they viewed the Shi’i Question mostly from a political 
standpoint. Thus, the main feature of the Ottoman official documentation on the 
preventive measures against the spread of Shi’ism was largely to pre-empt a potential 
danger that might pose political threats in near future. Furthermore, the ongoing 
tribal conflicts constituted one of the most troublesome issues on the state agenda, 
which required urgent attention in the Iraqi region. Since the military weakness of 
the imperial troops and gendarmerie was obvious, the Ottoman government was 
faced with grave difficulties in establishing authority over the region. Therefore, 
Ottoman authorities discouraged the thwarting of the majority of the Iraqi population 
and placed resolving the tribal conflicts at the top of their agenda instead of using 
force against a future threat. In the view of the Ottoman administration, the spread of 
Shi’ism was a nascent process; thus, the educational counter-propaganda could 
peacefully dissuade the furthering of the Shi’i movement. Attention could have also 
been given to the well-established and much avowed belief in the rule that 
“enforcement for the correction of faith is not allowed.” Appointing ulema and 
preachers to correct the beliefs of the subjects recently converted to Shi’ism was seen 
by the Ottomans as the “just and preferable way”278 of dealing with the issue. The 
Ottoman administration preferred to establish advisory commissions and to carry out 
lenient policies to solve the heterodoxy issue. 
In corroboration of their trust in education, Ottoman officials explained the 
major strength behind the spread of Shi’ism with intensive Shi’i educational activity 
that was enabled by abundant financial supports. Along with the other reasons, the 
Ottoman officials had chosen the education policy as an efficient tool for their 
counter-propaganda, as the officials anticipated that if they could have sent Sunni 
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ulema amongst those tribes that had not yet met with Shi’ism, then it could be 
possible to keep them away from “seductions.” Refik Hasan, the Vali of Baghdad, 
suggested that the central government appoint eight ulema to places such as Deylem, 
Horosan, Mendeli, Kût-ul Ammâre, Samarra, Anh, and Kazımiye with the allocation 
of monthly 800 kuruş per each alim.279 
Ottoman authorities tended to give utmost importance to the education of the 
basic tenets of the Sunni faith (akaid) in mosques, medreses, and in all of the 
elementary (ibtidaiyye), high (idadiyye), and the military schools. The students 
receiving education in these institutions were advised to pray five times and in 
congregation according to the Sunni procedures. Disorderly functioning educational 
institutions such as mekteb-i sıbyan (a primary school for children), which financially 
depended on the weekly payments of students, were considered to be taken under 
state control, including the institutions that were deemed unable to train and 
reproduce satisfactory scholars capable of providing education in both the 
“religiously and politically” important sciences, which were tefsir (exegesis), hadith, 
and akaid (the tenets of faith).280 Thus, the reformation of the medreses in Baghdad 
appeared to be fundamental to the Ottoman officials in order to retain both the 
subservience of the subjects and to establish political authority in the region. 
Alusizade Ahmed Şâkir, from a well-known Iraqi ulema family, wrote a 
general memorandum about the spread of Shi’ism and listed some methods to 
address the problem. It appears that his memorandum was amongst the most 
comprehensive ones in including various aspects of Ottoman educational counter-
propaganda. He explained the reasons behind the rapid spread of Shi’ism as being 
the concerted educational activity of the Shi’i mujtahids, mu’mins, and akhunds, and 
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highlighted chiefly that the financial support of the British government and the large 
sums of donations endowed by rich Iranian merchants were behind the success of 
these Shi’i scholars. He further suggested that itinerant Sunni preachers be sent to the 
tribes and advised that ulema be appointed to the Five Medreses of Iraq (Medaris-i 
Hamse), meaning the major medreses of Imam-ı Azam, Abdülkadir Geylâni, Sayyid 
Sultan Ali Rufâî, Shaikh Sandal, and Münevvere Hatun. These suggestions and other 
advice were centered upon the education policy of instilling the Sunni creed that both 
would have protected the unguarded faiths of people and ensured their obedience to 
the Sultan.281 
Major General Sayyid Tevfik Osman, commander of the 22nd Brigade of the 
Sixth Army Corps, suggested that in addition to sending of the ulemas, there should 
be a population transfer and settlement of at least twelve to twenty thousand 
Anatolian immigrants to the Iraqi region. He argued that this would not only hinder 
the spread of Shi’ism but also prevent the arbitrary raids of the Hemevand and Jaf 
tribes over Mousul, Süleymaniye and Şehrizor, resulting in the vacant quarters of 
Mousul, Baghdad, and Basra becoming prosperous. In addition, replacement of the 
soldiers from the Iraqi region with the provincial armies of Anatolia and Rumelia 
every three year would preclude potential disorder. He also suggested administrative 
reforms, such as the formation of a new post, which would have both political and 
military functions in order to overcome the problems that arose from the lack of 
coordination between the provinces of Iraq. For instance, because of the coordination 
problems, there were recurrent and constant problems regarding the conscription 
done every year, which was based on a system of drawing of lots. The absentee 
conscripts numbered to thirty thousand potential personnel. Therefore, the appointee 
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should have the authority over a vast territory including Baghdad, Basra, and Najd. If 
this suggestion were not to be implemented, then Baghdad was recommended to be 
chosen as the center of command for another formation of a post, which would 
function as the Âsâkir-i Nizamiyye from Mousul to Basra.282 
Many reports and petitions about the educational propaganda began to reach 
both the central and the local Ottoman administrators. Vahhab, the Minister of 
Finance of the Baghdad Province, suggested to the Porte the summoning of a 
scholarly community to sort out accurate and appropriate precautions for the spread 
of Shi’ism.283 Others argued to entrust the appointment of eligible and officially 
recognizable men of learning with the task of public sermons.284 Underscoring the 
fact that a solution needed to be found as soon as possible, a report carefully 
emphasized the public frustration from the spread of Shi’ism. Local authorities were 
advised to appoint experienced scholars to the mosques and medreses through paying 
monthly salaries ranging from 300 to 500 kuruş.285 Ömer Behçet Efendi, the 
Baghdad central substitute for Takiyyiddin Paşa, thought that vakfs (charitable 
foundations) of the medreses and mosques, which were controlled by powerful 
persons, should be retaken and reorganized by the state for the improvement of 
education.286 Divisional General (Ferik) Đsmet Paşa, inspector in Baghdad, advised 
that a sufficient number of primary schools (mekatib-i ibtidâiyye) should be opened 
and children should read the Qur’an and learn the Sunni akaid (the basic tenets of 
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Sunni faith).287 Ömer bin Mahmud Đhsan, director of a high school, in his petition to 
the Sultan, offered to increase the number of primary schools.288 
Refik Hasan, the Vali of Baghdad, suggested opening a medrese and 
appointing Shaykhh Muhammed Said Efendi as the chief müderris with a monthly 
salary of 1.100 kuruş. Said Efendi was a member of the ulema class of Baghdad and 
a Sunni scholar dealing with education in Samarra as well as a central figure in the 
Ottoman educational counter-propaganda in the Iraqi region. Said Efendi was 
working as a müderris at Muhammed-ül Fazl mosque and belonged to the 
Nakşibendi order.289 He announced that Iranian Mujtahids were opening medreses in 
which various Akhunds, Shi’i students, were educated. These students were sent into 
the tribes and, in time, attempted to convert the tribal members to Shi’ism. Against 
this situation, Said Efendi, advised to cultivate educated Sunni students. To this end, 
he suggested the repair of an old and deteriorated mosque with its adjoining medrese 
in Samarra. Sunni students, having completed the elementary religious education 
would be sent into the tribes, just as their Shi’i counterparts, in order to teach the 
basic tenets of faith or the principal necessities of religion (zarûruiyyât-ı dîniyyelerini 
öğretmek üzere). Said Efendi calculated that the total number of allocated stipends 
for almost a hundred students would cost 6,000 kuruş, which could be extracted from 
the funerary taxes (define rüsûmu).290 The request of Shaikh Said Efendi was 
accepted by the Sultan. Thus, the Ottoman officials allocated 1,200 kuruş for repair 
of the mosque, medrese, and a dergah (a dervish convent) in Samarra in addition to 
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the monthly payment of 5,000 kuruş as stipends. The central government 
recommended the enrollment of at least 100 students.291 
On 30 May 1894, some local ulema were appointed by an imperial decree to 
carry out the counter-educational activity against the spread of Shi’ism. They were 
given salaries on different scales. Those of who were appointed with the salaries of 
200 kuruş were Sayyid Mustafa, Sayyid Ma’ruf, Sayyid Hasan, Sayyid Ömer and 
Sayyid Đsa, all of whom were the brothers of Shaikh Said Efendi. In addition to them, 
Sayyid Muhammed Efendi, son of Shaikh Said Efendi, and Sayyid Ma’ruf Efendi, 
cousin of Shaikh Said Efendi, and Süleymaniyeli Ahmed Efendi were also appointed. 
The names of the others who were appointed with the salaries of 100 kuruş were 
Hacı Muhammed Emin Efendi, the Mufti of Süleymaniye district, Dileceli Hacı 
Molla Ahmed, Molla Ahmed el-Basrâvî, Kânî Kûhli, Molla Ali, Ciyârî Şeyh Sâlih, 
Hermenî Molla Sâlih, Yalkâdrî Molla Muhammed Emin, Dehlezî Molla Resül, 
Gazbânî Şeyh Abdurrahman, Baba Ali, Molla Emin Mâm Rüstem, Molla Ahmed, 
Molla Kadir, and Şeyh Đmam Muhammed Efendi. In addition, a monthly salary of 
300 kuruş was given to Ayşe Hanım, an elderly relative of Shaikh Said Efendi.292 
Nearly three years later, in 30 November 1897, more Sunni scholars were chosen 
through the office of Şeyhülisam and appointed with monthly salaries of 2,000 kuruş. 
Their names were Harputlu Abdurrahman Efendi, Karacaklı Muhammed Lütfi 
Efendi, Malatyalı Ömer Hulusi Efendi, Kırşehirli Muhammed Tahir Efendi, and 
Urfalı Abbas Efendi.293 Both the names and their affiliations show that the central 
authority was carrying out this policy through using a network of accredited ulema, 
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whether brought from Anatolia or selected from the Iraqi region under the 
supervision of Shaikh Said Efendi.  
The Ottoman officials were advised to take some Shi’i students in the early 
stages of their childhood, one by one or two by two, and send them to Ezher 
University in Cairo, providing them with necessary financial support. Ottomans 
anticipated that those students would have turned into “true” believers since the 
“heresy” had not yet been deeply ingrained in their minds. Ottoman officials also 
expected that those students might come back to their homelands within eight or ten 
years and then began to teach their fellow men the principles of Sunnism. In this 
context, Ottoman counter-propaganda was suggested to use the successful example 
of the methods of American missionaries who converted many of the Armenian 
lower classes to Protestantism through the indoctrination of Protestantism to 
Armenians and turning them into preachers and teachers of this religion. It was 
thought that this method would yield better results than taking harsh measures.294 
Kamil Paşa, Sadrazam was advised to take some Shi’i children to Istanbul for 
the purpose of education in the Sunni faith. Afterwards, they would be returned to 
their homelands as Sunnis and work in the service of the government while receiving 
regular salaries for educating their fellow men in the Sunni faith.295 Thus, twelve 
students from the Baghdad province were brought to Istanbul in 1891. During the 
first days of their visit to Istanbul, the students stayed at the accommodation of Bâb-ı 
Vâlây-ı Meşîhatpenâhî (office of the Şeyhülislam) until more permanent housing was 
located. They were to be educated by the office of Şeyhülislam (Dâire-i Meşîhât-i 
Đslâmiyye). They were well taken care of and had no need of new clothing. 
Nevertheless, they were out of money. Thus, 100 kuruş was given to each student as 
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pocket money and 300 kuruş was assigned to each student as a monthly stipend. 
Then they were assigned to teachers at the Fatih Medresesi. It was ordered that they 
should be educated in a manner that would prompt them to forsake the Shi’i creed 
and adopt Sunnism.296 
In the following year, due to the activities of Mirza Hasan Shirazi, the 
influence of Sunni education in Samarra seemed lessening to the Ottomans. As a 
result, the Ottoman officials appointed eight Sunni teachers to Atabat and one to 
Samarra in 1892. The Ottomans estimated that Shirazi was annually receiving 10,000 
liras from India in addition to the abundant sums of money coming from Iran. Those 
funds were allocated for paying salaries of the Shi’i Akhunds and the stipends of 
students. According to the Ottoman authorities, there were at least 500 employed 
Akhunds and students in Samarra benefiting from the ignorance of tribesmen and of 
the absence of Sunni ulema. The report specifically highlighted the current 
propagative activities of Shi’is over the Shammar and Anaze tribes, which had long 
remained loyal to Sunnism. The solution to this, following the other advice, would be 
to send 100 students, endowing them with 100 kuruş each. Thus, the total cost of the 
stipends would reach to 100,000 kuruş, which was nearly one third of taxes from the 
funerary revenues of the Atabat.297 
The educational counter-propaganda sometimes drew the Ottoman 
government into paradoxical situations. For instance, the government allowed 
foreigners to open schools and, since Muslim students were not permitted to enroll 
these schools, there was no problem. However, when the same authorization was 
given to the Iranian Shi’is, Muslim students could not be deprived of enrolling in 
those schools. They were Muslims, but Shi’is; and this contradicted the counter-
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propaganda, leaving the officials seriously baffled.298 It is clear that the Ottoman 
government was trying to increase the number of Sunni students in the Iraqi region. 
However, in doing this, they were also conscripting children from among the Sunni 
students themselves, unless they were appointed as registered müderrises (müderris-
nişîn). Sayyid Derviş Ali Rıza, a Councilor of the office of Şeyhülislam (Müsteşâr-I 
Meşîhat), regarded the conscription of these students as a discouraging factor while 
running the counter-propaganda, especially when compared with their Shi’i 
counterparts, who received sufficient sums of money.299 
It is interesting to note that the Ottoman authorities placed great emphasis on 
and trust in the transformative power of a book. Sadrazam offered the publication of 
an akâid kitabı, a book outlining the doctrines of the religious faith that would attract 
the Muslim population living in Iraq. As there is no evidence to demonstrate whether 
this book was actually published or not, assuming, however, that it would have been. 
The book contained one chapter for each community mentioned below to refute the 
tenets of their beliefs depending on Shari’a and reason and covered various other 
subjects as well. The book was expected, in accordance with its purpose, to challenge 
Shi’ism’s various branches such as Usuli, Shaykhi, Akhbari, Bektaşi, Aliyyüllahi, 
and Nasiri interpretations of Twelver Shi’ism; Ziri, Ismaili, Babi factions of 
Imamism; and further continue to challenge Wahhabism, Ebahism, Durzi, Mülhidin-i 
Sûfiyye, and Avdetism. In addition, the book was planned to challenge a small group 
of people who deviated from the “true” path because of the influence of European 
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philosophy. This akâid kitabı should emphasize the divergent points of various 
superstitious beliefs from the “true” one.300 
Similarly, the guidance of a catechism (ilm-i hal book) aimed to correct the 
beliefs of those Kurds who had “strayed” from the “true” path. They would have 
been “put back on the straight and narrow by the printing and distribution of 
‘religious guides’ (ilm-i hal) which would be printed in Turkish and Kurdish and 
would be distributed among them.”301 Accordingly, Osman Paşa, the Vali of Mosul, 
“asked for 300 books of ancient sayings (Kelam-ı Kadim), 700 primary school 
readers and 700 pamphlets teaching Islamic beliefs, for the instruction of the children 
of the Yezidi and Şebekli who had converted to Hanefi belief.”302 
It is also necessary to mention here some examples of the non-educational 
activities and practices of the Ottoman officials, which were employed as a 
precaution to the Shi’i Question. Indeed, the Ottoman counter-propaganda did not 
necessarily intend to regain the believers or correct the beliefs of those converted to 
Shi’ism. Their measures sometimes were defensive in tone as to protect those 
remaining Sunnis from the threat of the “heretic” interpretation of faith.303 On the 
other hand, Ottomans occasionally hesitated to perform serious changes but rather to 
modify certain things as painlessly as possible and then settle the problem in its 
place. On one occasion, one thousand households of Talas, a bordering town of 
Russia, sought refuge from the Ottoman Empire. Indeed, they had been happy where 
they were living. However, the Shi’i torture, according to their claims as reflected to 
the Ottoman official documentation, was the main reason behind their asylum 
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request. The Sublime Porte was willing to accept this request, but with two 
conditions: first, they themselves would have to cover the expanses of their 
migration; and second, their movement to the Ottoman lands should not give any 
harm to the diplomatic relations between the Ottoman and Iranian governments. In 
addition to these stipulations, the Ottoman government was aware of the fact that 
Iranians would not allow such mass movements to take place; therefore, they warned 
the Sunni inhabitants of Talas that if the Iranian government posed any preventive 
measure on their road to the Ottoman lands, they would not be able to do anything.304 
Although the Ottoman government was very keen on spreading Sunnism at the 
expense of Shi’ism within their borders and protecting the Sunnis under pressure 
outside of their borders, this time, their hesitations seemed very clear. 
Further analysis is necessary to understand the complexities and the range of 
the Ottoman counter-propaganda in the eastern provinces of the Empire. Though 
needing to be compared with and confirmed by other sources, it is interesting to note 
that Agha Khan claimed that some Bektasi preachers were working in the service of 
the Ottoman government at exactly the same time when the government was running 
systematic counter-propaganda against the spread of Shi’ism. Agha Khan informed 
the British Councilor, Lorimer, in 1901 that there were “some itinerant preachers, 
Bektashis, [who] had in recent years visited northern central Arabia. But they had 
obtained little success among the people and were suspected to be in reality political 
emissaries of the Porte.”305 However, contrary to the claim of Agha Khan, Colonel 
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Ali bin Hüseyin warned the Porte about the urgent necessity of transporting Bektaşis 
to another province since they had a strong penchant for and love of Shi’ism.306 
 
5.1 Scholarly Quality of the Ulema 
The Ottoman government was advised to appoint ulema who had an 
acquaintance with the exegesis of the Qur’an, the hadith of the prophet, and the true 
tenets of the faith (akaid). Furthermore, the ulema should be chosen from amongst 
those who are sound-minded and well experienced, in addition to having the special 
talent of eloquence in preaching. The appointed ulema were advised to be careful 
about how to penetrate into the places where Shi’is constituted the majority. As a 
caution, they were warned never to introduce themselves as the government 
appointees, though, in fact, they were. They were advised rather to behave as if they 
themselves moved to Iraq being independent Sunni scholars demonstrating their 
purpose with the intention of spreading learning among the ignorant (illiterate) 
people. They were to call people to pray as a congregation in mosques, teach them to 
read the Qur’an in the proper manner, and dispense with the basic religious 
knowledge for daily life. The Sunni ulema in Iran also were to acquaint themselves 
with the science of refutation to dispute the Shi’i Akhunds on certain matters. They 
were advised to behave in a moderate fashion when arguing with those Akhunds. 
They were never to use an aggressive, agitated, or emotional language, but rather 
behave as a good host treating their guests well. They were to reveal only enough 
evidences to support the argument at hand. Each member of the ulema was to be paid 
at least two thousand liras, which was the least amount of money that allowed them 
to maintain their livelihood. To finance those ulema, it was thought that the 
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necessary revenue could be extracted from the privy purse of the Sultan (miri 
muqataa) to be assigned as funds for their salaries.307 
Ottoman authorities were careful in selecting Sunni ulema. They principally 
preferred those who had proficiency in scholarly discussions and who had 
“religiously and politically important and necessary” knowledge of religious sciences 
such as the exegesis of the Qur’an, the hadith of the prophet, and the Islamic 
theology (kelam). The ulema were to educate Sunni students who preached the Sunni 
tenets of faith (akâid-i ehl-i sünnet) during the summers by going into the tribes and 
to the localities of Baghdad and Basra provinces. The ulema, in their activities, were 
to present various convincing arguments to refute the arguments of the opponent and 
choose a modest manner to adjust the beliefs (hüsn-ü tağyîr-i iltizâm). The ulema, 
when they confronted with their Shi’i counterparts, were to treat them well and make 
scholarly discussions using euphemism and adopting a polite language. They were to 
be careful never to increase the tension and never turn the scholarly discussions into 
mannerless polemics, even if they felt that the people they preached were not likely 
to accept their arguments. They were to confine themselves to explain and present 
their views. Very interestingly, amongst their spiritual duties, the ulema were 
recommended to secretly inform the provincial government of the Shi’i ulema who 
were thought to be “dangerous for the religious tranquility of the region” (diyânete 
mazarratlarını hisseyledikleri kimseleri).308 Ottoman authorities knew that the Sunni 
ulema they appointed were ignorant of the methods of disputation,309 whereas the 
Shi’i ulema were very skillful and talented in scholarly discussions, making scientific 
judgments, reasoning, and comparisons. Hence, depending on these features, they 
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were particularly influential in indoctrinating the Shi’i creed in the non-Shi’i 
people.310 Meir stated:  
Shi’i ulema often engaged their Sunni counterparts and Ottoman officials and 
even Jewish rabbis with polemical disputations in order to prove the 
superiority of their sect. Not surprisingly, according to Shi’i sources, they 
always had the upper hand, leading to the conversion of their rivals to 
Shi’ism.311 
 
Alusizade also offered that the appointed Sunni ulema should have 
knowledge of religious sciences and of the philosophy of Islamic jurisprudence.312 
The ulema sent to Najaf, Karbala, and Samarra, were expected to be equipped with 
special qualities such as “having high degree of morality, being closely familiar with 
the Islamic law and methodology, being suitable for education, and being informed 
of politics.”313 Similarly, they needed a working knowledge of the foreign affairs.314 
The Ottoman administration vacillated between selecting the ulema from the 
scholars of the Iraqi region and from the other parts of the Middle Eastern territory. 
Assigning local ulema had some advantages as that of being familiar with the local 
language and customs in addition to the demanded qualities that of being “well 
versed in political subtleties as well as religious dogma.”315 Thus, they appointed 
ulema with sufficient salaries through selecting from amongst the Iraqi ulema with 
the purpose of correcting the beliefs of tribesmen. However, the Sunni ulema’s 
activities did fully achieve the set aims both due to their ignorance of the methods of 
refutation and lack of a comprehensive book. Henceforth, another cohort of ulema 
was to be chosen from other provinces, this time not from amongst the Iraqis. They 
were to be acquainted with Arabic, Persian, or Kurdish. Hence, they could translate 
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the texts into other languages such as Turkish, Persian, Kurdish, Arabic, and even 
French. Then they would have the opportunity to prevent the spread of not only 
Shi’ism but also Protestantism.316 The Ottoman administration paid special attention 
to selecting the ulema member who were of Syrian, Aleppo or Harameyn origin. In 
any condition, they should have been Arabs or, if they were chosen from amongst the 
Sunni scholars of Baghdad, their prominence and qualities were to be carefully 
contested.317 
It was understood later that the Sunni preachers in Baghdad who were 
employed by the Ottoman authorities were not only ignorant of the basic knowledge 
of Arabic but also did not fulfill their duties. Instead, some of them engaged in 
cultivation in their gardens that they likely bought with the salaries paid by the 
government. The local kadi court (merkez neyâbet şer’iyyesi) was advised to make 
necessary admonitions to those preachers.318 Another report states that some 
previously appointed scholars could not accomplish their duties since they were 
familiar neither with the language nor with the dispositions of the local people. Thus, 
they were dismissed from their duties and sent to Mosul.319 
 
5.2 Financial Deficiency and Failure of the Educational Counter-Propaganda 
The education policy faced failure, even in the initial stages of its 
implementation. Owing mostly to the financial deficiency and the lack of educated 
Sunni scholars, reports, complaining of the existing situation, began to reach the 
central authority, causing overwhelming frustration. Efforts to introduce the modern 
education system throughout the empire faced actual constraints. According to 
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Deringil, “the most basic was money. Although all local administrations were 
expected to contribute a share of their revenues as the ‘education budget’ (maarif 
hissesi), very often this money was not forthcoming, and schools were not built and 
teachers left unpaid.” 320   
Thus, the modern educational system was suffering from lack of financial 
funds. In 1890, teachers at a primary school in Yemen complained about their unpaid 
salaries. Similarly, in the same year in Baghdad, sufficient funds could not be raised 
from the ‘charitable persons’ to support education in a local secondary school. Nine 
years later, in Kastamonu in Anatolia, funds were hardly raised by “the parents of the 
pupils providing a certain proportion of their agricultural yield at each harvest.”321 
According to Alusizade Ahmed Şakir, the educational propaganda of the government 
achieved nothing except troubling the state treasury.322 Newly established medreses 
in the Dir district in the province of Zor could not properly function due to the lack 
of sufficient financial sources.323 
One of the reasons behind the weakening of Sunni religious education was 
the loss of vakf revenues supporting the Sunni madrasas due to the Tanzimat’s 
centralization policies.324 Therefore, in order to restore the Sunni education, all the 
vakfs in the region would be located, their conditions be improved, and be reclaimed 
for the Ottoman government. The Ottoman officials realized that vakfs were passing 
from one hand to another for many years through inheritance or purchase, which was 
contrary to the Islamic judicial regulations. The existing vakf holders had in their 
hands vakfiyyes whose statues remained valid. However, the government officials 
tried to legalize and justify the appropriation of vakfs on behalf of those who bid 
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first. They then deemed to reorganize those wakfs in a conformable manner through 
constituting a commission composed of the chief accountant of the vakfs of the 
Baghdad province and the Directory of Education (Bağdad Evkâfı Muhsebecisi ve 
Maarif Müdîriyeti).325 
The financial deficiency was the most significant obstacle preventing the 
implementation of reforms in the provinces of Baghdad and Basra. The financial 
sources were so sparse that “the Sultan’s government had no money of its own to 
spare for such reforms and with memories of the 1875 bankruptcy still fresh, it was 
unwilling to resort to large scale foreign loans.”326 Three provinces of Iraq were 
producing 6.5 percent of the total of agricultural taxes, which amounted to 47.3 
million kuruş and 8.1 percent of the livestock taxes amounted to 16.5 million kuruş, 
collected in the Empire between 1909-1910. However, what was tragic for the 
educational activity was that “approximately two-thirds of the revenues of the Iraqi 
provinces were derived from agricultural and livestock taxes, and that about two-
thirds of expenditure went to the army and the gendarmerie.”327 
In an imperial decree forwarded in 1901, it was decided to allocate 500 kuruş 
for each scholar serving the medreses in the province of Basra. For the allowances of 
the Sunni ulema, the local government was advised to extract money from the 
funerary taxes of Karbala. If that sum was not enough, then funds were to be taken 
from the Treasury of Finance, and if not enough again, then taken from the Sultan’s 
Privy Purse. However, the province of Basra was annually receiving 254,882 kuruş 
for its educational activities. 128,080 kuruş of that total was spent for the repairs of 
old or the constructions of new primary and secondary schools whereas rest of the 
total budget, 126,802 kuruş, was spent for the standard expenditures of some schools 
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in Basra. Therefore, the new funding source for the ulema’s salary could be extracted 
neither from the funerary taxes nor from Imperial Educational Donations (Maarif-i 
Hâssa Đânesi) and could hardly be extracted from the education allowances of The 
Department of Imperial Finance (Hazîne-i Celîle-i Mâliyye).328 Ten years later, the 
office of Şeyhülislam asked the Department of Evkaf for financial aid for Shaikh 
Muhammed Hamid Ömeri Efendi and Müderris Sayyid Molla Hasan Efendi, both of 
whom belonged to the Naksibendi order and engaged in Sunni education to thwart 
the spread of Shi’ism on the Ottoman-Iranian border. The Evkaf Department 
regretfully explained the impossibility of covering the demanded expenses. (şeyh-i 
mümâ ileyhe maaş tahsisine müsâid karşuluk olmadığı cihetle hazînece birşey 
yapmağa imkan olmadığına).329 In sum, the financial deficiency was among the 
primary reasons for the failure of the Ottoman educational counter-propaganda 
against the spread of Shi’ism.  
Complicating the situation, educational structures were quite deteriorated to 
the point that highly intellectual and knowledgeable scholars could not be trained in 
the medreses. Even in the early stages of the implementation of the counter-
propaganda, in the 1880s for instance, the Ottoman officials realized that the 
influence of the Shi’i mujtahids was spreading beyond Baghdad, and even 
penetrating to Hakkari and Mosul. Ottoman officials had already taken a decision to 
appoint Sunni ulema to educate people on the “true” tenets of faith and to protect 
them against the threat of Shi’i doctrine. The local Ottoman authorities were also 
advised to provide the necessary funds for reorganization and improvement of the 
Sunni education in Atabat. However, the previously appointed Sunni scholars to 
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Baghdad were not properly fulfilling their duties. They neither were competent (nâ-
ehl) nor carried out their duties.330 Although it was repeatedly recommended for two 
years in the Mutasarrıflık and Kaymakamlık that the establishment of medreses and 
mosques was necessary to save the region, nothing had been done.331 
Another facet of the education policy, which was not mentioned above, was 
addressing the Christian missionary activities. Thus, one of the primary purposes of 
extending Sunni education came to be a reactionary struggle against the presence of 
Christian missionaries since they were regarded by the sultan as “the most dangerous 
enemies to the existing social order.”332 Ottoman efforts to spread Sunnism, by no 
means accidentally, coincided with the rise of anti-Christian feelings in Japan and 
China against the Christian missionary encroachments. However, despite the great 
efforts of the Sublime State to compete with the missionary schools, the complaints 
continued to reach the imperial center confessing the insufficiency of the state 
primary schools when compared with the missionary schools, which were clothing, 
feeding and paying for the students. 333 The same reasons were cited for the failure in 
halting the spread of Shi’ism. 
The demands of the central government were responded to with complaints. 
Vefik Ismet Paşa pointed out in 1890 that Shi’ism had become deeply ingrained in 
people’s minds.334 Neither the educational measures nor other strategies could 
achieve anything.335 The government could not establish enough authority over the 
ulema that were working for their own livelihoods rather than engaging with 
scholarly activities on behalf of the Ottoman Empire. They began to work as public 
                                                 
330
 BOA, MV. 1/26, 22/R/1302 (7 April 1885). 
331
 BOA, Y.PRK.ASK 72/80, 18/Ca/1309 (19 December 1891). 
332
 Deringil, The Well-Protected Domains, 114. 
333
 Ibid, 112-16. 
334
 BOA, Y.MTV 45/13, 7/M/1308 (22 August 1890). He further suggested to gain the favour of 
Shi’is on behalf of the Ottoman Empire. 
335
 BOA, Đ.ML 6, 6/Ra/1313 (24 October 1895). 
 126 
prosecutors (müddeî-i umûmî) or tried to embed themselves into the braches the local 
judiciaries.336 Commander Ali bin Hüseyin al-Fath noted that there were only two 
noteworthy ulema in the environs of the Baghdad province.337 Muhammed Arif Bey, 
Ottoman Consular at Tehran, reported that both the methods and policy to prevent 
the spread of Shi’ism could not achieve the required outcomes.338 Thus, Ottoman 
authorities gave up the policy of sending itinerant preachers and hodjas to the Shi’i 
dominant regions of Iraq around 1906. This decision was summed up in a report 
prepared by the Interior Ministry complaining of the inefficiency of their activities 
and instead proposing the spread of sciences and education within institutionalized 
forms.339 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
SOCIAL RELATIONS BETWEEN SHI’IS AND SUNNIS OF 
IRAQ IN THE LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY 
 
 
Since the second half of the nineteenth century, the predominantly rigorous 
and rapid modernization of the Middle Eastern societies was accelerated by the 
strong internal and external governmental cohesions. Both in the meanings and the 
functions of certain concepts, such as the interpretation of religion and the place of a 
leader in society, began a remarkable change. As a bilateral and highly complex 
process, state involvement in public affairs increased along with the escalation of 
public participation to government issues. In this context, the spread of Shi’ism 
primarily arose from the changes within the loosely defined social groups that were 
going through a process of internal consolidation and homogenization. Therefore, it 
is an interesting question how the relationships between different social groups, 
whether tribally or religiously defined, were affected by these changes. In this 
chapter, some aspects of the social relations between the Shi’is and Sunnis of Iraq in 
the late nineteenth century will be discussed mostly reliant on the official 
administrative documentation of the Ottoman and British governments. First, the 
Muharram Commemorations will be presented as the times in which sectarian social 
tensions grew stronger. As the relationship between the Iraqi Shi’is and the Sunni 
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government authorities constituted an important aspect of these social relationships, 
the Samarra Incident, as a socio-political issue, will be discussed in the last part of 
this chapter. 
Before entering into the debate, it is necessary to make a brief comment about 
the utilization of governmental documents. Indeed, understanding the influence of 
sectarian affiliations in social relations through official documentation creates a 
serious problem in that historical events will have a government bias. The records of 
law courts, in this regard, are better sources since they refer to the actual agents of 
specific events and offer precise information about real situations. However, the use 
of law court records is beyond the limits of this study. Nevertheless, since the 
accurate   information is of importance in terms of state governance, the value of the 
official documentation about particular events may also present an opportunity to 
understand some of the motives behind the social psychology both within the 
different segments of society and between the social groups and the state. In other 
words, as long as the state officials regarded them as important cases, then it is 
possible that these events were described without deliberate distortions.  
 
6.1 Conflicting Visions: The Muharram Commemorations 
Muharram commemorations were the traditional public ceremonies in 
memory of the slaughter of Imam Hasan and Imam Hussein, Prophet Muhammad’s 
grandsons. The commemorations conveyed conflicting visions. They presented an 
opportunity for providing a certain sense of syncretism as well as increasing hatred 
and antagonism within and between the followers of diverse denominations. These 
commemorations could also carry the potential for social protest and unrest by the 
ordinary attendees or by those performing the rituals. As the anti-government action 
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and passive disobedience to any form of political authority was two of the main 
themes of the Shi’i political tradition, these sermons provided an impetus for Shi’i 
social protests, which easily broke out especially against government officials. In 
Iran the Rawza-Khwan, the preachers running the Muharram procession and 
fulfilling the function of a Mu’min in the Iraqi Shi’i society, could stress “the current 
socio-economic grievances of the population, to mobilize people for political 
action”340 and provoke inter-communal strife. However, the implications of these 
remembrance ceremonies were highly complex.  
The ta‘ziya tradition was a religious ritual and connected to the Muharram 
commemorations. On the one hand, according to Algar, the high “potentiality of the 
ta’ziya for the inspiration of the revolt has moved several Iranian statesmen and 
governments to work for its abolition; concern for its possible illegitimacy in terms 
of religious law and precedent has been secondary.”341 On the other hand, Arjomand 
argued that there were two ranks in the Iranian hierocracy. Lower ranks were 
generally poorly educated and consisted of diverse groups led by rustic Molla and 
Rawda-Khans. Ta’ziya was among the activities of that lower hierocracy and was 
promoted and sponsored by the ruling Qajar elite whereas its development was 
opposed by “the jurists in the upper echelons of the [Shi’i] hierocracy.”342 Arjomand, 
quoting Calamard, emphasized that “the spread of ta‘zieh enhanced the political 
domination of the monarchy and the patrons among the nobility who controlled this 
branch of religious activity.” However, though it was hesitated by the upper Shi’i 
ulema, the ta’zieh functional as a motive of “communal oppositional action.”343 
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The Muharram processions were widely introduced in Iraq in the nineteenth 
century. Previously, the Mamluk governors of Iraq had forbidden these proceedings 
in cities such as Baghdad, Basra, Kazimayn, and Samarra where their control was 
effective. The Shi’is of Iraq, whether of Persian or Ottoman origin, were not allowed 
to proceed Muharram commemorations until the establishment of Ottoman authority 
and direct control in Iraq in 1831. Yet again, after couple of decades, in the 1870’s 
Midhad Pasha and Ahmad Shakir al-Alusi attempted to restrict the Muharram rites 
since they  provided a psychological stimulus to Shi’i Mujtahids and Akhunds,344 
mostly under the pretext of taking security measures to pre-empt possible public 
unrest  and social antagonisms. 
When compared to the Muharram commemorations of Iran performed in a 
highly professional and theatrical manner, the commemorations in Iraq were less 
professionally organized, but integrated the local participants more into the play. The 
plays in Iraq, in conformity with the intense tribal structure of the Iraqi society, 
focused on braveness as a central theme of the play and highlighting the strong 
physical attributes of certain players such as the image of Abbas, Hussein’s half-
brother.345 
In northern India, the Muharram sessions, to some extent, helped to develop a 
trans-communal society. The scripturalist strictly religious Brahmins, opposed the 
Hindus participation in the commemorations. Interestingly, when fighting broke out 
in Sunni-ruled Hyderabad between Muslims and Hindus during the 
commemorations, the participant Hindus could “actually take the Muslim side 
against their coreligionists.”346 Similarly, “boundaries between religious 
communities existed, and fighting occurred between Hindu and Muslim or Sunni and 
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Shi’i. However, to a greater extent in the early nineteenth century, cultural mediators, 
such as Sufi the pirs who transmitted symbols from one group to another drawing 
their clientele from both Muslim and Hindu, linked popular-class groups.”347 Sunni 
groups and others, did not embrace Shi’ism, did adopt the rituals in a different 
manner, and celebrated the Shi’i figures and Shi’i holy days. For instance, the “Sunni 
Shopkeepers of the Ranki caste commemorated Muharram, the Shi’i month of 
mourning for Imam Hussein, by getting drunk. The Sunnis of Dalmau held a fair at 
Muharram, which 6.000 people attended annually.”348 
The Muharram ceremonies, despite increased communal solidarity among the 
Shi’is, also strengthened and highlighted the sectarian distinctions between the 
Sunnis and Shi’is. Even if Sunni Muslims had a penchant to participate in the 
Muharram ceremonies, either their attendance or reactions to the rituals were 
dissimilar to their Shi’i brethren. As in the north Indian experience, particularly the 
practices in Shi’i Awadh, showed that:  
The Sunni Muslims in Awadh in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries also 
held mourning sessions, but frowned on the breast-beating and the ritual 
cursing of the Shi’is. The Sunnis, likewise, participated in the Muharram 
processions, but in various ways differentiated themselves from the Shi’is. 
For instance, although the latter held up five fingers to symbolize the 
Prophet’s immediate family, the Sunnis would hold up three fingers for the 
first three caliphs.349 
 
Although attracting large numbers of Sunnis and Hindus and functioning as a 
unifying factor, there were frequent outbreaks of violence since the establishment of 
the Shi’i Awadh government as an independent state in 1819. Depending on the 
policies of rulers or the religious elites in the nineteenth century Awadh, many 
commemorations celebrated in the large cities ended in bloodshed. Particularly, the 
public cursing of the first three caliphs during the commemorations had become one 
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of chronic sources of social tension. Thus, the Sunnis were actively persecuted by the 
military forces of Shi’i Awadh government.350 
The attitudes of the Ottoman government officers and ordinary Sunni people 
to the Muharram commemorations were rather different. The situation in Iraq 
regarding the Muharram ceremonies, though changing in accordance with the 
perceptions whether of ordinary people of government officials, was not as adamant 
as in North India after the establishment of the Shi’i Awadh State. The ordinary 
Sunni people were disturbed by these commemorations in Iraq, but overwhelmingly 
the Sunni Ottoman officers were suspicious about the performance of rituals and 
wished to forestall the subsequent social events. While the Sunni families were going 
to the Commemoration places to watch the plays and other rituals, the Ottoman 
officials skeptically monitored them. For example, Major Ali bin Hüseyin al-Fath, 
Aide-de-Camp to the Sultan, observed one of the Muharram commemorations in 
Iraq. He considered the commemoration culture of Shi’is, in general, as “amongst 
their shameful deeds and customs and heretic demonstrations” (Şiîlerin cümle-i âdât-
ı kabîhalarından bid’at-ı şebîhler [ve] nümâyişler icrâsı). Interestingly, he did not 
advise abolishing the Muharram commemorations; instead, he suggested preventing 
the audience from attending these commemorations. He presumed that Shi’is were 
chiefly giving importance to these rituals because of the non-Shi’i people who were 
coming to watch them. Then, he calculated that if the audience were prevented from 
attending then this would decrease the importance of the rituals in the eyes of the 
Shi’is themselves thus the commemorations would eventually lose their political and 
social importance.351 
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Major Hüseyin al-Fath mentioned in general about Shi’i commemoration, 
however, it is not known towards whom his skepticism was directed. There were 
different ethnic identities in the Shi’i populations in Iraq. During the public 
processions, their attitudes varied in accordance with their governmental affiliations. 
In Ottoman Iraq, “the Persian participants used to perform before the Iranian consul-
general, thereby stressing their Persian identity and strong sense of community. The 
Arabs, in contrast, used to act before the custodian of the shrine, who was a 
government nominee.”352 Therefore, the mistrust of the Major, though seeming to be 
aggravating, was not groundless. 
On the eleventh day of Muharram, Esad Bey, Lieutenant Colonel in the 
General Military Staff at Baghdad (Bağdad Erkân-ı Harbiyye Kâimmakâmı), 
reported two events to the Porte. These events happened one after the other, deeply 
upsetting the believers. On the seventh day of Muharram, some unemployed Shi’i 
youths made an effigy of Ayşe, wife of the Prophet Muhammad and walked it around 
the streets as an insult, a symbolic value of the Sunni faith. Furthermore, on the tenth 
day of Muharram, the day of commemoration, these Shi’i youths assaulted some 
people of the prophet’s descent serving in the mosque of Imam Musa al-Kadhim.353 
A similar kind of social antagonism was observed by Muhammed Arif Bey, 
the Ottoman Consul at Tehran. He reported that although Muharram sermons were 
not customary in Iranian Kurdistan, particularly in the districts of Sakız and Bâne, 
following the appointment of Amir-i Nizam to the government of Iranian Kurdistan 
the commemorations began and they were sponsored by Gulam Hüseyin Khan, a 
relative of Amir-i Nizam. However, according to the claims of Muhammad Arif Bey, 
the Sunni inhabitants in both districts were agitated by the news and attacked the 
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house where the attendees of the commemoration were gathered. Some of the 
attendees were killed and others were severely beaten. Following this, the situation 
became more complicated. The mother of Amir-i Nizam wanted revenge and went to 
a Sayyid to certify that 3.000 tuman belonging to her had been stolen during the 
affray. Furthermore, she instigated the detainment of a girl in the government prison 
until repayment of the money. The girl was the daughter of a disciple of Shaykh 
Mustafa Efendi who was supposed to have been involved in the event. This stirred 
the inhabitants of the district once more; they attacked the government building, 
rescued the girl, looted the belongings of the governor, and killed nearly thirty 
Persian officers. Gulam Hüseyin Khan and the mother of Amir-i Nizam were sent 
away. Thus, the district was out of the control of the Iranian officers for some 
time.354 
The places for Muharram commemorations served as a public arena where 
diverse segments of society gathered and communicated with each other. Thus, on 
one hand, they helped to increase the communal solidarity primarily among Shi’is, 
but on the other, during the Muharram commemorations it appeared that sectarian 
divergences occurred. Although the commemorations sometimes revealed the 
sectarian distinctions, the Sunni Ottomans living in the Shi’i dominated districts 
attended the commemorations with their families However, in keeping with their 
suspicions about any foreign activity, local Ottoman officials vigilantly monitored 
the commemorations and tried to prevent Ottoman subjects from attending. 
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6.2 The Shi’i Socio-Political Protest 
Islam was founded on a protest movement, according to Lewis, the Prophet 
Muhammad himself was “an oppositional leader” who struggled against the existing 
authority. Later, the revolutionary practice of early Islamic history was adopted in 
different frameworks, one of which was Shi’ism.355 In this context, Shi’ism had 
partly begun with a protest against the political authority, which was thought to have 
usurped the legitimate right of Imam Ali and of his descendents’. The movements of 
protest became one of the central and traditional manifestations of Shi’i political 
activism. The messianic idea of the occulted Imam provided an enduring expectation 
of the return of justice and the disappearance of oppression.356 In comparison with 
“Sunnism [which] associated with status quo, Shi’ism [associated] with a rejection of 
status quo, often though not necessarily accompanied by a determination to change 
it.”357 
Hanna Batatu, generalizing the theoretical view of the Shi’i jurisprudence 
about the right to political authority and presenting historical practices conjunctively 
with this jurisprudential generalization, argued that the relations between Shi’is and 
Sunnis in Iraq, but particularly between the Sunni Ottoman government and its Shi’i 
subjects, were uneasy. Batatu wrote that “to the strict Shi’is the government of the 
day- the government of the Ottoman Sultan that led Sunni Islam- was, in its essence, 
                                                 
355
 Bernard Lewis, “The Shi’a in Islamic History,” in Martin Kramer, Shi’ism, Resistance, and 
Revolution, (Colorado: Westview Press, 1987), 25-26. 
356
 Juan R.I. Cole and Nikki Keddie. (Editors) Shi’ism and Social Protest, (New Haven, London: Yale 
University Press, 1986), 4. However, it should also be noted that the culture of dissent was not 
inherent in the Shi’i political philosophy. There were two challenging opinions: the political 
quietism as endorsed by the Imams themselves and the political activism occasionally manifested in 
certain historical context such as the cooperation of Nasiriddin Tusi with the Mongol ruler Hulagü 
or later the collaboration of the Shi’i ulema with the Safavid government. Mangol Bayat, Mysticism 
and Dissent: Socioreligios Thought in Qajar Iran, (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1982), 16-
20. Furthermore, according to Arjomand, in Iran “in the second half of the nineteenth century, the 
dependence of the ulema on the king became considerably greater.” S.A. Arjomand, The Shadow of 
God and the Hidden Imam, 245. Neverhteless, this does not change the fact that the leglality of the 
oppositional movements to the governmental authority continued its theoretical validity depending 
on the idea of constant occultation of the twelfth Imam. 
357
 Bernard Lewis, “The Shi’a in Islamic History,” 29-30. 
 136 
usurpation.”358 Therefore, the idea of resistance to the political authority caused the 
formation of a ‘tradition of protest’ and resistance that led to further implications of 
the anti-governmental motive. This motive became influential in instilling the Shi’i 
creed into the tribal political structure thus redressing their political visions. It seems 
feasible to argue that the sectarian affiliations were very important in both injecting 
the anti-governmental motive into the Shi’i politics, which gave the Shi’is a 
consistent and systematic reason for political resistance, and influencing the political 
alignments primarily against the Sunni government.  
There are examples of the practical manifestations of this motive that 
demonstrate the consciousness of the Shi’i collective resistance to the Sunni Ottoman 
authority. Every year during Nevruz, many people visited the Place of Ali (Makâm-ı 
‘Ali) near Basra. However, on 12 March 1903, something strange happened, the door 
of the mosque suddenly opened by itself and this was acknowledged by the visitors 
as a sign of divine acceptance of their prayers. Henceforth, the news spread very 
quickly to other towns and various other Shi’i visitors arrived. There was neither a 
place nor time left for the Sunni Muslims to pray in the mosque, which was used by 
both Shi’is and Sunnis. However, many of the Shi’i visitors were women who could 
not be driven out by force. Ottoman officials asked the Shi’i ulema and shaykhs to 
empty the mosque during the times of prayer. After the prayers, the visits were 
allowed again. Not to give any occasion to bickering between Shi’is and Sunnis, as a 
precaution, the Ottoman officials assigned couple of military personnel to duty near 
the mosque. However, four days later in 16 March 1903, the Shi’i visitors did not 
listen to their ulema and began to “invade” the mosque. On Friday morning, they 
broke down the door and entered the mosque. The gendarmerie and police officers 
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on duty were unable to force the Shi’is from the mosque. Several of the Shi’i visitors 
were carrying guns and there was an exchange of fire between them and the Ottoman 
military personnel however, there is no indication in the document as to who fired 
first. Finally, the visitors were dispersed and subsequently, during Friday prayers, the 
Sunni Muslims were warned and advised to be calm.359 
It was understood a little later that the primary intention of the Shi’is was 
more than a visit. It was chiefly a social protest about the treatment of Mansur Pasha, 
the Honorary President of the Commission for the Imperial Local Lands of Qatif 
District. Although the Shi’i ulema knew the real reason, at the time, they said nothing 
to the Ottoman officials who later understood it from the slogans, which were in 
Arabic and meant “Mansur hakkın bizim yedimizden al.” The central government 
ordered an investigation, after which it was realized that the event was an outcome of 
a matter, of which the central government had been informed nearly a month ago by 
the Mutasarrif of Najd.360 
This event is very interesting since it shows how a Shi’i social protest was 
formed. The document does not contest the authenticity of the beginning of the event 
and remains unknown as to whether the ordinary Shi’i visitors actually saw the door 
miraculously opening by itself or that the witnesses were the protesters, who 
invented the event to make their protest more effective. Both are possible the visitors 
might have thought that it was a miracle and then the protestors seized the 
opportunity to draw more attention to their cause. If the time span is considered, four 
days seems to have been enough time to take the advantage of the event. However, 
both the visitors and the protestors might have been the same people, then, it 
becomes more likely that the miracle was invented. Whatever the truth of the 
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“miracle,” it was primarily a Shi’i social protest that was directed against a local 
Ottoman officer for his maladministration and blended with a mystical motive 
attached to the holiness of the Shrine.  
Akif Pasha, the governor general of Iraq at Baghdad, informed J.P. Nixon, the 
British Consul in Baghdad, about the forthcoming Ottoman punishment of the 
inhabitants of Karbala for their act of rebellion. He warned Nixon to notify their Shi’i 
Indian subjects to abstain from any interference during the march of the Ottoman 
troops. Although it is not possible to estimate the potential scale and the content of 
the unrest, Nixon confirms the antagonism in his report that, “As disturbances in this 
country are generally founded on the enmity between the two sects of the Sunni and 
Shi’i Mohammedans, there is always a danger of latter combining against the local 
authorities.”361 Furthermore, Nixon refers to the seriousness of the conflict, “It seems 
nearly certain that all the Arabs around the Euphrates and the Hindiyya Canal will 
rise against Turkish rule, if any of their Shi’ah brethren are killed in the impending 
hostilities.”362 Nixon’s assertion shows the lines of alliances in a possible state of 
conflict and the boundaries of subjecthood in the late nineteenth century Iraq. The 
potential revealed by Nixon shows that the Shi’i sectarian creed had the potential to 
provide a base for collective resistance against the government forces that signified 
important evidence for the influence of sectarian affiliations. 
Another event took place in Khorosan, a province of Iran. The event is 
important when it is considered in the context of other events that happened in 
Ottoman Iraq. The Ottoman Consular at Tehran reported that a dispute had emerged 
between a representative sent by the Vali of Meşhed and an official serving at the 
shrine of Imam Rıza. The duty of the representative was to pass the orders given by 
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the Vali to the shrine officials. However, he was insulted and severely attacked by 
these officials for the reason of passing the order that was the increasing demand of 
Iranian government from the incomes of the Shrine. Incited by the shrine officials, 
the news quickly spread to the people of the town, who barricaded the bazaars and 
shops in rebellion against the Iranian government. Some people had died in this 
serious rebellion.363 
It is unknown how the news spread to the people and how they were 
convinced about the credibility of the information from the shrine officials over that 
of the representatives of the Vali. The first assumption is that the late nineteenth 
century social environment of Iraq and Iran shared the fact that individual matters 
regarding sacred religious figures in people’s lives could easily become the basis for 
the development of more complicated social unrest. This was true even for very 
trivial circumstances or in cases of minor disputes. This was probably due to the fact 
that the matters regarding religion were among the most sensitive subjects for the 
people at that time. In this case, it was motivated by the power of the anti-
governmental movement in the Shi’i political tradition that quickened the rebellion 
against the state officials. This motive, as indicated above, was important in 
determining the direction of the social activism of the Shi’i people. The cases 
experienced in different provinces of Iraq illustrate that the spread of Shi’ism was 
very much supported by the underlying psychological factor. The anti-governmental 
motive here played a role through replacing the psychological condition of Shi’is as 
being against a supreme political authority. 
In theory, the Shi’is were supposed to be disobedient to any Sunni 
government. However, the Shi’i Ottoman subjects were communicating with the 
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Sunni Ottoman government and dispatching petitions to the central authority 
demanding impartial administration. On one occasion, Shi’i Ottoman subjects 
complained to Şâkir Efendi, the previous substitute judge of Karbala, because he had 
written a pamphlet against the Caferi branch of Shi’ism. Presumably, it was due to 
the content of the pamphlet, which upset the Shi’i Ottoman subjects. Although the 
Ottoman government was running a counter propaganda campaign against the spread 
of Shi’ism thus favoring any attempt to promote Sunni Islam, they regarded the 
pamphlet as “contrary to the regulations” (muğayir-i nizam).364 
 The Shi’i Ottoman inhabitants of the Sur district, in the province of Beirut, 
submitted a petition with 103 signatures to the Porte complaining about the 
oppressions perpetrated by the Mamluk family. According to their claim, not long 
before, a man named Yusuf Mamluk began to loot the properties of Shi’is, and 
violated their lives. Fortunately, Hamdi Pasha, the former Vali of Beirut, put an end 
to this man’s arbitrary abuses however, at the cost of his life. Nevertheless, the 
oppression of the Shi’is was continued by Yusuf Mamluk’s family. They gained the 
favour of Nasuhi Bey, the next Vali of Beirut, and they were supported by the Mufti 
of Beirut. The situation for the Shi’is seemed so hopeless that they even asked to 
migrate to another place in the Empire asking, “Is the oppression of the Mamluk 
family preferable to the lamentation of 50,000 people living in liberty and enjoying 
loyalty to the Ottoman government?”365 The petition was taken to the Internal Affairs 
Division of the Sublime Porte and was carefully scrutinized.366 Later, with the 
telegraph that was received by the Vali of Beirut who, as expected, denied the 
claims, and the matter was presented to the Sultan.367 
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Sectarian affiliations were important in injecting both the anti-governmental 
motive and the idea of collective sectarian resistance into the dissident communal 
groups in Iraq. The Shi’i sectarian affiliations did not directly lead the Shi’is into a 
continuous anti-governmental resistance; however, it formed the idea of collective 
resistance around the identity of Shi’ism. In addition, the Shi’i antagonism was not 
directed against their Sunni brethren but primarily and concertedly against the 
dominant political authority. There were also frequently occurring social disputes, 
minor in character. However, there were important issues, including the Samarra 
Incident discussed below, illustrating the problematic social and political relationship 
between the Shi’i and Sunni communities. 
 
6.3 The Samarra Incident: An Analysis of a Social Dispute  
“Kill the Indians men of English’s state”368 
In this section, first an event that occurred in 1874 will be described, and then 
a question be posed that connects this event with the Samarra Incident which 
happened 20 years later. In 1874, a dispute arose in Baghdad between some Sunni 
Muslims and two Babis, following a religious discussion near a Sunni masjid. The 
former blamed the latter for speaking against Islam after which the Babis were 
beaten up by the Sunni Muslims before the police intervened. However, according to 
the report of the British Consulate, 61 Babis were arrested and tortured on the road to 
the prison by both ‘the people in the crowd’ and by the police officers who were said 
to had injured those Babis with “the butts of the rifles, sticks, and pieces of pottery.” 
After the arrest, 12 Babis, were immediately released, and 43 were allowed to go free  
a little later, after renouncing their religion and promising to return home, six 
                                                 
368
 FO 195/1841 Document No: 210/23, (21April 1894) From E. Mockler Colonel, British Consul 
General at Baghdad To Sir Philip Currie, Ambassador at Constantinople. 
 142 
remained in prison. Mockler, the reporter, noted that although Babis generally did 
not speak about their religion, the question as to why they entered into such 
discussions with the Sunni Muslims near a Masjid remained unanswered. Persecution 
of the Babis would have caused to unpredictable disturbances since their numbers 
were considerable in both Iraq and Iran. Thus, were the Sunni Muslims of Baghdad 
“ever ready to take offence at the smallest doubt on, or slight to, their religious 
prejudices,”369 as described by Mockler? 
Parallel to Mockler’s description of this event, the Samarra Incident, which 
took place in April 1894, was recognized in the historiography as the most obvious 
example of the utmost social antagonism between the Sunnis and Shi’is of Iraq. The 
incident happened, not in Najaf, Karbala, Kazimie, or other cities whose majority of 
inhabitants were Shi’is but in a city where the majority of the population was Sunni,. 
The event was seen to be of major importance. Çetinsaya, for instance, described the 
Samarra Incident as “a serious outbreak … between Sunnis and Shi’is in Samarra.” 
Further, agreeing with the language of the official documentation, he claimed that it 
was “a petty quarrel … rapidly developed into something like a religious war 
between Sunnis and Shi’is, in which several people were killed.”370 A similar 
explanation was given by Litvak Meir.371 In this thesis reference to archival sources 
will made in order to discuss the extent to which the Samarra Incident was a socio-
religious or a socio-political event. 
According to Ottoman official sources, there emerged a simple dispute in 30 
April 1894 in Samarra, between a disciple of Mujtahid Mirza Hasan Shirazî and a 
butcher with an artilleryman in the army who was the butcher’s brother. I can be 
understood from the document that the Shi’i student owed money to the butcher. 
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Somehow, the dispute became serious and owing to the negligence of the local 
government, Iranian subjects, and the substitute representative of the Iranians, 
namely Mirza Mahmud joined with the Shi’i students. Then, the local Sunnis 
colluded against them. Moreover, during the unrest, Iranian, Indian, British, and 
Russian Consulates intervened because their nationals were among the students of 
Mirza Hasan Shirazî.372 The Ottoman scribe seemed to be much more interested in 
the intentions of the British. The Ottomans believed that the British intended to seize 
the opportunity of taking Mirza Hasan Shirazî under control. They assumed that if 
the British had taken the advantage of the dispute and taken Shirazî, then the 
Ottoman Empire would be unlikely to retain the control of the Iraqi region. 
Confirming the information in the Ottoman documentation, the British 
sources also demonstrate that the Samarra Incident occurred over a dispute 
concerning a financial transaction between two individuals belonging to “opposite 
denominations.” According to the report of the British Consulate, the dispute 
damaged both sides greatly. Verifying the Ottoman anxiety, one of the reasons 
behind the close interest of the British Consulate in the incident seemed to be the 
residing of the Great Mujtahid Mirza Hasan Shirazî in Samarra.373 However, the real 
concern of the British Consulate was aroused when they learned that the injured 
people were either British Indian subjects or those under a British protectorate. 
What stimulated the British agents to investigate the matter was a petition 
signed by some twenty British Indian subjects residing at Samarra for the purpose of 
education. The tone of their letter contains zealous expressions since they claimed 
that they were being attacked by their Sunni counterparts. They stated that on the 
twelfth day of Ramadan, the holy month for all Muslims, Sunni inhabitants of the 
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city attacked them with sticks and stones. According to their claims, the inhabitants 
attacked both Persian and British Indian subjects in Samarra. The students claimed 
that there were “higher men” who were calling the ordinary people “with a long 
sword” to unite a crusade and shouting “Kill the Indians men of English’s state.” 
Additionally, they claimed that previously they had been kidnapped and tortured 
kidnapped.374 
The case deserves special attention since it was the higher Sunni men who 
were calling for “crusade” against the Shi’is. The use of the term, crusade, shows that 
it was a religious war and consequently served to convince the reader of the petition 
of the religious content of the dispute. This is baffling since crusades were 
historically were mounted by Christians against Muslims, not by one group of 
Muslims against another. There might be two possible reasons: first, the use of the 
term “crusade” was deliberately chosen by the petitioners to give the impression that 
it was really a religious matter. Second, it might have been the choice of the British 
scribe who translated the term “jihad,” holy war against infidels, as “crusade.” As 
for the first case, the discourse of religious war, by any means, strengthens the hand 
of the petitioners whose innocence can be proven since they were attacked only for 
their beliefs. However, it is only an argument that should be considered as long as the 
content of the matter was fully grasped. As for the second case, it seems ambiguous 
that the British scribe chose to translate the term since they often used Ottoman 
Turkish, Arabic, or Persian terms in their reports. When the strangeness of the 
impression that “Kill the Indians men of English’s state” is considered, it seems that 
Mockler directly transmitted the petition written by the British Indian subjects. Thus, 
the first reason comes to the fore. 
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Much more important than these naive considerations on a specific term was 
that although the students, who were injured in the fight, claimed that it was a 
religious war between the followers of two denominations, their expressions reveal 
the fact that the target of the offending Sunnis were apparently foreign subjects 
residing in their town, Samarra. In addition, the call of higher men was directed not 
towards all the Shi’is but towards the Shi’i subjects of the British government. 
Therefore, as there were pre-established relations between some of the Mujtahids and 
the British government through certain channels, the idea of a ‘foreign evil’ could 
have been the underlying reason for the tensions. 
The details gradually reached the British officials. It was understood later that 
the dispute, which gave birth to Samarra incident, began between a Sunni soldier and 
a Shi’i student over the debt of 18 Shillings (40 Kıran). According to the British 
Consul, the underlying reason was that some seven months Hasan Refik Pasha, the 
Vali of Baghdad, had visited Samarra and gave “ill-advised orders” for the 
construction of a building near a mosque.375 Somehow, this was perceived as an 
offence against Mirza Hasan Shirazî, hence prepared the ground for the 
abovementioned atrocities. Although there is no mention of a particular construction 
of a building in other related documents, it was certain that the Ottoman officials 
were distressed, in general, by the activities of unofficial Shi’i agents residing in 
Samarra. As the Ottomans worried about the spread of Shi’ism, they labeled the Shi’i 
mujtahids, mu’mins, and akhunds as potentially unreliable and that they might 
collude with foreign powers for example, Britain and Iran. 
The presence of the Great Mujtahid Mirza Hasan Shirazî was a significant 
reason to precipitate the offense. However, it was not a single action but a serious of 
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activities organized by Shirazî following his taking up residence in Samarra. Shirazî 
had gained a further respect through rejecting the gifts sent to him by Nasiruddîn 
Shah during his visit to the Atabat in 1870. In the following years, he became the 
supreme Mujtahid in Iraq as well as being recognized as a higher authority among 
the Iranian ulema. In 1874, surprisingly, Shirazî decided to move to Samarra a city 
where the majority of inhabitants were Sunnis. He actively worked in Samarra, “built 
a seminary, a husayniyah, bath-houses for men and women, and even a bridge of 
boats over the Tigris.”376 Expectedly, his activities increased the tension with Sunnis 
and increased the suspicions of the Ottoman government. 
Eight years ago in 1886, another incident took place in Samarra. At that time, 
Muhsin Khan, the Iranian Consul primarily blamed the Mufti of Samarra for inciting 
people against the Shi’is residing in the town.377 Presumably, the unrest was due to 
the constant struggle between Ibrahim Efendi, the Mufti of Samarra, and Mirza 
Hasan Shirazî.378 Despite the fact that local Ottoman agents in Iraq used an 
apologetic and benign language for the future of the relations between the two 
empires and promised the punishment of the officials who were responsible, they did 
not keep their promise. Moreover, the arbitrariness of the Ottoman officials over the 
Iranian subjects continued, for example the Mufti, Kadi, and the mayor of Samarra, 
were not prevented from maintaining their positions and hostility towards the Shi’i 
students and Shirazî. Although the Ottomans assured the Iranian authorities that the 
Samarra officials would be removed from office and punished for their 
maladministration, they did not put this into effect. In consequence, the maltreatment 
continued to increase.379 
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Following the Samarra incident, a petition about the incident complaining 
about the curses of the Mufti of Samarra was telegraphed to the Porte with 280 
signatures from Shi’is whose nationality was unknown. Their petition was discussed 
at the Meclîs-i Mahsûs-u Vükelâ, but was found to be unfounded.380 Nevertheless, the 
Vali took the matter seriously, and he “removed the governor of the Samarra and 
Kadi to Baghdad, and arrested some of the ringleaders and deputing influential 
officials to Samarra to investigate the matters.”381 The report stated that the Sunni 
inhabitants of the city had no problem with Mirza Hasan Shirazî since he was an 
attractive figure for the pilgrims who were bringing money to the city and sustaining 
its economic prosperity. However, immediately after, the relatively rapid 
communication channels, primarily, the telegraph lines, enabled the news to reach 
adjoining cities such as Kermanshah and Najaf where the Shi’is closed their shops by 
the order of Mirza Ceybullah, a powerful Mujtahid in Najaf, to protest against the 
incident.382 Furthermore, Mujtahid Mirza Ceybullah insulted the lieutenant colonel of 
the district (Kaimmakam) resulting, soon after, his expulsion being demanded by the 
Porte.383 
In the days following the Samarra incident, a memorandum, signed by the 
representatives of Lucknow, reached the British Consul in Baghdad and contained 
detailed information about the fight, between an artilleryman Hasan Ibn Receb and a 
Shi’i student Abdul-Hasan, a disciple of Shirazî. Soon after, the Persian Consular 
Agent whose house was near to the butcher shop, heard the dispute, and wanted to 
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arbitrate.384 However, he was also injured by Hasan Ibn Receb then the people of 
Samarra attacked other Shi’i students residing in Samarra. According to the 
memorandum, the Rufaiyah Dervishes accelerated the fight against these Shi’i 
students. Shaikh Abbas, “leader of the circle of Rufaiyah Dervishes called out to the 
Kadi” to “fight for faith, fight for faith, kill these pigs and break your fasts o ye 
Muslims.”385 Furthermore, some government officials “Mahmud Nasayif, Sayyid Ali 
Sarraj, Hassoob, Salman son of Lataiyif, Jassim son of Ali Akbar, Mülazim 
(Lieutenant), Saleh Efendi of the reserve troops and Mülazim Hasan Efendi, collector 
of cattle taxes, mobilized the people.”386 Following the call, approximately 400 mobs 
gathered. They first attacked Mirza Mahmud, the Persian Naib, and some other 
Persians; and then plundered the house of the Naib. After that, they fought with 
whomever they came across from the Shi’is whether on the streets or in the bazaar. 
Abdul-Hasan, a disciple of the Mirza, hides a public bath. However, the mob rushed 
into the building but Abdul-Hasan found a way to escape and “sought asylum in the 
house of the Kaimmakam.” Although some people threw stones at the house Abdul-
Hasan, Kaimmakam did not hand Abdul-Hasan over to the mob. The angry crowded 
directed toward the women’s bath, but were prevented by son of the Kaimmakam. 
The frustrated and angry crowd then marched to a school and attacked some students 
and during the night of the next day, they threw stones at the houses of Shi’is. On the 
morning of that day, according to the claims of the memorandum writers, the body of 
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a student from Khorosan was found on the bank of the river. The corpse was later 
examined by the officials of the Ottoman infantry.387 
Mirza Hasan Shirazî spoke to the Iraqi Shi’is to decrease the tension saying: 
 
Be it known to my brethren the true believers belonging to the Shia sect that I 
disapprove of anything happening which may cause hatred, dispute, aversion, 
and discord of words between Muslims and that I impose upon you the 
avoidance of such altogether and the assurance of sentiments of affection, 
love, accord and good behavior. Peace be upon you and God’s mercy and 
blessings.388 
 
Wockler argued that as long as Mirza resides in the city and attacks the pilgrims who 
bring prosperity, the Sunni inhabitants of the city would remain quiet. It meant that 
the antagonism was between small sections of society, and the Rufaiyah Dervishes 
had accelerated the dispute. 
The Iranian government immediately received the news of the incident and 
perceived it as a cold-blooded insult against Mirza Hasan Shirazî and a serious threat 
to the Shi’i presence. The Porte asked Muhammed Arif Bey, the Ottoman Consul 
General at Tehran, to ensure that there was nothing about the incident to displease 
them. Furthermore, they tried to convince the Iranians that it was unconceivable to 
permit any offence against the highly esteemed Muslim Shi’i ulema by the Ottoman 
Caliph, the protector of all Muslims. They promised to arrest the culprits as soon as 
possible; and never allow any further annoying events. The Porte also transmitted the 
information that they had already persuaded the mujtahids to resolve the problems of 
the town; and showed the appreciation of Ağa Seyyid Abdullah, an important Shi’i 
Mujtahid in Tehran and a supporter of the pan-Islamist policies of Abdülhamid II, for 
the consideration of the Ottomans.389 Afterwards, Ağa Seyyid Abdullah was given a 
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decoration by the Ottoman Consulate at Tehran following the consent of the Sultan 
and a feast was given for his honor.390 
By the August 1894, the Samarra unrest was fully suppressed.391 After the 
Ottoman troops marched into the city and the calm returned, Wockler, stated that 
although an unpleasant dispute had erupted in Samarra against the Shi’is, the city, 
where Mirza Hasan Shirazî had been residing for the past twenty-five years, it still 
seemed one of the best places for him to reside. In addition, the Ottoman 
Commander in Chief described the Samarra Incident as “a very small ailment but not 
treated with sufficiently strong medicine in the beginning.”392 Wockler believed that 
the incident was of little importance that came out of “a petty quarrel.” At most, the 
source of the incident was “a concern for the government of the Vilayet for some 
time to come.” He further stated, “Within Baghdad, Kahhimain, Karbala, and Najaf 
in a combined resident population of at least 80.000 Shi’is, no incident which stirs 
“en masse” in the same Vilayet so large a number of co-religionists of a peculiarly 
fanatical type can be called trivial.”393 
At first glance, the Samarra Incident provokes questions, such as; how could 
a simple dispute between two ordinary people turn into a large-scale social conflict? 
or, was the incident a manifestation of the deep-seated polarization and the hidden 
antagonism in that society? Both the Iranian and British Consuls deliberately tried to 
present it as an attack against all the Shi’i people living in Samarra. Furthermore, 
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they interpreted the event as a symbol of how the Sunni Ottomans, whether official 
or unofficial, perceived Shi’is and wished to treat them whenever possible. After the 
official reports were thoroughly examined, it is understood that the Samarra Incident 
was an unlawful activity executed against non-Ottoman Shi’i subjects, particularly 
against the Shi’i British Indian and the Shi’i Persian people. To a certain extent, it 
was a political maneuver and the rhetoric employed by the agencies of the British 
and the Persian states since they were in constant struggle with the Ottomans in order 
to increase their power in the region. However, to another extent, the Samarra 
Incident was a clue to how the organized groups, in this case, the Rufaiyah Dervishes 
accredited to the governmental authorities, could function in the service of the 
official power holders The Samarra Incident was seemingly an event between Sunni 
and Shi’i inhabitants of the city having nothing to do with the governmental 
authorities. Conversely, the incident could be considered to be, primarily, a political 
problem, which was encouraged both by the governmental authorities and by the 
accredited organized groups proceeding against ‘the foreign elements’ in their town.  
A further question awaits an answer as to whether the community in Samarra 
was on verge of sectarian violence. In Iran, Arjomand stated, “the masses were 
particularly prone to incitement against the non-Muslims and religious minorities by 
any troublesome Molla.”394 A short review of the events discussed above shows 
people seemed ready to instigate. The Babis were beaten by the Sunni Muslims. In 
Iraq, regarding the Samarra Incident, there emerged mobs to collude with the higher 
Sunni ulema following their call against “the enemy,” and probably not knowing 
both the content of the event and the aim of the attack. In Iran again, the “popular” 
opposition against the Vali of Meşhed by the Kiliddar of the Imam Rıza shrine, had 
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quickly instigated certain masses who colluded against Iranian government officials. 
Yet, these examples show that the people living in the abovementioned places were 
very active in dealing with political and religious matters. Saying speculatively, they 
should have gathered around certain identities that drawn them into mobilization thus 
accelerating the inter-communal disagreements and disputes. 
When compared with the 1850 events in Aleppo, the Samarra Incident 
remains a minor issue. Following the growing influence of the European powers, the 
incorporation of Syria into the Capitalist circles had augmented. The existing 
economic and political system in Aleppo as well as in the other cities of Syria began 
to change dramatically and the wealth of the non-Muslim populations increased 
along with their status. This resulted in a deterioration of the “traditional 
equilibrium” and the old interdependence between Muslims and non-Muslims. In 
addition, in addition to their economic influence, the cultural values of the western 
powers were penetrating that together differentiated the non-Muslim population from 
the rest and antagonized the Muslims against them. Therefore, the underlying reason 
behind the Aleppo events was the indirect consequences of the impact of imperialism 
on “the traditional corporate communal bonds,”395 whereas the major reason behind 
the Samarra Incident was the massive anxiety of the Ottoman officials towards any 
potential power brokers within their official borders that might collude with the 
foreign power against their authority. In this context, the Samarra Incident, far from 
being economic or religious conflict was primarily a diplomatic struggle between 
local government agencies and non-Ottoman Shi’is who were either Iranian or 
British subjects. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
OTTOMAN OFFICIAL DISCOURSE ON SHI’ISM AND 
TREATMENT OF SHI’IS IN LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY 
IRAQ 
 
 
The Ottoman perception of Iraqi Shi’is was unsteadily altered since the 
second half of the nineteenth century. This was both due to the transformation of the 
governmental mentality and to the increasing power and activities of the Shi’i ulema 
in the Iraqi region. The jurisprudential transformation in the Shi’i Fiqh and the 
structural changes in the Iraqi society through governmental cohesions and inter-
communal rivalries began a process of social consolidation and homogenization. The 
increasing importance of the public in affecting the legitimacy structures combined 
with the growing religious and political activity of Shi’i scholars, endowing the Shi’i 
masses with a type of power synergy. Thus, the Ottoman officials perceived the 
dynamism of Iraqi Shi’is as a serious political threat and developed a systematic 
policy to prevent Shi’i activism. They chiefly favored education, instead of using 
forceful measures, as the most important tool of their counter-propaganda. In 
addition, along with the counter-propaganda, the Ottoman officials created an 
abusive discourse on Shi’ism, which could be realized through an analysis of the 
language of the official documentation. However, their treatment of Shi’is differed 
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from the aggressive tone of their discourse. Thus, this chapter discusses both the 
Ottoman official discourse on Shi’ism and the Ottoman treatment of Shi’is. 
 
7.1 The Ottoman Official Discourse on Shi’ism 
The utilization of an aggressive and abusive discourse against Shi’ism and 
against the Shi’i religious missionaries in Iraq came gained a special characteristic 
primarily after the second half of the nineteenth century. The discourse began to be 
used intensely since the Ottoman bureaucratic mentality changed significantly during 
the Hamidian regime. Until that time, the Ottoman bureaucracy considered the 
activities of the Iranian governments as the most serious danger threatening their 
authority in Iraq. As such, the incessantly dispatched reports about the spread of 
Shi’ism changed the official perceptions regarding the Shi’i presence in Iraq, thus 
acquiring a particular meaning, prompting the Shi’i Question to emerge. It was after 
the rise of the bureaucratic tension that the Ottoman official documentation adopted 
an abusive and offensive discourse concerning Shi’ism and the Shi’i missionaries in 
the Ottoman official documentation within the context of the nineteenth century. 
Shi’is were regarded by the Ottomans “as potentially disloyal.”396 Ottoman 
officials thought that the degree of hatred and bigotry among Shi’is against Sunnis 
were high.397 However, it should be noted that these Shi’is were primarily the non-
Ottoman Shi’i subjects. The Ottoman officials blamed the Shi’i akhunds for their 
activities of “seducing and halting the thinking of people” (Akhundlar vasıtasıyla 
efkâr-ı ahâli ifsâd ve ihlâl olunarak),398 and for planting “seeds of seduction into the 
minds of people” to spread Shi’ism. (ezhân-ı umûmiyyeye bir tohum-u mefesedet 
                                                 
396
 Çetinsaya, Ottoman Administration of Iraq 1890-1908, 99. 
397
 BOA, Y.PRK.MK. 4/80, 27/L/1306 (26 June 1889). 
398
 BOA, A.MKT.UM 549/27, 22/N/1278 (22 March 1862). 
 155 
bırakarak).399 Furthermore, Ottoman official ideology deemed Shi’ism as a “heretic 
belief”400 in various occasions. A report entitled Shi’ism as “Rafizilik”401 meaning 
the heretic acts or beliefs. Shi’ism was also regarded as “superstitious belief,”402 
whereas the reception of Shi’ism was considered as tedenni (degradation).403 Major 
Ali bin Hüseyin al-Fath, Aide-de-Camp to the Ottoman Sultan, considered the 
commemoration culture of Shi’is as “amongst their shameful deeds and customs and 
heretic demonstrations.” (Şiîlerin cümle-i âdât-ı kabîhalarından bid’at-ı şebîhler [ve] 
nümâyişler icrâsı)404 
Ahmet Yaşar Ocak has argued that, “Circles falling afoul of Sunni Islam were 
always with suspicion and tight control by the Ottoman political power, which had 
based its official ideology on Sunni Islam.”405 The central administration 
occasionally suppressed the circles out of the mainstream through marginalizing and 
officially labeling them as heretic or heterodox or as reflected in the language of the 
official documentation as “râfızî, zındık, mülhid and hâricî.”406 However, the 
application of such as an abusive discourse was dependent on the political 
circumstances and power relations as much as it was dependent on the predisposition 
of the official ideology. 
As demonstrating the contextual utilization of the offensive discourse, 
Maurus Reinkowski has argued that the utilization of the barbarous-civilized 
discourse had provided a “psychological outlet and recompense” to the Ottoman 
administrators in expanding the official limits of Ottoman sovereignty over 
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Montenegro. During the 1840s and the 1850s, the Catholic populations of the 
Shkodra province remained loyal to the Ottoman Empire. However, the political 
conditions began to change radically by the 1860s following the Leiningen 
Convention of 1853. The Ottoman military advance into the Montenegrin heartland 
was cut by European powers. Moreover, the campaign of Ottoman military forces in 
1858 could not achieve successful results. Thus, the local population of Shkodra 
seemed likely to separate themselves from the Ottoman Empire, colluding with the 
European powers to achieve their independence. Henceforth, the Ottoman authorities 
began to label the Catholic populations of the Shkodra province as “unruly people 
deserving to be punished” with the terms that were reflecting the Tanzimat ideology, 
namely terbiye (educating), inzibât (disciplining), and te’dîb (punishing).407 
Similar reflections of this ideology can also be seen in the official perception 
of the Ottoman authorities regarding the nomadic people in the lands of the Ottoman 
Empire. Mostly governed by the quest for keeping the empire politically and 
ideologically integrated, the Ottoman officials sponsored a politics of benign 
missionary activity for protecting the subjects from evil and directing them towards 
good. The governmental efforts were considerably reinforced by the understanding 
of an ordinary man being mostly ignorant and simple and having no capacity for 
reasoning or making judgment between good and bad. The Ottoman officials utilized 
such a “compassionate” yet offensive discourse when they faced a perceived danger 
threatening the official ideology or the symbolic sovereignty of the imperial 
authority. The offensive tone of the official documentation concerning the tribal and 
nomadic people was nearly a customary one since they were described as unyielding 
autonomous political entities having no will to submit the state authority. Therefore, 
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being tribal communities and threatening the political integrity of the empire, they 
were portrayed in the official documentation as people “living in a state of nomadism 
and savagery (hâl-i vahşet ve bedeviyetde yaşarlar).”408 Thus, the main purpose of 
the state was to transform them into reliable members and fundamental elements of 
the society. Another example of this practice can be detected in the discourse of the 
official documentation regarding the local Syrian population, which was thought to 
be under the threatening influence of Protestant missionaries. It was “when 
Protestant missionaries became active among the Christian population of the Vilayet 
of Syria, the [local] people were again seen as ‘simple people who can not tell good 
from ill and are having their believes poisoned’ by evil elements” or profoundly 
against the Shi’i threat, they blamed the Shi’i missionaries as “perturbing the minds 
of the people (tahdîş-i efkâr).”409 
 
7.2 The Ottoman Treatment of Shi’is 
The Ottoman treatment of Shi’is differed from the Ottoman official discourse 
on Shi’ism. The foremost fear of the Ottoman officials in taking pre-emptive 
measures against the spread of Shi’ism was the probability of facing political 
problems in the near future.410 As has been argued in previous chapters, both the 
perception of the spread of Shi’ism and the counter-propaganda of promoting Sunni 
education to check this spread were considered by the Ottoman officials as a political 
necessity411 rather than being a theological obligation. It is also discernable in the 
Ottoman official documentation that the concern of the Ottoman officials regarding 
the conversions to Shi’ism emerged when changing the sectarian affiliations meant 
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the alteration of the political loyalties and commitments to the Ottoman Sultan. In 
other words, reception of Shi’ism was perceived by the Ottoman officials as 
dangerous for maintaining the loyalties of the subjects to the state.412 Although the 
Ottoman officials employed exclusively an abusive discourse on Shi’ism and the 
Shi’i missionaries, politically they adopted a modest manner and treated their Shi’i 
subjects in an accepting way. In this context, being a Shi’i Ottoman subject slightly 
differed from being a Sunni Ottoman; however being a Shi’i Iranian or Indian subject 
was quite another matter. 
Despite the abusive discourse on Shi’ism in religious terms and despite the 
certain cases of maltreatment against Shi’is inhabiting in the Iraqi region, Ottoman 
authorities considered the Shi’i presence, in general, as an essential component of the 
regional politics. The Ottoman authorities appointed Shi’is to their administrative 
offices, yet, ensured that a Shi’i officer was not appointed to the governorship of a 
town whose inhabitants were mostly Sunnis.413 Similarly, Ottoman authorities 
appointed Mehmet Bey, a Yezidi chief, to the post of mirimiranlık in 1892.414 The 
official documentation mentions another appointment, that of Resul Efendi to the 
post of Kazimiye Kaimmakamlığı, although he was a Shi’i.415 Moreover, the Ottoman 
authorities appointed Bektashis to their official posts. Ali Rıza Pasha was “a member 
of [the] Bektashi order, which honored the twelve Imams”416 who was appointed as 
an Ottoman official. Mirza Pasha, the chief of the Yezidis, for instance, requested 
support from the Ottoman troops against Küçük Mirza, who became popular in his 
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resistance in the highlands and thus began to collect taxes from his co-believers. In 
other words, a Yezidi chief consulted to the Ottoman authorities to overthrow the 
rival chief in order to keep his position.417 Therefore, the politics in the historical 
context of nineteenth century Iraq was functioning not on sectarian lines but rather 
on hegemonic power relations. 
In this regard, Ottoman engagement in Shi’i mujtahids in the Iraqi region 
deserves special attention. Indeed, there is a two-fold tendency in the literature 
concerning the position of Shi’i mujtahids. One group of historians has claimed that 
Shi’i mujtahids in Iraq were independent actors representing the government officials 
as people who attempted to gain the support of these Shi’i mujtahids in order to have 
a free hand in establishing political control over a considerable majority of people 
living in Iraq. Another group of historians has claimed that mujtahids were not self-
governing and autonomous actors in the region. They rather looked for the support of 
the Iranian Shahs or the British officials in the region to defend themselves against 
Ottoman oppression. Meir Litvak, for instance, agreeing with the second group 
argues that, “Being Shi’is under a hostile Sunni rule, the ‘ulema’ were often in need 
of Iranian and British patronage against oppressive measures imposed from 
Baghdad.”418 Furthermore, Litvak presumes an unyielding antagonistic relation 
between the Shi’i ulema and the Sunni Ottoman government of Iraq. Litvak states:  
The population and the ‘ulema’ in particular, did not regard the Ottoman 
government as legitimate and felt no alliance to it. Moreover, the ‘ulema’ had 
good reasons to fear Ottoman control over the town as it could (and in fact 
did) lead to restrictions on Shi’ism and the ‘Ulema’s freedom of action.419 
 
Indeed, Shi’i mujtahids were not solely accredited to certain governmental 
authorities. However, they were able to build relationships with several governments. 
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They established both official and unofficial connections with Russian, British, 
Ottoman, and the Iranian governments. Regardless of their political status and 
affiliations, mujtahids were among the primary and de facto powerful actors in the 
Iraqi region in the late nineteenth century. Any state policy could not be achieved 
without calculating their presence, intentions, and, moreover, their consent. Thus, the 
Ottoman, Iranian, British, and Russian governments were competing with each other, 
to gain the favor of these Shi’i religious notables in the Iraqi region. However, the 
Ottoman policy, in this regard, differed from the other governments since the 
Ottoman authorities did not have a consistent policy in establishing relationships 
with the Shi’i ulema residing in the Iraqi region. The Ottoman officials carried out a 
bilateral policy, that of both breaking the influence of Shi’is through promoting 
Sunnism and cooperating with them on local as well as international matters. 
The Ottoman authorities thought that mujtahids were capable enough in 
persuading the Iranian Shahs to make their demands accepted through their ability to 
rise up the Iranian Shi’i masses in less than twenty-four hours.420 The power of the 
Shi’i mujtahids led the Ottoman Sadrazam to assume that “the position of mujtahids 
in Usuli Shi’ism was equal to the position of Pope in Christianity or having more 
power than what the Pope actually exercised.”421 Ottoman officials thought that 
performing the ceremonies of marriage, divorce, and inheritance depended on the 
will and decision of the Shi’i mujtahids. Furthermore, they thought that these 
mujtahids had the power to abolish and legalize things as they wished. In addition, 
they had the right to collect the alms and khums (an Islamic tax meaning one-fifth of 
a persons’ annual wealth collected by Shi’i mujtahids) to redistribute to whomever 
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needed them from the poor to those traveling, however, at the expense of the 
governmental taxes.422 
These Shi’i mujtahids were envisaged by the Ottoman authorities as 
independent actors having no fear of dismissal or will of appointment due to their 
positions of not being state officials. Instead, these mujtahids rose to power through 
personal fame and charisma attained before the public opinion. The Ottoman 
officials considered that, “People think the Shi’i mujtahids as the true representatives 
of the Twelfth Imam given that they are accepted the true interpreters of his 
words.”423 In the Ottoman official documentation, as an example of the Ottoman 
perception of the enormous power of the Shi’i mujtahids in the Iraqi region, the 
Iranian Shahs were depicted as persons visiting the Shi’i mujtahids and kissing their 
hands as demonstration of respect. However, the Ottoman authorities hoped that 
since most of the Shi’i mujtahids were Arabs subjects of the Ottoman Empire, these 
mujtahids would cooperate with the Ottoman government rather than with the Iranian 
government.424 The Ottoman officials believed that these mujtahids would favor 
Ottoman rule, which was thought by the Ottomans themselves as “righteous and 
reasonable” when compared to Iranian rule. The government officials thought that if 
they could obtain the support of these mujtahids, then they would easily control Iran 
or intervene in its affairs. To this end, the Ottoman officials sent gifts to the tombs of 
the Twelve Shi’i Imams and repaired the shrines whether in the borders of the 
Ottoman Empire or beyond its boundaries.425 
The rapprochement efforts to establish an Islamic unity between the Ottoman 
and Persian governments and among the Muslims of diverse communities and beliefs 
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also provided grounds for communication between the Shi’i mujtahids and the 
Ottoman government.426 Discussions among the Ottoman intellectuals concerning the 
applicability and the range of Pan-Islamism were thought to have included the Shi’i 
ulema for their success in missionary activities and ability in preaching.427 Thus, one 
of the primary aims of the Pan-Islamist policy came to build up relationships with the 
Shi’i mujtahids.428 The Pan-Islamic policy was successful in bringing the Shi’is and 
Sunnis together under the symbolic leadership of the Ottoman Sultan, for instance, 
during the reactions against the Italian invasion of Libya.429 Moreover, although the 
British mediation of channeling large sums of money (Oudh Bequest) flowing from 
India to the Shi’i shrines of Najaf and Karbala could be an influential source of 
political hegemony in acquiring the goodwill of the Shi’i ulema, the attempts of the 
British government to manipulate the Shi’i ulema to rise against the Ottoman army 
during World War I failed.430 In the following decades, the Ottoman government 
needed the political power of Islamic unity; thus, the Ottoman authorities even 
demanded the appointment of Shi’i scholars to Sunni medreses.431  
The Shi’i ulema were regarded by the Ottoman authorities as nearly as equal 
with other notables of the Iraqi region as long as these ulema had estimable political 
power. Thus, the Ottoman authorities established ad hoc alliances with the Shi’i 
mujtahids since these mujtahids possessed an overwhelming power in regional 
politics. When the Ottoman Russian War of 1877-78 was going on, a disturbance at 
Karbala broke out. On 11 August 1877, Nixon, the British Council General at 
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Baghdad, solicited from Sayyid Ali Bahr-al-Ulum, a Shi’i Müjtehid of Najaf, to deal 
with the disturbances taking place in Najaf. In his letter to the mujtahid, Nixon 
addressed him as his “dear friend.” At about the same time, Miralay Hacı Bey, the 
Commandant of the Ottoman Troops, asked Sayyid Ali Bahr-al-Ulum for help in 
suppressing the disturbances. Indeed, the disturbance was one of the customary 
skirmishes occurring in rare frequencies between the two tribes of Najaf, the Zugurd 
and the Shumurd, or between the tribes and the Ottoman troops. Sayyid Ali Bahr-al-
Ulum was depicted in the official documentation as a powerful Shi’i religious 
notable who was always willing to put an end to such disturbances using his best 
efforts. Thus, having the consent of the Ottoman authorities and the British 
representative, Sayyid Ali Bahr-al-Ulum intervened in the disturbances and 
succeeded in the submission of the rebels to Ottoman authorities.432 
Sayyid Ali Bahr-al-Ulum solved the problem in a very traditional way, that of 
summoning a meeting between the ulema, elders, and the chiefs of the Hindiyya 
Arabs in order to establish a commission-like party to communicate with the rebels. 
Sayyid Ali Bahr-al-Ulum convinced the rebels, and then the events followed a usual, 
nearly customary, way of submission. Nixon stated: 
This [commission-like] party brought the rebels into Najaf to pray for mercy, 
exhibiting on their person the marks indicative of submission usual to Arabs, 
that is, their heads uncovered and the rope-like tie of the head led down round 
their necks accompanied with resentful expression and prayers for pardon. 
They were thus conducted to the Barracks and made to fall upon the hands 
and feet of their Meer Alai, and the Ulema begged pardon for them, which the 
Meer Alai granted and gave them leave to go. Thus, tranquility was restored 
to the inhabitants of the town, and thank God everything is now quiet.433   
 
It seems clear that the local Ottoman government gave Sayyid Ali Bahr-al-
Ulum an important role and recognized him as an intermediary between the rebels 
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and the Ottoman government. Hence, the government officials recognized the Shi’i 
mujtahid as no different from any other religious or political notables of the town. 
The event is especially important for demonstrating the decisive influence of a 
mujtahid concerning a political dispute. Nevertheless, it is necessary to keep in mind 
that it was a relation built up by a local government agency that might have differed 
from the view of the central government. In addition, the British policy to keep the 
Ottoman Empire integrated during its war with Russia is beyond question. Therefore, 
there are two seemingly contradictory processes taking place concurrently: first, the 
continual struggle to decrease the power of the Shi’i religious notables; second, 
entering into alliances with, and cooperating with, these Shi’i religious notables. 
Azmi Özcan and Cezmi Eraslan have argued that the Hamidian government 
adopted a lenient and consistent policy concerning the Shi’is living in the Ottoman 
territories.434 However, the situation was much more complex. The Ottoman officials 
did not have a consistent policy to deal with the Shi’i ulema and the non-Ottoman 
Shi’is inhabiting the Iraqi region. They sometimes favored the Shi’i mujtahids and 
sometimes the Shi’i ordinary men. An example of this inconsistency can be seen in 
the report of Muhammed Arif Bey, Ottoman envoy to Tehran. As a precaution to the 
increasing power of mujtahids, Muhammad Arif Bey offered the deportation of some 
Shi’i mujtahids who had acted on the contrary to the interests of the Ottoman 
government. However, the same Muhammed Arif Bey confessed that Shi’ism would 
endure in Baghdad; therefore, the Ottoman government should have undertaken the 
responsibility of Iranian Shi’is who were thought to be potentially dangerous against 
the Iranian government. To this end, he suggested that when an Iranian subject 
consulted with the Iranian Consulate in Iraq, the local Ottoman government should 
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retard the process. On the contrary, when an Iranian subject consulted with the local 
Ottoman authorities, his request should be replied as soon as possible. Thus, the 
Ottoman authorities anticipated to gain the favour of the Iranian subjects whose 
numbers were considerable in the Iraqi region and to break the influence of the 
Iranian government.435 On the one hand, the Samarra incident displayed the 
maltreatment of non-Ottoman Shi’is, and on the other, the Pan-Islamist policies and 
the advice of Muhammad Arif Bey that was suggested to attract these non-Ottoman 
Shi’i subjects. 
Contrary to the view, which drew the Shi’i mujtahids in constant struggle 
with the Ottoman authorities, the case of Shaykh Caferzâde Ali Efendi represents 
another good example. He was a Shi’i mujtahid of Najaf residing in Baghdad, 
presented his obedience to the Ottoman Sultan. He introduced himself as an 
important Shi’i mujtahid whose power was extensive in the Baghdad province. In his 
letter to the Sultan, he provided information about the British designs on tribes 
inhabiting the areas around Najaf. He believed that the solution to prevent the foreign 
intrigues was to provide “the unity of sects” (tevhîd-i mezheb) through rendering all 
of them Sunnis. Interestingly enough, Shaykh Caferzâde Ali was a Shi’i mujtahid but 
demanded the conversion of Shi’is to Sunnism. In return for his obedience to the 
Ottoman Sultan, the shaykh expected his grace and favor.436 Indeed, it was the 
second letter of Shaykh Caferzâde Ali Effendi to the Porte. One month earlier, he 
had written about the land previously belonging to him that had been taken by the 
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Ottoman authorities. Then he complained about the financial deficiency in sustaining 
education in his tekke and medrese after the lands were taken from him. He asked for 
financial aid as to receive in the sum of 1,500 kuruş monthly. The shaykh expressed 
that his father had followed the same manner of submitting to submitting the 
Ottoman authorities. Then he asked why the lands had been taken from his 
possession.437 Shaykh Caferzâde Ali Efendi was a Shi’i scholar who presented his 
obedience to the Ottoman Sultan and tried to get along with the Ottomans in order to 
regain the financial resources recently confiscated by the Ottoman government.  
There are two other points, which exceed the limits of this study; however, 
needed to be emphasized here briefly: first, the inconsistency in the relations between 
the central and local governments concerning the treatment of local people; second, 
the tendency of the Ottoman officials to treat different unorthodox religious sects 
differently. The demands of the central government and the practice of the local 
rulers were not always in congruence with each other. When the Yezidi chiefs 
rebelled in around 1893, the central government favored taking lenient measures 
against the rebelling dissident Yezidis. Thus, the local Ottoman officials were 
suggested to end their surrender without bloodshed. The central government 
highlighted that the rebels should have been “dispersed without spilling blood, and 
only to resort to force if (the Ottoman troops) were fired upon.” However, the 
commission report concerning the rebellion was scandalous informing that, “Some 
twenty Yezidis had presented themselves before it with the grisly evidence of seven 
severed heads, which they claimed had belonged to men slaughtered by Asım Bey’s 
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forces.”438 In addition to this, the Ottoman authorities tended to make a 
differentiation between diverse non-Sunni Islamic communities. The official 
documentation reveals that the Ottoman authorities treated Yezidis and Shi’is 
differently. They were more likely to use force against the Yezidis, while unlikely to 
use force against the Shi’is. Shi’ism, in the views of Ottoman officials, although was 
a deviation from the “true” path of Islam, was still keeping the basic tenets of Islam 
such as the holistic unity of God, Qur’an, prophethood, and Qıble.439 
To sum up, the Ottoman treatment of the Shi’is differed from the Ottoman 
official discourse on Shi’ism. On the theological level, Ottoman authorities were 
very adamant regarding the theoretical acceptability and justifiability of the Shi’i 
creed. Moreover, they generated an abusive discourse against Shi’ism and against the 
Shi’i missionaries in their official documentation. However, their treatment of the 
Shi’is was quite lenient compared to their discourse. On the level of politics, the 
situation was much more complex since the Ottoman authorities appointed Shi’is, 
Yezidis, and Bektaşis to their administrative offices at the same time as when they 
attempted to utilize Sunnism as an efficient tool of centralization and to run counter 
propaganda against diverse sectarian communities. The Shi’i presence was not 
regarded as dangerous for the Ottomans, yet mainly the activities of the Shi’i ulema 
coming from Iran were thought to be serving the interest of the Persian government. 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
The major feature regarding the socio-political history of the Middle Eastern 
societies was the bilateral process of the homogenization of society and of the 
consolidation of organized social movements followed by a process of politicization. 
The Tanzimat reforms’ persistent policy of centralization achieved not the settlement 
but the dislocation of large tribal confederations. Thus, the increasing governmental 
pressure upon the decentralizing elements intensified the internal homogeneity of the 
tribal and nomadic communities. Therefore, the dominant process in the Iraqi region 
was the homogenization of diverse segments of society while coming under the 
direct control of central administrations and embracing overarching identities. The 
entire complexity of this process gave rise to the resurgence of religious political 
activism. Shi’ism, in this regard, was not an exception. The triumph of Usulism at 
the expense of the Akhbari interpretation of Shi’i jurisprudence through the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries founded and indicated the rise of Shi’i 
politics. Following the triumph of Usulism, there appeared a strong tendency towards 
the formation of a central and functional Shi’i religious hierarchy depending on the 
teachings of the leading Shi’i scholars. Thus, the internal consolidation of the Shi’i 
hierocracy granted considerable potential to the Shi’i religious organizations and 
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proliferated the authority of the mujtahids over significant numbers of people. 
Thereafter, these masses began to be greatly influenced by the mujtahids regarding 
both worldly and divine affairs. 
As a modern phenomenon, the influence of religion considerably increased 
throughout the nineteenth century. The sectarian affiliations played a significant role 
in shaping mostly the political relationships between state and society throughout the 
Middle Eastern history. Various social movements carried religious motives and 
incorporated large numbers of the population from both the lower and upper 
segments of society. The Mahdi Rising in Egypt, Babi Movement in Iran, the 
conversion of Oman’s subjects from the Khodja Sect to Twelver Shi’ism, the 
Dreyfus Affair, accelerating Christian missionary activities and the Zionist 
Movement all shared the same historical framework with the rise of Shi’i politics in 
Iraq as well as the Hamidian policy of Pan-Islamism. The rise of Shi’i politics and 
the subsequent precaution of the Ottoman authorities contributed to the process 
social homogenization and consolidation. On the one hand, the increasing political 
activism of the Shi’i mujtahids mobilized Shi’i masses to achieve certain political 
ends. On the other hand, the Ottoman officials perceived the growing influence of 
Shi’ism as a serious political threat and carried out educational counter-propaganda 
of indoctrinating Sunnism to increase piety among local people. Thus, the 
competition between the state-sponsored Sunnism and the self-reliant Shi’ism helped 
to broaden the scope of religious influence as well as the governmental authority 
over the masses. In other words, both the Ottoman government and the Shi’i ulema 
attempted to increase religiosity among people who in return devoutly submitted to 
the higher authority, whether it be the Shi’i ulema or the Ottoman Sultan who 
defended. 
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The spread of Shi’i influence over the tribal populations in the Iraqi region 
had a limited impact. The Shi’i missionary actors, particularly the akhunds, first 
accredited to nomadic groups and then achieved recognition among the tribesman by 
way of issuing marriage contracts and fulfilling similar less important judicial 
functions. However, since the nomadic people were driven more by their customs 
and traditions than the rules of the Sharia, the spread achieved the nominal reception 
of certain Shi’i traditions and rituals. Moreover, contemporary research indicates that 
the tribal identities and affiliations were quite strong and continued for a 
considerable length of time. However, the striking feature of the penetration of 
Shi’ism into the tribal communities was its affect in redressing the vision of tribal 
politics through instilling the anti-governmental sentiments into the tribal politics. 
Thus, the already antagonistic relations between the tribal communities and the 
Ottoman government acquired a special dimension. The Shi’i political culture of 
protest and disobedience to any form of political authority provided the tribal 
populations with a consistent and systematic reason for political resistance. The 
increasing political power of the Shi’i mujtahids promoted and sanctioned the idea of 
collective sectarian resistance amongst the sedentary Shi’i population. Nevertheless, 
it is important to note that the Shi’i sectarian affiliations did not directly lead Shi’is 
into a continuous anti-governmental resistance; instead, it formed the idea of 
“collective resistance” around the identity of Shi’ism. In addition, the Shi’i 
antagonism was not directed against its Sunni brethren but primarily and concertedly 
against the dominant political authority of Ottoman authority and against the 
communal groups accredited with this political authority. 
As the official defenders of competing denominations, the Ottoman and 
Iranian authorities had long struggled over the Iraqi region, which remained in the 
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sphere of influence of both governments. Thus, the Ottoman officials perceived the 
centuries-old Shi’i presence in the Iraqi region to be connected to the political 
ambitions of the Iranian governments, formulating a bureaucratic mentality of 
enduring conflict with Iran. The traditional perception that accepted the Shi’i 
presence in the Iraqi region as an implication of imperial conflict between the two 
sides of the Iraqi frontier began to change in the second half of the nineteenth 
century. Particularly the Hamidian regime represented a breakthrough in altering the 
traditional perception of “external threat” and the Shi’i Question emerged. The 
political ambitions of the Persian government were still the main motive in 
increasing the Ottoman apprehension; however, the attention of the Ottoman officials 
was drawn from an external to a mostly independent and internal threat. Both the 
sectarian policies and the activities of the Shi’i ulema in the Iraqi region became 
more precariously subjected to international politics. Accordingly, the Ottoman 
central government identified the Shi’i presence in the Iraqi region as a regional 
problem, placing it into the greater framework of the Persian Gulf politics. The 
religious affiliations of the subjects were among the primary reasons for constant 
struggles between the Ottoman and Persian Empires. Thus, Iranians were involved in 
the sectarian attachments of the Iraqi Shi’is whereas the Ottomans carefully 
monitored the circumstances relevant to the Sunni Iranian subjects. 
Going back at least to the 1860s, the incessantly increasing reports on the 
spread of Shi’ism escalated the anxiety of the Ottoman officials. Although it was not 
primarily the spread of Shi’ism but mostly the increase of Shi’i sectarian influence 
through the agency of Shi’i mujtahids, the Ottoman authorities identified the process 
with the rapid spread of Shi’ism to the very segments of society however mainly 
inhabiting the countryside. Thus, the Ottoman officials were convinced to take 
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necessary measures against this spread and launched a systematic counter-
propaganda campaign, whose focal point carried a peculiar characteristic, that of 
being pre-emptive. Although the fear of the Shi’i threat strongly existed, the Ottoman 
official documentation never referenced an actual Shi’i threat. It existed rather 
potentially and was expected in the near future. The Ottoman government adopted 
lenient policies in dealing with the Shi’i Question and chiefly preferred 
disseminating Sunni education at the expense of Shi’i propagation. The major 
reasons behind the implementation of educational counter-propaganda were the high 
degree of optimism in the transformative power of education, the conjectural 
political necessities of managing the customary ongoing tribal warfare, the official 
identification of the principal characteristic of the Shi’i threat with a potential for a 
future problem, and the reluctance to enforce a certain faith due to religious reasons. 
Nevertheless, due to the financial deficiency and the lack of educated Sunni scholars, 
the educational counter-propaganda faced failure even in the early phases of its 
implementation. Thus, the Ottoman authorities renounced this policy. 
During the course of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman officials developed 
a two-dimensional view regarding both the Shi’ism and the Shi’is of Iraq. As for the 
ideological dimension, Ottoman authorities perceived Shi’ism as a theological 
deviation from the true path of Islam, thus a heretic belief whose followers could not 
be trusted anymore. In terms of the historical dimension, the Ottoman officials 
recognized the Shi’is of Iraq as being similar to those of other local figures who 
made up the Iraqi population, however, connected to the political ambitions of the 
Persian governments. Particularly, the Shi’is of diverse subjects inhabiting Iraq, if 
not unruly people acting for their own interests, were perceived by the Ottoman 
authorities as actors of both local and international politics. Thus, the major target of 
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the Ottoman officials was not the Shi’i Ottoman subjects, but the Shi’is of foreign 
origins, as it was the case in the Ottoman policy of reacquisition of lands in Iraq or in 
the Samarra Incident. Although the Ottoman authorities used exclusively an abusive 
discourse in their official documentation against the Shi’ism as a branch of theology, 
they treated Shi’is and people of other sectarian affiliations in an accepting manner. 
The government authorities even appointed Shi’is, Yezidis, and Bektaşis to the 
administrative offices. Furthermore, the Ottoman officials tended to make a 
differentiation in treatment between Yezidis and Shi’is, and between non-Ottoman 
and Ottoman subjects. The Ottoman officials also established relationships with the 
Shi’i ulema in the Iraqi region, sometimes even accepting their role as mediators or 
sometimes directly colluding with them as in the case of the Pan-Islamic policy. 
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FO (Foreign Office, British National Archives, Kew Gardens, Great Britain) 
 
95/1030  55, (8 August 1874) 
 
195/1142  127, (29 October 1879); 31, (11 August 1877); 33, (14 July 
1877); 36, (17 July 1877); 36, (22 September 1877). 
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November 1882) 
 
195/1841  210/23, (21 April 1894); 237/24, (28 April 1894); 242/25,        
(9 May 1894); 281/33, (23 May 1894); 273/32, (7 March 
1894). 
 
195/2020  214/30, (11 May 1898). 
 
195/2116   304/34, (1 August 1902). 
 
195/2164   917/70, (5 November 1904). 
 
195/2214  230/24, (17 February 1906); 464/43, (17 May 1906). 
 
195/2242   19, (8 March 1907). 
 
195/2338   97/4, (31 January 1910). 
 
195/2340  878/51, (12 September 1910). 
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195/2368  19, (14 April 1911). 
 
424/183   476, (16 July 1895). 
 
602/40   345, (21 November 1879); 39, (9 February 1879). 
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